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- Chapter 1 -
Introduction
Hall and Jorgenson (1969) open their seminal model of corporate taxation stating that
“businessmen in pursuit of gain will find the purchase of capital goods more attractive
if they cost less”. When capital is mobile and heterogeneous, an increase of corporate
tax rates rises the pre-tax return of capital and induces the “businessmen” to reduce the
volume of investments. This explains why the literature on corporate income taxation
and investment focuses on the impact of corporate tax policies on capital stock accumu-
lation: a change in corporate taxes can induce a change in the volume of capital stock,
or a shift of capital stock toward different types of investment, and less tax-costly lo-
cations. The arguments advanced by the corporate tax competition literature directly
follow: as showed in the seminal works of Wilson (1986) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski
(1986), countries tend to compete over capital income tax rates, in order to reduce the
cost of domestic capital and attract larger volumes of investments. This “race to the
bottom” induces the competing countries to lower their taxes to the point of causing a
loss of revenue. When public goods and services are financed by capital income taxes, the
loss of revenue translates into underprovision of public goods and services, and possibly
into a reduction of welfare, which explains the concern of governments to identify policies
of “harmful” tax competition.
During economic stagnation, the interest of policy makers might shift on designing
instruments that enhance the profitability of domestic firms. They might see in the de-
velopment and and internationalization of domestic firms an effective channel for growth.
The arguments advanced by the literature on corporate tax competition can then be as-
sessed under a different light, that focuses on the effect of corporate tax changes on the
investment decision of domestic firms, rather than on the decision of foreign firm to invest
in the home country. The first paper presented in this Thesis investigates how home
corporate taxes affect the initial decision of a firm to undertake investment projects, such
as cross-border merger or acquisitions (M&As). Drawing from the “new” new interna-
1
2tional trade literature, corporate taxes are introduced in a model where heterogeneous
firms make the decision to expand by undertaking domestic and cross-border acquisitions.
The model permits the derivation of three predictions on the effect of corporate taxes on
firms’ expansion decisions. When M&A are associated with high fixed costs, (1) higher
home corporate taxes make cross-border acquisitions relatively cheaper than the implicit
alternative of serving foreign market through exports; (2) the adoption of reliefs on double
taxation of foreign profit in the form of deduction also makes cross-border acquisitions
relatively cheaper; (3) but none of the above affects the likelihood of making domestic
acquisitions. The first two predictions are consistent with the literature on corporate tax
competition, which suggests that firms relocate production abroad, in response to rises
in home corporate taxes. A dynamic random parameter probit model is used to test the
predictions of the theoretical model, and a firm-level dataset that follows the pattern of all
ownership changes that occurred between 2005 and 2010 for a sample of 29,000 large Eu-
ropean companies is constructed to this purpose. Results from the empirical investigation
show that “established” multinationals are the most likely to undertake M&As. Results
also show that, when domestic firms expand, they are more likely than multinationals to
make consecutive acquisitions in subsequent years. More importantly, the effect of home
corporate taxes differs across firms and expansions types. The predictions of the theoret-
ical model hold only for multinational parent firms. Domestic parent firms react in the
opposite way: a rise in home corporate taxes negatively affects their ability to undertake
a cross-border acquisition and subsequently evolve into multinational organisations, but
it has a positive effect on the probability that these firms expand local production (via
the acquisition of a domestic subsidiary). As a result, Domestic policies whose goal is to
discourage multinationals headquartered in the home country from acquiring additional
foreign subsidiaries (and possibly exploit new profit shifting channels), can use corporate
taxes as an instrument to encourage the internationalization of domestic firms.
The second paper presented in this Thesis uses firm-level data to investigate the im-
pact of taxes on the international location of targets in M&A. In principle, a higher tax
rate in the target’s country could make an acquisition there more likely, less likely, or
have no effect at all. Particular attention is dedicated to explain the possible motives
behind an observed acquisition. The parent firm can choose to expand in order to fulfil
efficiency motives, or rather strategy motives. Efficiency motives can justify five different
predictions for the effect of taxes levied in the target’s country. When the parent firm
intends to expand in order to transfer its branding to the target firm and increase revenue,
higher taxes in the target’s country negatively affect the expansion decision; but when the
parent firm intends to expand in order to transfer its technology to the target and reduce
production costs, then higher capital allowances in the target’s country positively affect
the expansion decision. This second effect should hold also when parent firms intend to
3undertake vertical acquisitions meant to transfer production to low-cost locations. When
the acquirer intends to purchase the ownership of a target for the sole purpose of shifting
profit and reduce tax-costs, then the difference between home and foreign tax rates is
relevant for the investment decision. Finally, if the parent firm intends to gain efficiency
by increasing its scale of production, then it will compare the share of profit that would
be paid in taxes in the possible alternative location, and the effective average tax rate
(EATR) should represent the relevant tax measure. When the parent firm is moved by a
strategic motive, and intends to simply acquire a competitor to gain control of a larger
share of the market, then the more attractive target firms will be those residing in the
countries that apply higher tax rates. Financial and ownership data for companies in OR-
BIS in 2005 are combined with domestic and cross-border acquisitions data in ZEPHYR,
for the period between 2006 and 2008. A random parameters form of mixed logit model
is then estimated to test the various predictions. Results show that the statutory tax
rate in the target country has a negative impact on the probability of an acquisition in
that country, with an average elasticity of around 1. The size of the effect differs (i)
between acquirers that were multinational or domestic in 2005; (ii) between domestic and
cross-border acquisitions; and (iii) depending on whether the acquirer’s country has a
worldwide or territorial tax system.
The papers presented in this Thesis focus on two aspects of firms discrete investment
decisions. Parent firms have to choose whether to maintain their status quo or rather
expand their ownership structure by acquiring the controlling share of other pre-existing
firms. If they decide to expand, they have to choose what is the most desirable location for
the acquisition targets. In both papers, the empirical analysis relies upon an attentively
built dataset, that follows the pattern of Ownership Structure changes due to all Merger
and Acquisition transactions (M&As) undertaken during a fix period of time. The final
chapter of this thesis explains the methodology followed to build the dataset.
- Chapter 2 -
Corporate Taxes and the Growth of the Firm
§ 2.1 Introduction
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) inflows are of strategic importance for countries that
expect capital investment to bring positive spillovers and boost economic growth. The
public economics debate on international tax competition has widely studied the policy
instruments available to attract these investments, particularly with regard to resources
employed by multinational companies (MNCs). The general suggestion being that volume
and location of capital are negatively affected by the host country marginal and average
corporate tax rates, respectively. The expansion of domestic companies and their diversi-
fication into foreign markets represents a second channel for growth. A channel that could
prove particularly suitable in a situation of economic stagnation and financial uncertainty.
With a specific interest into capital taxation, this paper investigates how home corporate
taxes affect the initial decision of domestic firms to undertake investment projects such as
cross-border Merger and Acquisitions (M&As), and through them eventually grow into a
multinational organisation.
The latest World Investment Report (UNCTAD (2012)) stresses how the rise of FDI
outflows from the EU that touched its peak in 2007 was driven by cross-border M&As,
and how the financial crisis caused this trend to revert into a steep fall. In 2011, outflows
from developed countries reached levels comparable to the pre-crisis average of 2005-2007
(see Figure 2.1), but this renewed growth was originated mainly from the United States
and Japan. Europe remains behind the World trend, excluding the few countries that
witnessed a rise in FDI, such as the UK, Sweden and Denmark. Netherlands and Italy
had their outflows fall by half in 2011 as compared to the previous year. In the same
period, Germany and Spain had theirs reduced by no less than thirty and forty per cent.
The World Investment Report draws particular attention to how future policies should
frame the liberalisation of investment into a quest for growth:
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A “new generation” of investment policies is emerging ... with simultaneous
moves to further liberalise investment regimes and promote foreign investment,
on the one hand, and to regulate investment in pursuit of public policy objec-
tives, on the other. These policies are characterised by a shared recognition
of the need to promote responsible investment as a cornerstone of economic
growth. . . . “New generation” investment policies increasingly incorporate tar-
geted objectives to channel investment to areas key for economic or industrial
development and for the build-up, maintenance and improvement of productive
capacity and international competitiveness
In the recession climate generated by the European sovereign debt crisis it is im-
portant to understand whether corporate taxes constitute an instrument for supporting
the growth of domestic firms. In keeping with the well-known result of the “new” new
trade theory, firms that break into foreign markets are characterised by productivity levels
higher than those of firms who confine to their domestic borders. Policymakers should
have an interest in designing incentives for these domestic companies to start serving the
international demand, while maintaining their headquarters within domestic borders.
This paper departs from the international trade literature, to introduce corporate taxes
in a model that describes the discrete choice of heterogeneous firms who intend to expand
their production through domestic and cross-border M&As. Three propositions are de-
rived from the model: (1) a raise in Home corporate taxes increases the probability that
highly productive firms expand into foreign markets through cross-border acquisitions;
(2) the application of a Tax Credit, as form of relief from international double taxation,
negatively affects the probability that firms choose to serve the foreign market through a
cross-border M&A; and (3) a raise in Home corporate taxes leaves the choice of making
a domestic acquisition unaffected, for multinational firms. A firm-level dataset is con-
structed using detailed accounts unconsolidated to the subsidiary level, for the purpose of
testing these three propositions. The dataset traces the pattern of corporate expansions
followed by a sample of 29,000 European companies over a period of 6 years (2005-2010).
It allows to estimate a model for the discrete choice of making a M&A, while paying
particular attention to the way home corporate taxes affect such choices.
This paper extends on the existing literature in several ways. First, the proposed
theoretical framework explicitly models the role of corporate taxes on the expansion of
heterogeneous firms, following the literature initiated by Melitz (2003). Corporate taxes
are introduced in a simplified version of the model by Helpman et al. (2003) to describe
the mechanism driving both domestic and cross-border M&As. In the proposed model,
acquisitions are associated with high fixed costs that are fully deductible. Under these
conditions, a raise in home corporate taxes does not affect the probability that a firm
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expands its activity by acquiring domestic subsidiaries, but it affects the probability that
the same firm expands its activity by serving the foreign market through the acquisition
of foreign subsidiaries. An increase in home corporate taxes raises the marginal cost sav-
ings from acquiring foreign subsidiaries rather than doing exports (the implicit alternative
entry mode), so firms are more likely to choose serving foreign demand by relocating pro-
duction abroad.
Second, firms heterogeneity plays a central role in understanding the way corporate
taxes affect firms’ investment decision. There is a tendency in the empirical literature on
international corporate taxation to concentrate exclusively on multinational companies1,
so one of the main goal of this paper is to show that the expansion pattern of domestic
firms is very different from that of multinationals. The dataset used in the empirical
analysis constitutes a special feature of this paper. It combines two commercial databases
provided by the Bureau Van Dijk, named ORBIS and ZEPHYR, to follow the ownership
structure changes occurred to a sample of circa 29,000 Global Ultimate Owners (GUO)
located in Europe. When a GUO itself or any of its subsidiaries (up to the tenth level)
acquire the majority share of a pre-existing firm, the acquired target is added to the
structure of the GUO and removed from that of the seller. This process guarantees per-
fect identification of the mode of expansion as an M&A and precise reconstruction of all
changes occurred to a given company. It also allows to identify three different “types”
of large firms: established multinational companies, large domestic companies (whose
subsidiaries are all domestically located) and standalone companies (who are constituted
only by their headquarter). The empirical evidence shows that multinational firms are
more likely to expand their structure by acquiring a new subsidiary. Non-multinational
firms do not expand as likely. However, the non-multinational firms that do expand have
a higher probability to start expanding in sub-sequent years, and recursively acquire new
subsidiaries. The empirical investigation then moves onto testing whether corporate taxes
affect all three “types” of firms in the way predicted by the theoretical model.
Finally, this paper empirically investigates the possibility that the expansion choice is
characterised by true state dependence. In particular, the empirical model allows to iden-
tify whether the M&As undertaken by the observed firms are single standing or rather are
part of a complex restructuring that involves consecutive acquisitions of several different
subsidiaries. The observation that non-multinationals are per se less likely to invest than
multinationals, could motivate a lack of interest into supporting the expansion of domes-
tic companies. However, showing that non-multinationals that begin expanding are to
1As Baldwin and Okubo (2009a) state, “the public policy debate on international tax competition has
long focused on large firms based on the premise that large firms are both the most likely to move in
response to tax differentials and the sort of firms that a nation would be least happy about losing”
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continue their expansion in several consecutive periods could motivate the promotion of
policies that support their development into multinational corporations. As expected, the
results show that the expansion choice is characterised by time dependence. In addition,
the time dependence is stronger for standalone firms, that, before the first expansions
are constituted only by their headquarter, rather than for firms with more sophisticated
ownership structures.
The results from this paper seem to suggest that policies intended to enhance firms
productivity should support the internationalization of simply structured firms. Home
corporate taxes are a potential instrument for such policies. In particular, they could be
used to support firms that undertake their first acquisition while choosing to maintain
their headquarter within the domestic borders, and distinguish them from broad multi-
national firms that continue to expand, possibly in an attempt to exploit profit shifting
opportunities.
Section 2.2 reviews the related literature. Section 2.3 presents the model for the firms
discrete choice of making an expansion. Section 2.4 describes the Data and shows key
descriptive statistics. Section 2.5 explains the empirical methodology, and section 2.6
presents the results. Section 2.7 concludes.
§ 2.2 Literature Review
During the last twenty years a growing body of literature has focused on the role played
by taxes in defining the volume and direction of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) 2. The
general result that lower tax jurisdictions guarantee higher post-tax returns has inspired
the literature on corporate tax competition, which predicted a race-to-the-bottom in set-
ting corporate tax rates among different countries (among others, see Ferrett (2005) and
Devereux et al. (2008)). Recently, the diffusion of firm-level data has allowed new studies
to overcome the limits of conducting analysis exclusively on aggregate FDI.
Three main aspects related to the taxation of capital have attracted particular atten-
tion. First, there has been a revision of the analysis on the direction of foreign direct
investments (FDI). A firm that is looking to make an investment follows some criteria to
choose one out of a number of mutually exclusive alternative locations, which are com-
pared also in terms of corporate tax legislation. Several empirical works estimate the role
and importance of differences among the tax systems of a number of countries that qualify
as potential investment destinations (see Devereux and Griffith (1998a), Buettner and Ruf
2Extensive surveys are Devereux (2007) and de Mooij and Ederveen (2008) and, more broadly on FDI
determinants, Blonigen (2005)
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(2007), Barrios et al. (2009) and Arulampalam et al. (2012)). The evidence brought by
this literature confirms the initial result of Devereux and Griffith (1998a): corporate taxes
affect the extensive margins of the investment project. Moreover, discrete decisions, such
as the one of comparing potential investment locations, depend, among other things, on
the effective average tax rate (EATR), which compares the various mutually exclusive al-
ternatives by measuring what portion of profit would be paid as taxes under each scenario.
Secondly, the topic of international double taxation. Corporate organisations consti-
tuted by subsidiaries located in different countries pay corporate taxes in each country
where profit is realised. The firm’s parent also pays additional home taxes upon repatri-
ation of the foreign profit. The parent’s domestic government can alleviate the burden
of double taxation in different ways. It can exempt the parent from domestic taxation
of the repatriated profit. It can offer deduction of the taxes already paid in the foreign
country. Or it can grant a credit for the taxes paid in the foreign country, so to bring
taxation of all profits to the same level. The literature has focused on how to attain tax
rules that are nationally and globally optimal 3. Desai and Hines (2003, 2004) argue that
the exemption system is optimal from a national point of view, because it reduces the
ownership distortions that would be caused by double taxation. But the literature on FDI
and, in particular, Greenfield Investments agrees on the fact that it is with the tax credit
system that global optimality is achieved. Huizinga and Voget (2009b) propose an em-
pirical investigation of the effect of different double taxation systems. With a particular
attention devoted to M&A investments, Devereux and Hubbard (2003) and Becker and
Fuest (2011) show how, in a theoretical model where capital is not limited to the domes-
tic supply, the exemption system can be shown to be both nationally and globally optimal.
Finally, the possibility of observing data on the activity of multinationals at the un-
consolidated level has allowed to study how corporate taxes influence the headquarters
decision to shift profit among subsidiaries so to minimise the costs related to tax pay-
ments. The literature focuses on the channels used to exploit profit shifting opportu-
nities: notably strategic allocation of over-head costs, intra firm financial transactions,
and transfer pricing. Early works, like Clausing (2003), look at the channel of transfer
pricing through intra firm trade. Dischinger (2007) use data similar to those of this paper
to provide empirical evidence of a general pattern of profit shifting outside of European
countries. Dischinger and Riedel (2007) give empirical support to the hypothesis that
the transfer pricing channel is particularly exploited by multinationals with high volume
of intangible assets. Dischinger and Riedel (2010) show how profit shifting opportunity
3Becker and Fuest (2011) define National optimality as prevailing “if investment decisions cannot be
changed without reducing national income” and Global optimality if “investment decisions cannot be
changed without reducing global income”
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due to differentials in home and foreign corporate tax rates are generally in favour of the
headquarters location, to finally generate a flow toward the parents home countries and
away from the high-tax subsidiary locations. Heckemeyer and Overesch (forthcoming)
present a meticulous meta-review of all the most recent empirical evidence on the topic.
One aspect arising from this framework, on which the entire literature seem to convey, is
that established multinationals are the most responsive to profit shifting opportunities.
The literature of international trade initiated by Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al.
(2003) provides a theoretical framework to study investment decisions of heterogenous
firms. It shows why more productive firms earn larger profit and it uses entry fixed costs
to explain the endogenous selection of the mass of expanding firms. Only sufficiently
productive firms will be able to serve the foreign demand. Among these, the most pro-
ductive will engage in merger and acquisitions (M&A) and the others will simply export.
Nocke and Yeaple (2007) extend the model by Helpman et al. (2003) to include non-
mobile productivities such as market and managerial capabilities, that are reflected in the
quality of production. When these capabilities represent a second source of heterogeneity
across firms, they can explain the specific advantage of making M&A over Greenfield
Investments (which is purchasing a pre-existing firm instead of setting a new plant from
scratch) so to motivate the existence of domestic acquisitions. This literature has been
recently adapted to study the effect of corporate taxation, with a particular focus on profit
shifting and tax competition. Baldwin and Okubo (2009b,a) propose a model of tax com-
petition with agglomeration economies and firm heterogeneity to show how the large and
more productive firms are more sensitive to tax differences across countries and hence
more likely to relocate in reaction to high taxes. Small countries attempt to attract these
firms by inefficiently lowering their tax rate. They propose that a reform that increases
the tax base can raise tax revenue while limiting relocation. Davies and Eckel (2007) also
show how tax competition, realised through a race-to-the-bottom in corporate tax rates
to attract foreign investors, leads to underprovision of public goods and overabundance
of entering firms. In line with the empirical results of Desai et al. (2006), Krautheim
and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2011) introduce firm heterogeneity in a tax competition model to
show how the larger more productive firms are more likely to shift profit to Tax Heavens.
Finally, Lockwood (2012) applies the Melitz framework to a model for the optimal rule
of foreign-source profits. He shows that the optimality of a double tax rule depends on
the level of trade costs: high trade costs imply that all firms serving the foreign market
choose to do so through FDI, and in this case the exemption rule is nationally optimal.
With low trade costs, instead, only the more productive firms choose FDI, in which case
the deduction rule is the nationally optimal one.
The “new” new international trade theory explains the endogenous sorting of firms
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into different market entry modes in a static framework. A firm’s productivity is a random
draw from a given distribution function, but once firms learn their productivity type they
face no other source of uncertainty. The possibility that the fixed costs associated with
specific entry modes, such as exports (like in Melitz (2003)) or also FDI (like in Helpman
et al. (2003)), have the characteristics of sunk costs has drawn new attention upon this
literature. Recent works like Ghironi and Melitz (2005), Alessandria and Choi (2007) and
Ruhl (2008) extend Melitz’ model into a dynamic framework where changes over time
of productivity and prices also affect the sorting of firms into different foreign market
entry modes. At the same time, the empirical literature initiated by Roberts and Tybout
(1997) explores the hypothesis that sunk entry costs explains the persistence of export
participation. Bernard and Jensen (2004) explores the difference in the exporting pattern
of new and “established” exporter, Das et al. (2007) propose a structural model for both
exit and entry into the export market that allows to estimate firms productivity growth
over time and the size of export sunk costs. Non of these paper assess the issue of time
dependence in the choice of entering domestic or foreign markets with modes alternative
to exports.
§ 2.3 Theoretical Model
This section draws from the “new” new international trade literature started by Melitz
(2003) to present a theoretical framework for the firms discrete choice of whether to expand
production by acquiring pre-existing subsidiaries located in foreign countries. Departing
from a simplified version of the model by Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2003) (HMY),
corporate taxes are introduced and comparative statics for their effect on the probability
of expanding production to foreign markets are derived.
The HMY’s model explains the international organisation of production when firms
differ in terms of productivity and can choose whether and how to serve foreign demand of
a differentiated good. The model shows that firms face the same proximity-concentration
tradeoff suggested by Brainard (1997), but also that the response to such tradeoff depends
on their productivity level. Any firm wanting to serve foreign demand needs to choose
whether to cover the transport costs necessary to export part of the domestic production
to the foreign market, or avoid paying transport costs and instead cover the fixed costs
necessary to purchase a subsidiary that is already active in that foreign market. Ultimately
countries where the distribution of firms productivity is highly dispersed will witness a
higher number of firms choosing to serve foreign demand through cross-border M&As.
Because the data used in this paper does not allow to observe firms exit from the domestic
market or export to foreign market, the model assumes that expanding firms face fixed
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costs only when choosing to make cross-border acquisitions.4 This simplifies Melitz result
on the sorting of firms into different modes of production: under these assumptions all
active firms can realise a positive profit from serving foreign demand through exports, but
only the most productive realise a even higher profit from undertaking a M&A project.
This section is closed by a discussion of an extension to the model that allows to explain
domestic acquisitions.
2.3.1 The Economy
There are K countries, Home and K − 1 Foreign countries. Variables indexed by k refer
to the Foreign countries. Each country has a specific labour endowment (L for Home and
Lk for each Foreign country), which constitutes the only input used for production. Two
different types of goods are produced in each country. The first good is the numeraire, xn:
an homogenous good produced in an integrated market with no transport cost and unit
price. The second good is the differentiated good , x(ω): it has varieties denoted by ω ∈ Ω
and can be exported only at a non-zero cost. Varieties are substitutable with constant
elasticity η > 1. Each variety ω has a country-specific price, denoted as p(ω) (pk(ω) for the
Foreign countries). Because each variety ω is produced by only one firm, characterised by
a specific productivity level 1/m, to simplify notation set ω = m. Marginal productivity
of labour is also different across countries, so the Home country produces w units of the
differentiated good with 1 unit of labour, and foreign countries produce wk.
To focus the attention on corporate taxes, assumption is made that the labour in-
come tax, tL, and the ad-valorem tax on consumption of the differentiated goods, tx,
are both zero. Corporate taxes, instead, are levied on the volume of profit realised by
all production sites located within the domestic borders at the statutory rate t. Fixed
costs are fully deductible. However, when a firm decides to purchase a foreign subsidiary,
the acquisition price is non-deductible. The profits realised by production sites located
outside of the domestic borders are initially taxed at the foreign corporate tax rate tk by
the foreign government, and, upon repatriation to the home country, also taxed by the
home government at the domestic rate T .
Individuals have two sources of income. They collect total (post-tax) profit, Π, and
supply labour, L, at the country wage rate w. So their budget constraint can be written
as I = Π + wL = (1−µ)xn +µ
∫
m
x(m)p(m)dm. Utility from consuming the homogenous
good, xn, is constant and additively separable, whereas the utility from consuming the
differentiated good has CES form, so that:
4This assumption follows Yeaple (2009)
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U(xn, x(m)) = (1− µ) log xn + µ
α
log
(∫
m
x(m)αdm
)
, (2.1)
where α = η−1
η
. Solving the maximisation problem yields Home country’s demand for
variety m of the differentiated good
x(m) = µ
I
P
(
p(m)
P
)−η
, (2.2)
where P represents the Home country’s price index, a weighted average of the price set
for all demanded varieties of the differentiated good, which can be written as
P =
(∫
m
p(m)1−ηdm
) 1
1−η
(2.3)
In the K − 1 Foreign countries demand for the differentiated good and price index have
the same functional form. Given Uk(xn, x(m)), demand of the differentiated good will be
xk(m) = µ
Ik
Pk
(
pk(m)
Pk
)−η
with price index Pk =
(∫
m
(pk(m)
1−ηdm
) 1
1−η .5
2.3.2 Firm Heterogeneity and Production
On the supply side, in each country there is a mass N of potential entrant firms. Potential
firms, like in Melitz (2003), need to pay a sunk cost, S, before being able to observe their
randomly drawn productivity type and choose whether to start producing or exit the
market. The productivity type is defined by the level of marginal costs, it is denoted by
m and follows distribution G(m)6. For the firms that pay the sunk cost, the profit from
serving domestic demand of the differentiated good in the Home country is given by
piD = (1− t) [x(m) (p(m)− c(m))− fD] , (2.4)
where c(m) = wm indicates variable cost and fD indicates fixed costs. As mentioned
earlier, the data used in this paper do not allow to observe firm-level exit and entry in
5In Helpman et al. (2003) the differentiated good is produced in H sectors, each having a different set
of varieties Ωh with h = 1, ...,H, so demand for the differentiated good and price index are both specific
to each sector within each country. Here the setup is simplified by assuming there is only one sector
producing the differentiated good x(ω). This does not affect the result on corporate taxes.
6It is here implicitly assumed that the support of G(m) is the positive real line. Helpman et al. (2003)
and Yeaple (2009) assume that G(m) is Pareto, implying its support corresponds to the interval [b,∞),
with b > 0,
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the domestic market: all observed firms started production before the beginning of the
panel and stayed active during its own length. This lead to the assumption that fD = 0,
which implies that all firms with strictly positive productivity actively serve the domestic
demand.
Firms in the differentiated good sector are monopolistically competitive: they take
demand for the variety they produce and price index for the country they serve as given,
and maximise profit by charging the optimal price p(m) = c(m) η
η−1 =
mw
α
. This yield
maximum profit from domestic production, which is
piD = (1− t)
[
µI
ηP 1−η
(mw
α
)1−η]
. (2.5)
The differentiated good is demanded worldwide, so each domestic firm can expand its
activity in order to serve foreign demand of the variety it specialises in. Foreign demand
can be served by increasing the scale of domestic production to export the share in excess
of domestic demand to the foreign market, or alternatively by purchasing the control of a
foreign firm to adapt its technology and have it serve demand for local consumers.7 The
first option implies no fixed cost8, but it requires that τ units of differentiated good are
transported to the foreign market for a single unit to be delivered (so τk > 1 denotes
iceberg transport costs between the Home country and the destination country k ). The
second option involves no transport costs, but requires that the fixed cost fA is paid,
together with the acquisition price for the purchase of the foreign subsidiary.
The market for corporate control is perfectly competitive, so any potential target is
acquired at the target’s shareholders reservation price, which corresponds to the post-tax
domestic profit realised by the target firm, denoted by (1− tk)p¯ik. The target firms tech-
nology can be adapted by the acquirer firm to produce the variety of differentiated good
in which the acquirer specialises, so the determinants of p¯ik are not modelled. The fixed
costs associated with making an acquisition can be thought of as including also the cost of
adapting the technology of the target for production of the acquirer’s differentiated good
7Helpman et al. (2003) do not explicitly talk about acquisitions in their original model. They only talk
about the option of locating production abroad, which implicitly means that domestic firms can make
Greenfield Investments by setting up new subsidiaries in the foreign market. Nocke and Yeaple (2007)
extend the HMY model by allowing firms to make either Greenfield Investment or Acquisitions in order
to serve foreign demand. Here interest lies on the determinants of the choice of making an acquisition,
rather than on the determinants of the choice between Greenfield Investment and Acquisitions. Also, the
data used in this paper do not include expansions of domestic firms through Geenfield Investments. For
this reason the Greenfield Investment option is not modelled.
8In Helpman et al. (2003) there is a fixed cost also associated with export, which implies that there
exist a productivity cutoff below which firms cannot afford serving foreign demand through export. Once
more, the assumption of no fixed costs associated to export is due to the fact that the dataset used here
does not allow to observe entry and exit in the export market.
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variety.
Defining the mark-up adjusted demand of the Home country as A = µI
η(Pα)1−η allows to
rewrite Equation 2.5 as
piD = (1− t)
[
A(mw)1−η
]
, (2.6)
and also to derive the equations for the additional profit from export (piij,E) and from
cross-border acquisition (piij,A) as
pik,E = (1− t)
[
Ak(mwτk)
1−η] (2.7)
pik,A = (1− tk − T )
[
Ak(mwk)
1−η − fkA
]− (1− tk)p¯ik (2.8)
Condition necessary to guarantee a specific ordering in the sorting of firms into different
foreign market entry mode is that the tax-adjusted transport cost between Home and the
Foreign country k is relatively high with respect to the wage differential between the two
countries, which is
τ η−1k
(1− tk − T )
(1− t) >
wη−1k
wη−1
. (2.9)
This condition adapts the assumption of Helpman et al. (2003) to an environment where
corporate taxes are levied by both the domestic and foreign government (Lockwood
(2012)). It implies that the profit from making an acquisition is more responsive to
m than the profit from doing export, which is ∂piA
∂m
> ∂piE
∂m
. Additionally, it rules out the
possibility that firms engage in “export platform FDI”, which is setting up production in
a foreign country in order to export from that country to a third locations.
The Figure shows the different profit functions for the case where countries are sym-
metric in terms of demand, wage and corporate taxes. It shows the well known result of
Melitz’s model, adapted to the case where there are no fixed costs associated to domestic
production or export. With a positive level of productivity (1/m > 0), all firms can
afford to produce domestically and export to foreign countries, because a positive profit
can be realised in both markets. The domestic profit function is more responsive to m
than the export profit function because of the iceberg transport costs. At the same time,
the acquisition profit function is shifted below the domestic profit function because of the
fixed costs associated with purchasing a foreign subsidiary. In particular, from fA > 0 it
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Profit from Domestic Production (piD) and addition Profit from Export (piE) and cross-border
M&A (piA) in the case of symmetric countries
follows that firms choose how to serve the foreign demand according to their productivity.
Firms with m > mA would realise positive profits from acquiring a foreign subsidiary,
but they will not choose this strategy over exports unless m > mEA, which is the pro-
ductivity cutoff of indifference between doing exports and purchasing a foreign subsidiary.
At equilibrium, firms will expand their activity through the acquisition of a foreign
subsidiary only if, conditional on their productivity level, they expect to realise a strictly
positive profit. At equilibrium, the condition of indifference between making or not the
cross-border acquisition is given by equating the profits from export and cross-border
acquisitions:
(1− tk − T )
[
Ak
m1−η
wη−1k
− fkA
]
− (1− tk)p¯ik = (1− t)
[
Ak
m1−η
(wτk)η−1
]
(2.10)
2.3.3 Effect of Corporate Taxes on Cross-Border Acquisitions
The interest of this paper lies on understanding the effect of corporate taxes on a firm’s
decision to expand the scale of its activity by acquiring another pre-existing firm located
in a foreign country. As discussed above, all firms have the ability to serve foreign demand
through exports, but it is the cutoff level mkEA that, at equilibrium, defines the position
of indifference for making cross-border acquisitions. The number of firms headquartered
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in the Home country that will complete a M&A in the foreign country k is given by
NkA = N(1 − G(mkEA)). So the probability of being among these firms is determined by
the cutoff productivity level mkEA, which can be derived from Equation (2.10), as
(mkE,A)
η−1 =
1
Ak
( [
(1− tk − T )fkA + (1− tk)p¯ik
][
(1− tk − T )w1−ηk − (1− t)(wτk)1−η
]) (2.11)
An analysis of the equilibrium condition for the cutoff mkEA allows to make some predic-
tions on the effect of corporate taxes on the probability that a firm can afford the fixed
costs associated with making the cross-border acquisition. The first term on the RHS is
an inverse measure of the size of the mark-up adjusted demand in the foreign country,
and the second term is a relative measure of the fixed costs associated with making the
acquisition. In particular, the denominator of the second term gives the marginal cost
savings from expanding through M&A (rather than through the implicit alternative rep-
resented by exports).
Proposition 1: An increase in the Corporate Statutory Tax Rate of the Home coun-
try, t, raises the marginal cost savings from making acquisitions instead of exports. So it
causes the productivity cutoff level mE,A to fall
Proposition 1 implies that, following an increase in the home statutory tax rate, the
mass of firms making cross-border M&A is larger and their average productivity is lower.
This is in line with the literature on tax competition, according to which high home cor-
porate taxes drive capital toward locations with “lighter” tax jurisdictions. Firms whose
productivity is just below the level that would allow them to afford the high costs asso-
ciated with acquiring a foreign subsidiary will be affected by a change in t. When facing
an increase in home corporate taxes, these firms see in cross-border acquisitions an op-
portunity to save marginal costs by locating production destined to serve foreign demand
directly abroad.
However, the effect of an increase in home corporate taxes is relevant for firms with
productivity in the neighbourhood of mE,A. Firms with a very low level of mobile capa-
bility might not be able to benefit from the shift in the productivity cutoff mE,A. This
particularly applies to firms that are just productive enough to serve foreign demand with
exports. Conjecture could be made that an increase in Home corporate taxes has on these
firms the opposite effect of what stated in Proposition 1. An increase of home corporate
taxes could represent to these firms a reduction in domestic post-tax profit, with the
result of delaying any ongoing internationalization process. The empirical investigation
conducted in this paper pays particular attention to controlling for different sources of
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heterogeneity across firms, and testing whether Proposition 1 equally holds for “all types”
of firms observed in the sample.
Proposition 2: An increase in the Foreign Profit Repatriation Tax, T , reduces the
marginal cost savings from making acquisitions instead of exports. So it causes the pro-
ductivity cutoff level mE,A to raise
Proposition 2 implies that, following an increase in the Repatriation Tax (T ), the mass
of firms making cross-border M&As is smaller, and their average productivity is larger.
Because a higher repatriation tax reduces the post-tax profit realised by the foreign sub-
sidiary, it makes cross-border M&As less desirable and it pushes the cutoff productivity
level toward the right. This argument is in line with the suggestions advanced from the
literature on double taxations. In fact, in a situation where firms from different countries
compete over the acquisition of a particular target, firms located in countries that apply
exemption reliefs from double taxation of foreign repatriated profit will have an advantage
w.r.t. firms that are located in countries that don’t.
These two propositions can be empirically tested in a model for the probability that a
firm expands its ownership structure through the acquisition of a pre-existing subsidiary.
From Equation (2.10) follows the condition necessary for any firm to be able to afford a
cross-border M&A, which is piA ≥ piE. Impose that all acquisition fixed costs are firm i
and time s specific, and that they have both a stochastic and a non-stochastic component,
so that
(1− tk − T )fA + (1− tk)p¯ik = Fi exp(i,s). (2.12)
After defining yi,s as an indicator function for whether firm i chooses to make a cross-
border acquisition in year s, Equation (2.10) and (2.12) can be combined into
yi,s = 1
[
(1− tk − T )Akw1−ηk
(
1− (1− t)
(1− tk − T )
(wτ)1−η
w1−ηk
)
m1−ηi ≥ Fi exp(i,s)
]
,
whose logarithm motivates the following reduced form econometric specification
yi,s = 1[β
′
indIndi + β
′
yY ears + β
′
tTAXis + β
′
zZi,s + β
′
hHomei + ci + i,s ≥ 0]. (2.13)
Dummies for the Industrial Sector and the Year of the acquisition (Indi and Y ears)
control for the economic climate in which the expansion takes place9. Characteristics
9As discussed in section 2.4, any variable specific to the acquisition target or its location, meant to
proxies for the target country Demand (Ak) or for the target country tax system (tk), are endogenous to
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of the acquirer’s Home country tax system (TAXi,s) allow to test Proposition 1 and
Proposition 2. Characteristics of the acquirer’s Home country (Zi,s and Homei) control
for the marginal cost savings from serving foreign demand through acquisitions, and firms
heterogeneity (ci) control for the acquirer’s specific unobserved heterogeneity, such as the
productivity level and the specific fixed costs.
2.3.4 Domestic Acquisitions
The model presented in Section 2.3.3 explains how productivity determines the mode cho-
sen by firms to serve foreign demand. Firms that are highly productive can afford the fixed
costs associated with cross border acquisitions and become multinationals. This section
extends the model in order to explain the motives behind a different kind of expansion:
the acquisition of domestic subsidiaries made by multinational firms. Under the proposed
extension, Proposition 1 and 2 hold for all firms in the economy. In addition, it can
be shown that the Home Corporate Statutory Tax rate, t, has no effect on multinational
firms’ decision of acquiring a domestic subsidiary in order to expand domestic production.
The “OLI” framework, introduced by Dunning (1997), argues that multinational firms
benefit from advantages derived from their Ownership, Location and Internalization fea-
tures. In particular, Internalization advantages arise when multinational firms benefit
from taking control of firms that would otherwise conduct production at higher costs, or
lower quality. Following this argument, the model of Helpman et al. (2003) can be ex-
tended by assuming that marginal costs of production are higher for domestic firms that
do not own the comparative advantages described by Dunning.10 Under this assumption,
the total post-tax profit for a domestic firm is
piDomk = (1− t)λ
[
A(mw)1−η + Ak(mwτk)1−η
]
, (2.14)
and the total post-tax profit of a multinational firm is
piMNEk = (1− t)
[
A(mw)1−η
]
+ (1− tk − T )
[
Ak(mwk)
1−η − fA
]− (1− tk)p¯i, (2.15)
where λ ∈ (0, 1) represents an efficiency parameter, common to all domestic firms.11 The
differences between the two profit functions indicate that drawing a low productivity type
the firm’s choice of expanding through M&As, and cannot be used in a probit model
10Nocke and Yeaple (2007) also extend HMY in this direction. Their model suggests that firms are
characterised by two types of productivity, and that these productivities differ in terms of mobility.
Technological capabilities (the 1/m in HMY’s model) are fully mobile and can be freely transferred across
production sites, whereas Marketing capabilities can be transferred only at a non-zero cost. In this
setup domestic M&A are used by firms to match capabilities and acquire the “productivity profile” that
maximises overall profit.
11Total post tax profit includes all profits from serving domestic and foreign demand
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(m < mEA) not only determines the decision on how to serve foreign demand (whether
through exports or cross-border acquisitions), but also limits access to the OLI compar-
ative advantages and negatively affects production efficiency.
At equilibrium, the cutoff productivity level of indifference between choosing cross-
border acquisitions over exports is now given by
(mkE,A)
η−1 =
[
(1− tk − T )fkA + (1− tk)p¯ik
]
A [(1− λ)(1− t)w1−η] + Ak
[
(1− tk − T )w1−ηk − λ(1− t)(wτk)1−η
] ,
The first term of the denominator measures the efficiency gains from serving domestic de-
mand as a multinational, and the second term of the denominator measures the marginal
cost savings from serving foreign demand with cross-border acquisitions, rather than with
exports. When all firms are equally efficient (λ = 1), the cutoff is equivalent to the one
discussed in the previous section. However, the wider is the efficiency gap between do-
mestic and multinationals (i.e. the closer λ is to 0) and the lower the productivity cutoff
of indifference for undertaking cross-border acquisitions. This recalls HMY’s result on the
distribution of productivity: countries with higher firms heterogeneity are characterised
by a larger mass of firms choosing to serve foreign demand with FDI.
The existence of an efficiency gap between domestic and multinationals also explains
the motives for domestic acquisitions. Multinational firms now have the incentive to
acquire domestic firms, transfer technology on to the target, and benefit from the synergies
generated in terms of efficiency gains. This implies that all firms with high productivity
(m > mEA) now have the additional option of expanding domestic production with the
acquisition of a (less-efficient) domestic firm, and realise the additional profit
piMNEDA = (1− t)
[
A(mw)1−η − fDA
]− (1− t) [A(mw)1−ηλ] ,
where fDA is fully deductible fixed cost from the acquisition and the second term is the
price paid to purchase the target firm. At equilibrium, multinational firms will choose
this option if piMNEDA > 0, which implies the productivity cutoff level of indifference with
respect to domestic acquisitions
(mDA)
1−η =
fDA
Aw1−η(1− λ) (2.16)
Equation (2.16) implies that larger differences in efficiency between multinational and
domestic firms (i.e. a lower λ) increase the incentive for domestic acquisitions, because
imply larger efficiency gains from domestic expansions. The derived condition also leads
to a preposition on the effect of taxes on domestic acquisitions. In particular
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Proposition 3: An increase in the Home Corporate Tax Rate, t, does not affect the
probability that a multinational firm expands domestic production with the acquisition of
a (less efficient) non-multinational firm.
§ 2.4 The Data
Two facts stressed in the UNCTAD reports are of particular interest to this paper. First
cross border M&A have covered, on average over the last ten years, about 60% of total FDI
flows. Second, M&A deals worth over 1 Billions USD are increasing in number and are
made mostly by large multinationals located in the World largest economies. These facts
reconcile with the environment described in the literature initiated by Melitz (2003) and
Helpman et al. (2003). This section describes the methodology followed to build a firm-
level dataset that allows to test the three prepositions derived from the theoretical model
of section 2.3. It also presents descriptive statistics that show evidence of two key features
of the data: the heterogeneity across firms, in terms of firms size and performance, and
the persistence of the expansion choice, defined as time dependence in the parent firms’
decision of acquiring new subsidiaries.
2.4.1 Firm Expansion Data
The data on firms’ expansions were drawn from three commercial databases compiled by
Bureau Van Dijk (B.v.D.): Orbis 2004, Zephyr 2010 and Amadeus 2010. Orbis contains
information on the identity and location of all known shareholders and subsidiaries of
firms active worldwide. Zephyr contains information on all ownership transactions that
involved the companies listed in Orbis. The third source, Amadeus, contains historical
financials of the European firms listed in Orbis.12 These sources were combined in order
to reconstruct the decision pattern followed by headquarters that expanded through the
acquisition of one or more pre-existing subsidiaries.
The data sources were combined using a two-step procedure. In the first step, data
from Orbis were used to identify all the ownership links that connect large and very large13
12Amadeus constitutes a subset of Orbis. Access to the sources used in this paper included only
information on the ownership links reported in the 2004 CD update of Orbis, and on the historical data
for the financial years 2002-2010 reported in the 2011 internet update of Amadeus.
13B.v.D. defines a firm as “very large” if its operating revenue is above 140 mil USD, if its total assets
are above 280 mil USD or if its employees are more than 1000. It defines a firm as “large” if these figures
are reduced to, respectively, over 14 mil USD, over 20 mil USD and over 150 employees. The internet
version of any B.v.D. database provides no access to information on medium and small companies, which
generally cover about the 85% of the overall sample.
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firms to their shareholders, as at the end of financial year 2004.14 The reconstructed
ownership maps list each firm under the control of its direct majority shareholder, and
report it as part of the corporate structure of a unique “Global Ultimate Owner” (GUO)
(hereafter also referred to as “parent” or “headquarter”). This simplification reflects the
assumption that, for a given level of dependency, the largest shareholder has the power
to influence all changes in the ownership of its controlled subsidiaries, so that, for a given
organisation, the “Global Ultimate Owner” can be held accountable for the expansion
decisions that involve the subsidiaries linked to its ownership structure.15 Through this
first step, three different types of firms were identified: standalone firms (consisting of a
single company with no subsidiaries), domestic firms (consisting of a parent linked to one
or more subsidiaries, all located within the parent’s domestic borders), and multinational
firms (consisting of a parent linked to at least one subsidiary located in a foreign country).
The classification of firms into types is based on 2004 data and it is time-invariant, so it
is exogenous to all ownership changes that occurred between 2005 and 2010. This step
resulted in the identification of a base sample of 28,940 European parent firms.
The second step involved the selection of mergers and acquisitions reported in Zephyr,
that affected the composition of the base sample identified in the previous step. All M&A
deals that involved the purchase of the controlling share of a pre-existing firm made by
a known acquirer (matching a parent or a subsidiary of the base sample) were used to
update the ownership structures, as to the end of the financial year 2005. Such M&A
deals unambiguously affect the composition of the base sample, because they imply the
addition of a new subsidiary to the ownership structure of the acquiring parent. This up-
dating process was recursively repeated for all years up to 2010, so to form a final panel
spanning six financial periods. This step resulted in the creation of an indicator variable
that defines a parent firm as making an “expansion” in year s if, by the end of financial
year s, at least one new subsidiary was added to its ownership structure, following the
acquisition of its controlling share.16
One of the advantages of the dataset is that it does not require sample restrictions
based on firm characteristics. In fact, the only conditions imposed are: (1) an ownership
link is defined on the basis of the largest share of the subsidiary, and (2) an M&A deal
is considered only upon availability of full information about its ownership effects. This
14The Bureau Van Dijk lists all types of shareholders, among which private individuals, public author-
ities, institutions and foundations. For the purpose of reconstructing the corporate ownership structures,
only shareholders corresponding to firms were considered.
15The ownership structure reconstructed at this stage can have up to ten different subsidiary depen-
dency levels.
16A parent firm makes a “direct” acquisition if it is reported in Zephyr as the acquirer of the completed
deal, whereas it makes an “indirect” acquisition if one of its subsidiaries (irrespective of their dependency
level) is reported in Zephyr as the acquirer of the completed deal.
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guarantees perfect identification of the expansion mode17, and at the same time preserves
the heterogeneity across parent firms.
2.4.2 Firm Heterogeneity and Expansion Persistency
The final sample of 28,940 parent firms is constituted by 3,268 multinational firms (the
11% of the sample), 10,855 domestic firms (the 38% of the sample) and 14,817 standalone
firms (the 51.20% of the sample). Firms’ size, measured in terms of number of subsidiaries
controlled by the parent at the end of 2004 represents a source of (observable) hetero-
geneity. As shown in Table 2.2, the average multinational parent controls 11 subsidiaries,
while the largest control more than 121. Domestic firms are considerably smaller than
multinationals, but equally diverse, with the average parent controlling only 3 subsidiaries
and the largest controlling above 20. Finally, as revealed by the top graph in Figure 2.2,
the distribution of size for the subsample of firms that never made an acquisition between
2005 and 2010 is more (positively) skewed than that of firms that made at least one ac-
quisition. The same level of heterogeneity seems to be preserved by a second measure
of size, defined as the number of countries where the controlled subsidiaries are located.
Table 2.2 and the bottom graph of Figure 2.2 report statistics for this second variable.
Note that size, measured by number or geographic spread of owned subsidiaries, does
not directly capture the scale of production. It rather controls for the complexity of the
ownership structure of a parent firm, relevant when the expansion is defined in terms of
newly acquired subsidiaries. Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 report the geographic and industrial
sector coverage of the sample. United Kingdom, Spain and France are the countries where
the largest number of parent firms is legally registered; while Financial Services, Retail
and Manufacturing are the industrial sectors in which the largest number of parent firms
operate. As can be noted in these Tables, a second source of heterogeneity is represented
by the distribution of firms’ types within each country or industrial sector.
Part of the international trade literature has focused on testing the presence of a re-
lation between productivity and firms self selection into the export market (see Wagner
(2005) for a comprehensive survey). This has been done following different methodolo-
gies: linear model estimation for the direct effect of exports on firms productivity growth;
quantile regressions for the effects of exporting on firms productivity; or comparison of
17Other definitions of the expansion choice could generate ambiguity on the nature of the ownership
change. For example, an alternative to the methodology proposed here would be to compare the ownership
structure of the parent companies at two different points in time, and build an indicator variable for the
expansion choice based on whether a new subsidiary is observed in the second period. This procedure
would require an assumption on the very nature of the expansion, because it would be based on no
information on whether the expansions followed an acquisition, a merger or rather a Greenfield Investment
(i.e. the creation of a new firm)
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productivity between matched firms. The dataset described above does not allow to
directly test the hypothesis that productivity is higher among firms involved in M&A
projects, simply because productivity remains unobserved. The dataset, however, allows
to build an indirect test based on those firms observed characteristics that, as suggested
by the model, are related to productivity. 18
For each firm “type” (multinational, domestic and standalone), the characteristics of
the parent firms who never expanded between 2005 and 2010 were compared to the char-
acteristics of the parent firms that expanded at least once during the same period. Firms
were compared in terms of size (measured by Volume of Sales), in terms of stock of intel-
lectual capital (measured by Intangible Assets), performance (measured by Revenues and
Profit) and labour cost. All size and performance characteristics were measured in terms
of average over the pre-acquisition period (2002-2004). The results are reported in Table
2.5. The tests on the multinational firms were conducted on the full sub-sample, and
then repeated after excluding the largest 5% of parent firms, those that controlled more
than 8 subsidiaries by the end of 2004. For each size and performance variable, the Table
reports the mean for the groups of non-expanding and expanding firms (column [1] and
[2]), a test for the difference in these mean (column [5]), and a two-sample Kolmogorov
Smirnov tests for the equality of the distributions of each characteristic across the two
groups (column [6]).
The table shows three different results. First, for all characteristics and for all par-
ent firm types, the group of expanding firms stochastically dominates the group of non-
expanding firms, suggesting that expanding firms are larger and better performing than
non-expanding ones. Second, the mean characteristics for standalone firms are always
lower than the mean characteristics for domestic firms, and the mean characteristics for
domestic firms are lower than those of multinationals, suggesting that there is a sorting of
firms into “types”. Finally, the difference in mean characteristics between expanding and
non-expanding firms is considerably larger for standalone firms than for domestic, and
even more so for multinationals, suggesting that heterogeneity in size and performance is
higher between standalone firms, and those standalone firms who do expand are consid-
erably better performing than the average of their type.
The second feature of the dataset is persistence in the expansion decision. Table 2.6
shows statistics on firms transition across different ownership “types”. Column [a] reports
the number of acquisitions completed every year: it shows that domestic and multina-
tional parent firms are more involved into M&A transactions than standalone firms, and
18Amadeus allows to collect information on the consolidated financial accounts of the observed parent
firms
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that in general over the years the total number of completed acquisitions has more than
halved for all firm “types”. Column [b] reports the percentage of firms that transition into
a different ownership “type”, cases like those of Standalone and Domestic firms acquiring
across borders, or those of Standalone firms acquiring domestically. The table shows that
around 20% of the acquisitions completed in the observed period involved domestic firms
acquiring their first international subsidiary and transitioning into a multinational organ-
isation. Table 2.7 reports the probability that a parent firm expands through M&As,
conditional on the previous period expansion decision. The first three columns report
statistics for the total sample, while the remainder of the table separately looks at the
different firm “types”. The unconditional probability of making an expansion is between
0.015 and 0.036 for the overall sample, but raises as high as 0.16 for multinational parent
firms and drops as low as 0.001 for standalone firms: this indicates that multinational
firms are unconditionally more likely to expand than domestic and standalone firms. The
ratio of raw probabilities from Table 2.7 computed on the whole sample indicates that
firms that did expand in period s−1 are twenty times more likely to expand also in period
s than firms that did not expand in s−1. The same ratio varies largely across firms types:
multinationals that expanded in s − 1 are only six times more likely to expand also in
period s than multinationals that did not expand in s− 1, whereas standalone firms that
have expanded in s−1 are up to one hundred times more likely to expand again in s than
standalone that did not expand in s− 1.
2.4.3 Corporate Tax Data
The empirical literature on corporate taxation argues that different measures of corpo-
rate taxes matter at each stage of an investment decision process (Devereux (2007)). This
paper looks at the first stage of the process, when a firm decides whether to undertake
an ownership transaction that will cause the expansion of its corporate structure. Alter-
native tax measures for the parent firm’s Home country are included in the data. The
corporate statutory tax rate (STR) simply reports the highest rate legally imposed on
corporate profits by the Home country. It includes also local and regional taxes, and it
does not include the tax alleviations recognised to small firms. The effective average tax
rate (EATR) is a forward looking tax measure that reflects the portion of profit paid as
tax in the home country, also accounting for capital tax allowances. Devereux and Griffith
(1998b) and Auerbach et al. (2008) suggests that this second tax measure is particularly
relevant for the stage of the investment decision process when a firm compares the capital
tax treatment in the alternative locations where the investment could take place.
Choosing to purchase the controlling share of a foreign subsidiary has other tax effects
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for the acquiring parent. The profit of a domestic firm is simply taxed at the corporate tax
rate levied by the Home country, but the taxation of a multinational firm depends on the
international tax system applied by all countries where the firm operates. The profit re-
alised at Home by the multinational parent will be taxed at the home corporate statutory
rate, while the profit realised by the foreign subsidiaries is taxed at the corporate statutory
rate applied by the countries where the subsidiaries are located. Following the notation of
the model, denote these tax rates as t and tk, respectively. If the post-tax profit realised
by the foreign subsidiaries is not re-invested, a (non-resident) dividend withholding tax
rate, dk, can be applied by the foreign country before the profit is repatriated as dividends
to the parent firm, so that total tax rate levied by the foreign country is tk + (1− tk)dk.
If the Home country applies a source-based system and taxes only profits realised within
the domestic borders, the repatriated profit is practically exempted from further taxa-
tion. In principle, however, the repatriated profit can also be taxed by the parent firm’s
Home country. If the Home country applies a residence-based system, worldwide profits
of the parent firms resident within the domestic borders are taxed at rate t. In order to
reduce the burden of international double taxation, countries can coordinate and provide
different tax reliefs. In particular, the Home country can allow a tax-credit for the overall
amount of taxes already paid in the foreign country (indirect credit system) or a tax-
credit for the amount of withholding dividend taxes already pad in the foreign country
(direct credit system). The tax credit is given when foreign tax rates are higher than
domestic tax rates (which is tk + (1 − tk)dk > t in the case of indirect credit and dk > t
in the case of direct credit), and guarantees equal tax treatment of all profits realised by
the multinational firm. The data used in this paper include information on the double
tax system applied by the Home country of the observed firms, which allows to tests the
second proposition derived from the model. Table 2.8 reports descriptive statistics for
the tax variables applied in all countries where the parent firms observed in the sample
reside. The table also indicates whether the parent Home country applies the Credit or
the Exemption system to foreign repatriated profit.
Characteristics of the tax system applied by the country where the acquired subsidiary
is located, are, instead, endogenous to the binary choice of whether or not to make the
ownership expansion. One way to overcome this limitation would be to include informa-
tion on the characteristics of the “most generous foreign tax system”, which is common
to all firms, and exogenous to the expansion choice. In fact, other things being equal, any
expanding firm should prefer directing its investment toward this tax-favourable location.
However, variables that capture the main features of the most advantageous fiscal system
available among a given pool of countries (or even the entire World) do not have enough
variation over the observed six years period, so their effect on the expansion choice cannot
be estimated.
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§ 2.5 Empirical Strategy
The dataset built for this paper tracks all M&A deals completed by the base sample of
28,940 European companies over a period of six years (2005-2010). It allows to follow
the time-pattern of corporate structure changes and to extend the static discrete choice
model of Equation (2.13) into a setup that accounts for the presence of time-dependence
in the choice-outcome.
Time-dependence in the decision of making a M&A can be explained by different ar-
guments. First, a single M&A could represent only one stage of a complex ownership
restructuring process. The headquarter might be going through a phase of diversification
into new markets. It could be starting a large expansion that implies extending production
to different locations, or it could be transitioning from a standalone, into a domestic and
finally a multinational corporation. All these changes are radical enough to potentially
require several periods to be completed. This effect would be particularly captured by
data with a short time coverage, like those used in this paper. Second, time-dependence
could be due to an “acquisition learning process” that affects the cost structure faced by
firms that repeat the same choice over time. In the model presented, the fixed cost of
making an acquisition is time invariant, so it is similar to a sunk cost, that firms need to
pay in order to break into the acquisition market. Once the fixed cost is paid, the acquir-
ing firm needs to cover only the marginal cost of additional acquisitions. An extension of
the theoretical model into a second period would show that firms who already acquired in
the first period have an advantage in undertaking acquisitions also in the second period
with respect to firms who did not acquire in the first period. Alternatively, similarly to
what suggested by Roberts and Tybout (1997), Bernard and Jensen (2004) and Das et al.
(2007), the level of fixed cost could depend on the amount of experience that the firm has
in the matter of M&As. Having successfully completed M&As in the past means that a
firm has already adapted its organisation to the existence of dependent subsidiaries, so
that making additional acquisitions comes at a lower cost. Finally, conjectures could be
made in support of a negative effect of past acquisitions on the probability of making new
acquisitions. For example a firm that persistently enters the same market could find it
increasingly costly to complete a new investment, because of the gradual market satura-
tion resulting from previous M&As. Or a firm with an already sophisticated structure
might find it particularly difficult to stretch its managerial capacity and its coordination
network to an additional subsidiary.
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To allow for the dynamics in the estimated model, Equation (2.13) is rewritten as
yi,s = 1[γyi,s−1 + β′Xi,s + ci + i,s > 0] (2.17)
where yi,s is a dichotomous variable, equal to 1 if the headquarter of company i com-
pletes the acquisition of at least one new subsidiary by the end of accounting period s.19
Xi,s = (TAXi,s, Zi,s−1, Hi, Ys, Indi), where TAXi,s is a vector of variables capturing differ-
ent aspects of the parent home country fiscal system, Zi,s−1 is a vector of macroeconomic
indicators for the parent home country, Hi, Ys and Indi are parent home country, year and
industry-specific dummies. ci denotes the unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity. Testing
for the presence of time-dependence in the acquisition choice, corresponds to investigate
on the significance of γ.
Assuming a normal distribution for the disturbances, i,s, a dynamic Random Effect
(RE) Probit for the probability that a parent firm undertakes an “ownership expansion”
is specified
Pr(yi,s = 1|yi,s−1,Xi, ci) = Φ(γyi,s−1 + β′Xi,s + ci) (2.18)
Conditional on the dynamics of Equation (2.17) being well specified and on Xi,s being
strictly exogenous, the likelihood contribution of firm i can be written as
Li =
S∏
s=1
f(yi,s|yi,0,Xi,s, ci) =
S∏
s=1
Φ[(γyi,s−1 + β′Xis + ci)(2yi,s − 1)]
The advantage of this specification is that it can capture the presence of state-dependence
(which is observed if γ 6= 0), while distinguishing its effects from that of unobserved het-
erogeneity. It allows to quantify how much the likelihood of a firm’s expansion is affected
by the fact that the same firm has already expanded in the previous period. At the
same time it guarantees that the observed dynamic effect is due to true state dependence,
rather than due to unobserved time-invariant characteristics specific to the firm under
observation.
Dynamic probit models, defined as in (2.18), suffer from the well-known initial con-
dition problem. The unobserved heterogeneity captured by the random coefficient ci is
correlated with the initial value of the dependent variable, yi,0. The co-presence of these
19A firm is defined as undertaking an “ownership expansion” if at least one subsidiary is acquired for the
majority share during the course of a particular financial year. This definition allows to control also for
expansions that correspond to the contemporaneous acquisition of several subsidiaries. The data section
gives an accurate description of how the definition of expansion was applied to construct the dataset.
In the empirical investigation, distinction is made between expansions that involve only cross-border
acquisitions and expansion that involve both domestic and cross-border acquisitions.
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two elements in the equation for the conditional probability of yi,s = 1 would make the
parameter estimates inconsistent and would cause a positive bias in the estimation of γ.
The “naive” approach of treating yi0 as non stochastic (which corresponds to assuming
its exogeneity with respect to ci) represents a solution to the problem only if the first
period observed in the sample corresponds to the beginning of the true data generating
process.20 In that case the density of ci would be integrated out of the Likelihood func-
tion and the conditional probability of observing an expansion would be estimated using
maximum likelihood. In this paper, the dataset starting period does not correspond to
the incorporation date of the firms observed in the sample21, hence this first approach
cannot be applied.
The econometric literature presents other solutions to the initial condition problem.
All proposed alternatives mainly consist of integrating the unobserved heterogeneity out
of the likelihood function, to approximate the density of yi conditional on the exogenous
variables Xi. Heckman (1981a,b) suggests to approximate the distribution of the initial
value of the dependent variable, yi0, conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity and the
exogenous variables, while also making an assumption on the unobserved heterogeneity.
Orme (1997, 2001) suggests to follow a two step procedure and find an approximation
of the unobserved heterogeneity that is uncorrelated to the lagged dependent variable.
Wooldridge (2005) shifts the attention on the unobserved heterogeneity, and claims an-
other solution to the problem consists in finding an approximation of the distribution of
yi conditional on the initial condition and the exogenous variables, while again making
an assumption on the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity.22
Two recent papers have compared the performance of these different methodologies.
Arulampalam and Stewart (2009) propose a shortcut to implement the Heckman esti-
mator using standard softwares. In addition, they examine the difference between the
methodologies proposed by Heckman, Orme and Wooldrige in a real application on UK
unemployment data, and in a series of Monte Carlo experiments. The results from the
simulations suggest that none of the three estimators performs better than the others in
all cases. Akay (2011) compares the performance of the Heckman and the Wooldridge
estimators, in an empirical application once more based on labour force participation, and
in a series of Monte Carlo experiments. Akay’s empirical application focuses on studying
20Wooldridge (2010) argues that the exogeneity between yi,0 and the ci is questionable, regardless of
whether yi0 corresponds to the beginning of the data generating process, in all cases where the unobserved
heterogeneity is supposed to affect the dependent variable in s > 0.
21Also consider that a panel including all firms from their incorporation date would be very difficult
to handle due to severe unbalanceness
22A different route is that of using Bayesian techniques of estimation. For Bayesian modelling and
computation of discrete responses model see Lancaster (2004), Chib (1992), Albert and Chib (1993) and
Chib and Greenberg (1996)
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the performance of the different estimators in unbalanced panels. The results from his
simulation show that the Heckman estimator performs better, in term of bias, in very
short panels (where T < 5), while the Wooldridge estimator performs better for medium
length panels (5 ≤ T ≤ 8).
In this paper the methodology used by Wooldridge is preferred for three specific rea-
sons. First, the dataset used covers a period of six years, and, according to Akay (2011)
Wooldridge’s is the better performing estimator on this time length. Second, implement-
ing this methodology over the available alternatives has the advantage of computational
efficiency and feasibility of estimation of the average partial effects (APE). Finally, the
methodology proposed by Wooldridge can be used in an extension of the random effect
model where some of the parameters are allowed to vary across firms, which represents
an alternative way to explore the heterogeneity in the data (see Greene (2004)).
Wooldridge’s suggestion involves proposing an assumption for the distribution of ci,
conditional on the initial condition yi,0 and on a set of strictly exogenous explanatory
variables, zi. Following this method,
ci|yi,0, zi ∼ N(φ0 + φ1yi,0 + φ′zi;σ2a) (2.19)
so that
ci = φ0 + φ1yi,0 + φ
′zi + ai (2.20)
where ai ∼ N(0, σ2a). This allows to substitute out the unobserved heterogeneity, ci, with
Equation (2.20) so that the indicator function becomes
yi,s = 1[γyi,s−1 + β′Xi,s + (φ0 + φ1yi0 + φ′zi + ai) + i,s > 0] (2.21)
and the unconditional likelihood contribution of firm i is
Li =
∫ ( T∏
t=1
Φ [(γyi,s−1 + β′xi,s + φ0 + φ1yi,0 + φ′zi + ai)(2yi,s − 1)]
)
1
σa
f
(
ai
σa
)
da
(2.22)
with f(ai) indicating the density of the random effects, ai, uncorrelated with the initial
condition and with the other exogenous regressors.
Wooldridge suggests that Equation (2.20) should contain the full history (over s =
1, ..., S) of the explanatory variables z. Arulampalam and Stewart (2009) specify that one
could follow Mundlak and substitute zi = (zi1, ..., zi,S) with z¯i· =
∑S
s=1 zi,s. They stress
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how Equation (2.13) should contain any exogenous time-invariant individual characteristic
that explains the correlation between ci, the initial condition yi,0 and the other variables of
the model. This constitutes a useful flexibility for the application presented in this paper,
where the vector zi can be defined in terms of observable parent-specific characteristics.
Firm-specific variables are naturally affected by the contemporaneous acquisition choice,
and they cannot enter the vector zi. The same holds for firms characteristics averaged
over the full length of the panel (years 2005 to 2010), but not for characteristics measured
over the years preceding the first observed expansion choice (made in 2005). So for the
specification of zi, the within average over the years from 2002 to 2004 is used for each
continuous variable, and the value observed at 2004 is used for each qualitative variable.
The resulting set of instruments is exogenous to the expansion choices taken during the
period 2006-2010. The data allows to define three kinds of firm-specific characteristics:
characteristics on financial performance of the parent firm; on the size of the firm (both
in terms of volume of sales and in terms of number of owned subsidiaries); and on the
level of “internationality” of a firm.
Computational convenience for this model is guaranteed by the fact that the likelihood
contribution, conditional on the ci, as above specified, corresponds to that of a standard
random effects probit model. So that consistent maximum likelihood (ML) estimation of
the parameters β, γ, φ and σ2a can be obtained using standard softwares that approximate
the log likelihood function using adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature (such as STATA12
and NLOGIT5). Note that a robust estimate of ρ = σ2a/(σ
2
a + 1) gives a measure of what
portion of the total variance is explained by the unobserved heterogeneity. Additionally,
this model allows to quantify the size of the effect of any variable of interest by deriving
its Average Partial Effects (see Appendix B).
Finally, the model is extended to allow for the effect of the tax variable and of the
lagged dependent variable to be random. This implies that the effect of a given vari-
able on the probability of making an expansion is specific to each firm i, and follows a
distribution with heterogenous mean. This extension of the classic random effect model
represents an alternative way of exploring the unobserved heterogeneity in the data. The
possibility of allowing the parameters to vary across firms is crucial, as it represents a way
of considering that unobserved differences across firms goes as far as defining the way in
which various factors, and especially corporate tax measures, affect the probability of a
future corporate expansion.
The model in Equation (2.17) is extended as follows:
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yi,s = 1 [θ1iyi,s−1 + θ2iTAXi,s + β′Xi,s + (φ0 + φ1yi,0 + φ′zi + ai) + ui,s > 0] (2.23)
with
θi = θ
′ki + ζvi
where θi = (θ1i, θ2i) are the random parameters for the i = 1, ..., N parent firms, whose
mean is shifted by the firm characteristics ki. Normality of the stochastic component of
the parameters, vi, can be assumed so that θi ∼ N(θ′ki, ζ2). Exogeneity of the mean
shifting firm characteristics ki is required for consistency with the Wooldridge’s initial
condition model. In the empirical analysis, ki are characteristics of the parent firm’s
ownership structure, as measured before any expansion took place. By substituting the
equation for the random parameter in the indicator function, the model becomes
yi,s = 1[(θ
′
1ki)yi,s−1 + (θ
′
2ki)TAXi,s + β
′Xi,s+ (2.24)
(φ0 + φ1yi,0 + φ
′zi + ai) + (ζ1viyi,s−1 + ζ2viTAXi,s + i,s) > 0]
Simulated Maximum Likelihood (SML) can be use to consistently estimate the struc-
tural parameters of Equation (2.24), with simulation conducted by building θi,d over D
draws of ζi,d the likelihood contribution of firm i can be approximated by
Li = log
1
D
D∑
d=1
[ ∫ S∏
s=1
Φ
(
(θ1i,dyi,s−1 + θ2i,dTAXi,s + β′Xi,s + φ0 + φ1yi,0 + φ′zi + ai)
(2.25)
(2yit − 1)
)
1
σa
f
(
ai
σa
)
da
]
§ 2.6 Results
This section presents the results from the econometric analysis. Table 2.9 and 2.10 give
a list of all the variables, their definition and descriptive statistics. Table 2.11 presents
estimates of different dynamic probit specifications where the parent firm is recorded
as making an expansion if it acquires the controlling share of at least one pre-existing
subsidiary. Table 2.12 extends Table 2.11 by including additional tax variables. Table
2.13 and 2.14 restrict the definition of the choice variable and present results for models
where the expansion decision is limited to only cross-border acquisitions and only domes-
tic acquisitions, respectively. Table 2.13 and 2.14 constitute a test for the propositions
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derived from the theoretical model. Finally, Table 2.15 extends the preferred model for
each choice variable using a random parameter dynamic probit.
Table 2.11 presents estimates of the baseline model for the parent firm’s choice of mak-
ing at least one acquisition, without conditioning the definition of the dependent variable
on the location of the acquired subsidiary. All acquisitions are recorded as expansions at
this stage, irrespective of whether they are only domestic, only cross-border or a combi-
nation of the two. Column [1] presents the results from a simple Pooled Dynamic probit
model for the effect of the lagged expansion choice and of the statutory corporate tax rate
levied by the parent firm’s Home country (STR) on the probability of making an expan-
sion at time s. The model also controls for observable firm heterogeneity, by including a
set of dummies for the parent firm’s initial type (multinational, domestic or standalone),
and allowing these dummies to shift the effect on the expansion choice of both the STR
and the lagged dependent variable. Column [2] estimates a random effect dynamic probit,
equivalent the model in column [1], using the Wooldridge’s method. The ci are assumed
to be a linear function of the first observed choice yi,0, and of key characteristics of the
parent firm, the zi. Motivated by the discussion of Section 2.4, the time-invariant firm
characteristics that enter Equation (2.20) are the number of subsidiaries and the number
of foreign countries where the subsidiaries are located, both measures of parent firms’ size.
Column [3] uses a richer specification for Wooldridge’s assumption on the unobserved het-
erogeneity, by including also squared measures of the size variables. Column [4] further
extends the model by controlling for macroeconomic variables reporting characteristics of
the economic environment in which the parent firm operates. Finally, Column [5] presents
a robustness check where the ci are assumed to be a function of financial variables that are
meant to capture the pre-acquisition performance of the parent firm. The parent firm’s
“type” is defined on the basis of the ownership structure as at the end of 2004, and the
base category is the group of standalone firms. Parent firm’s size measures are also based
on the number of subsidiaries owned in 2004, and have the group standalone firms as
the base case. Finally, the variables capturing the parent firm performance are measured
on the average between 2002 and 2004. Dummies for the expansion year, for the Home
country and for the parent firm’s industrial sector are always included.
The Pooled Dynamic probit estimated in Column [1] ignores the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity across firms, and estimates a large time dependence: γˆ = 1.948, with
SE(γˆ) = 0.100 for the reference group of standalone firms. Dividing the lagged choice
variable coefficient estimated in Column [2] by
√
1− ρ gives a scaled coefficient of 0.776
(for standalone firms), which can be directly compared with the much higher coefficient
of 1.948 estimated in Column [1].23 In terms of Average Partial Effects (APE, reported
23RE probit coefficient estimates need to be scaled before being compared to the pooled probit coeffi-
cient estimates, see Arulampalam (1998). ρ is the constant cross-period error correlation
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at the bottom of Table 2.11), the results from the model of Column [2] imply that the
probability of making an expansion in period s is 0.02 points higher for standalone firms
that expanded in s− 1 than for standalone firms that did not expand in s− 1. According
to the results from Column [1], the effect of having made an expansion in s − 1 on the
probability of making an expansion also in s is ten times higher than what estimated
in Column [2]. Similar results hold for domestic and multinational firms. The model in
Column [2] also allows to test whether the effect of corporate taxes is homogenous across
firms’ types. When interacted with the parent firm’s initial type, the tax effect on the
probability of making an expansion is significant at the 1% level, but it has different sign
for the different types of parent firms. In particular, according to the APE from Column
[2], a raise of 10 percentage points in the Home Statutory Tax rate increases the probabil-
ity of an expansion for a Multinational and a Domestic firm by, respectively, 1.5 and 0.3
percentage points, but reduces the probability of an expansion for a Standalone company
by 0.1 percentage points.
The model in Column [3] provides further investigation on the role of firms’ size. Theo-
ries on the growth of the firm suggest that firms expand only until the marginal benefit
from a further expansion is zero. Accordingly, a multinational firm with a very complex
structure and subsidiaries spread worldwide might represent a case where opportunities
have been already exploited, and the map of potential international locations has been
saturated, so that the acquisition of one more subsidiary would only increase fixed costs.
This implies that there is an optimal “size” for each company, beyond which any further
expansion represents a loss of efficiency. Consistently with the hypothesis of a bell shape
relationship between size and probability of expansion, the results reported in Column [3]
show that the estimated coefficient of parent firms’ initial size (measured both in terms
of number of subsidiaries and number of countries where the subsidiaries are located) is
positive and significant, whereas the estimated coefficient of the squared of these measures
has negative sign.
Column [4] introduces control variables for the characteristics of the Home country’s
economy. First, firms headquartered in larger and more industrialised countries are gen-
erally characterised by high productivity, as suggested by Melitz (2003). Also, during
economic expansions firms might have stronger incentives to increase their scale of pro-
duction through the acquisition of domestic subsidiaries. For this reason, the logarithm
of real GDP and the industry value added (as a share of GDP) are both included in the
model. The GDP variable is non-significant, whereas the Industry Value Added is posi-
tive and significant. Second, flexible and easy access to financial assets might affect the
feasibility of an M&A project (see di Giovanni (2005)). This argument justifies the inclu-
sion of three variables measuring the parent firm’s home country financial “depth”: the
volume of domestic credit to private sector, the domestic credit provided by the banking
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sector and the market value of listed domestic companies, all expressed as a share of GDP.
The results of Column [4] interestingly show that a greater involvement of the banking
sector into the domestic credit market deteriorates the probability that parent firms un-
dertake M&As, but larger availability of credit services to the private sector improves this
probability. The size of the stock market, measured by the market capitalisation of listed
company (as a share of GDP), is instead insignificant. Finally, countries whose firms are
greatly involved in serving foreign markets through exports might see a low participa-
tion in the cross-border M&As, which justifies the inclusion of three variable capturing
characteristics of the domestic export market. Trade, as a share of GDP, measures the
size of net exports. Consistently with the theoretical model, the effect of exports on the
probability of an expansion is negative, because it indicates that domestic firms prefer
serving foreign markets with exports rather than with cross-border M&As. The remaining
two variables measure concentration and diversification of the export market.24 Including
both indices allows to identify different aspects of the involvement of domestic firms in
international trade. A high concentration index indicates that firms undertaking exports
are all concentrated in the production of few specific goods, which implies that exports is
the dominant foreign market entry mode only in a minority of industrial sectors. Once the
concentration index is controlled for, a high diversification index indicates that domestic
exports are diversified over many goods, which translates into the fact that firms choose
exports over M&A in the majority of industrial sectors. As expected, the effect of the
concentration index is positive and significant, while that of the diversification index is
negative and significant. With the inclusion of these macroeconomic indicators the esti-
mated coefficients of the lagged dependent variable remain unchanged, but the size of the
estimated effect of the statutory corporate tax rate for Multinational and Domestic firms
falls of few points. The APEs from Column [4] indicate that a raise of 10 percentage
points in the Home Statutory Tax rate increases the probability of an expansion for a
Multinational firm by 0.7 percentage points (instead of 0.9 of [3]), increases the probabil-
ity of an expansion for a Domestic firm by 0.1 percentage points (instead of 0.3 of [3]),
but still reduces the probability of an expansion for a Standalone firm by 0.1 percentage
points (as estimated in [3]). The maximised log likelihood in Column [4] is also the highest
of all models estimated in Table 2.11, so this represents the preferred specification, base
for further extension in the remainder of the econometric analysis.
Column [5] presents a robustness check for Column [4], where variables extracted from
the consolidated financial accounts of the parent firm enter the vector zi. Firm size is
now captured by the natural logarithm of total sales, while performance is captured by
24In particular, the concentration index is an Herfindahl-Hirschmann for the export market: it is
increasing in the share of total export given by exports of a single product and decreasing in the number
of exported products. Instead, the diversification index measures whether the composition of net exports
of a given country differs from the World composition of net exports. It is close to 1 when exports are
more concentrated or when they are more diversified than in the World aggregate composition
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the solvency ratio and by the profit margin. Including these variables causes a significant
reduction in the sample size, due to the fact that financial accounts are available only for
a subset of the observed firms (11,221 of the 28,940 parent firms). 25 The profit margin
variable is not significant, but the coefficient of the sales volume and of the solvency ratio
is always positive and significant. The other results are consistent with those reported in
the rest of the table.
Table 2.12 extends the preferred model by adding variables that control for additional
aspects of the home corporate fiscal regime. Column [1] reproduces Column [4] of Table
2.11. Column [2] adds a dummy variable controlling whether the home country applies a
credit system or an exemption system on repatriated foreign profit. Column [3] includes
a control variable accounting for the size of domestic capital allowances, and Column [4]
substitutes the corporate tax measure, by using the Effective Average Tax rate (EATR)
instead of the Statutory Tax rate (STR). The coefficient for the dummy variable on the
double tax system is not significant, and neither is the coefficient for the variable on cap-
ital allowances. The EATR variable is a non-linear combination of the STR and of the
variable measuring the generosity of capital allowances recognised by the Home country.
The argument that firms compare EATR, when evaluating the corporate tax treatment
applied in possible investment locations (Devereux and Griffith (1998b)), would imply
that a raise in home corporate taxes reduces the likelihood of domestic acquisitions and
increases the likelihood of cross-border acquisition, because it makes domestic taxes more
unfavourable relatively to foreign taxes. The coefficient for the EATR is significant and
negative, but the results indicates that changes in this variable equally affect all types of
firms. In this Table, the dependent variable includes both domestic and foreign acquisi-
tions, so at this stage it is not possible to distinguish between the effect of tax on one or
the other kind of expansions.
2.6.1 Effects of Corporate Taxes on Cross-Border Acquisitions
The main hypothesis advanced by the theoretical model presented in Section 2.3 is that
multinational firms are more productive than domestic firms, and consequently more
likely to favour cross-border acquisitions over the implicit alternative represented by ex-
ports. Proposition 1 suggests that, under these conditions, a raise of Home STR lowers
the productivity cutoff level of indifference between making or not a cross-border acqui-
sition, and increases the likelihood that a high productivity firm chooses to complete the
25The sample changes also in composition, because the consolidated financial accounts are provided to
the BvD to the discretion of each company’s headquarter. In general, simply structured firms, such as
standalone and domestic firms, submit only the unconsolidated accounts,so they are the group with more
missing values for these variables.
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cross-border acquisition. Proposition 2, instead, suggests that parent firms located in
countries that apply a Tax Credit on foreign repatriated profit are less likely to serve the
foreign market with a cross-border acquisition, than parent firms located in countries that
exempt foreign repatriated profits from double taxation. Additionally, the literature on
profit shifting suggests that the complex ownership structure of established multination-
als constitutes per se a comparative advantage with respect to that of domestic firms,
in terms of ability to capture opportunities and shift profit to locations that are more
“tax-advantageous” than the Home country.
Table 2.13 allows to test Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, by estimating a model for
the parent firms’ choice of expanding their ownership structure through the acquisition of
at least one foreign pre-existing subsidiary. Column [1] re-estimates the baseline model
from Table 2.11 on the newly defined dependent variable. Column [2] presents a model
specification that only controls for whether the parent firm already had the structure of
a multinational organisation by the end of 2004, without distinguishing domestic parent
firms from standalone parent firms, while Column [3] omits the irrelevant macroeconomic
variables from Column [1]. The remainder of the table extends Column [3] with additional
tax variables: Column [4] includes the dummy indicating whether the Home country ap-
plies the Credit System on foreign repatriated profits, Column [5] includes a measure of
capital allowances, and Column [6] substitute the STR with the EATR.
Column [1] of Table 2.13 presents two interesting results. First, when it comes to cross-
border acquisitions only, standalone parent firms do not seem to be significantly different
from domestic parent firms. The model’s estimates indicate that a change in Home STR
would not affect the choice of foreign acquisition of a domestic parent firm differently
than how the same change in Home STR would affect a standalone firm; and also having
completed an acquisition in s − 1 affects the probability of making a new acquisition in
period s in a similar way for domestic and standalone parent firms (the Average Partial
Effect (APE) estimated with respect to the lagged dependent choice variable is 0.0066
for Domestic Firms and 0.0070 for Standalone Firms). This first result motivates the
specification of Column [2]. Second, the results reported in Column [1] suggest that the
macroeconomic variables accounting for Home market size and financial sector “depth”
do not play a role in the parent firms’ decision of whether to acquire a foreign subsidiary.
In fact, only the coefficients estimated for the export concentration and diversification
indices are significantly different from zero. This result motivates the specification of
Column [3]
Column [3] allows to conclude that the tax effects from the base line model estimated
for the choice of making any acquisition (domestic and/or cross-border) also hold for the
model estimated for the choice of making cross-border acquisition only. In terms of APE,
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the model predicts that a 10 percentage points increase in the Home STR increase the
probability that a multinational parent firm acquires a foreign subsidiary by 0.6 percent-
age points, but reduces the probability that a standalone or a domestic firm makes the
same acquisition by 0.1 percentage points. This suggests that Proposition 1 holds only for
multinational firms, and that parents that do not already have a multinational structure
would not find the acquisition option more profitable than exports, following an increase
of Home corporate taxes. In line with the theory, this would seem to indicate that non-
multinational firms are considerably less productive than multinational firms and do not
benefit from marginal shifts in the cutoff productivity level.
The results from Column [4] indicate that the probability of making a cross-border ac-
quisition is not affected by whether the Home country applies a Tax Credit on foreign
repatriated profit. This result contradicts the hypothesis advanced by Proposition 2, but
could be driven by the low variation in the Tax Credit System dummy due to the fact
that most countries in Europe do apply the Exemption System. Column [5] suggest that
an increase of capital allowances reduces the probability that any firm chooses to make
cross-border acquisitions. More generous capital allowances constitute an improvement
in the domestic tax treatment of capital expenditure, that might represent an incentive
to concentrate production at home, instead of locating it to a foreign location through
cross-border acquisitions. Column [6] substitutes the STR measure with the EATRA, and
finds results similar to those of Table 2.12, column [4].
A final important result from Table 2.13 regards the time dependence of the cross-border
acquisition choice. The estimated coefficients for the lagged dependent variable are sig-
nificant in all model specifications. According to the APE, multinational firms that did
acquire foreign subsidiaries in s−1 are more likely to acquire also in period s with respect
to multinationals that did not acquire in s− 1 by only 0.002 percentage points, whereas
the same difference in probabilities amounts to 0.005 for non-multinationals. This indi-
cates that there is time dependence in the cross-border acquisition choice. However, the
interesting fact is that the time dependence measured in terms of Average Partial Effects
is for this choice up to five times lower than how it was for the general acquisition choice
(cross-border and/or domestic acquisition).
2.6.2 Effects of Corporate Taxes on Domestic Acquisitions
The extension to the theoretical model presented in section 2.3.4 was closed by a propo-
sition on the effect of Home corporate taxes on the choice made by multinational parent
firms to acquire domestic firms, in order to increase their domestic production. In par-
ticular, proposition 3 suggested that such investment choice is affected by the size of the
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(mark-up adjusted) demand in the Home market and by the inefficiency of domestic firms,
but it is not affected by changes in Home corporate taxes. Table 2.14 presents results
from model specifications estimated on the parent firms choice of acquiring the controlling
share of at least one domestic subsidiary. Column [1] replicates the specification of the
base line model from Table 2.11, Column [4], after omitting the macroeconomic variables
controlling for the export market (that were found to have no significant effect on the do-
mestic expansion choice). Column [2] adds the dummy controlling for whether the Home
country applies the Tax Credit System, Column [3] adds the capital allowance variable
and Column [4] substitute the STR with the EATR measure.
The main result from table 2.14 is that, in line with Proposition 3, the estimates for
the coefficient of the Statutory Tax rate applied by the Home country lose significance
with respect to the estimates from the models on the choice of making a general (cross
border and/or domestic) or a cross-border acquisition. Column [3] accounts from the tax
allowances. The estimated coefficient of the STR for domestic parent firms is significant
only at the 10% level, and the estimated coefficient of the capital allowances indicates that
a more generous treatment of capital expenditure represents an incentive for any type of
firm to expand domestic production through the acquisition of a pre-existing domestic
subsidiary, which is consistent with the results from Table 2.13. Finally, the estimated
coefficients of the lagged dependent variable , and the respective Average Partial Effects
(APE), suggest that the time dependence of the domestic acquisition choice was the driver
of the results on time dependence from Table 2.11. In fact, whereas the time dependence
in the cross-border acquisition choice is very low, Table 2.14 indicates that multinational
firms that did acquire domestic subsidiaries in s − 1 are more likely to acquire also in
period s, with respect to multinationals that did not acquire in s−1, by 0.007 percentage
points, and the same difference in probabilities amounts to 0.015 for domestic firms and
to 0.017 for standalone firms.
2.6.3 Results from the Random Parameter Dynamic Probit
Table 2.15 present the results from model specifications that attempt a different approach
to investigate the role of firm heterogeneity. The random effect dynamic probit is extended
to a random parameter dynamic probit, that allows the estimate a firm-specific effect of
corporate taxes on the probability of making an expansion. This is combined with the
assumption that the observable firm heterogeneity (the parent firms’ type) shifts the mean
effect of the tax variable on the probability of making an acquisition.
Column [1], Column [3] and Column [5] replicate the best preferred models from Table
2.11, Table 2.13 and Table 2.14, respectively; while Column [2], Column [4] and Column
[6] re-estimate these models allowing for a random parameter in the effect of the Home
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STR and of the lagged dependent variable, as shown in Equation (2.20). The mean of the
distribution of the random parameters is allowed to vary according to the “original firm
type” (the ki of Equation (2.20)), and the stochastic component of the random parameters
are assumed to follow a normal distribution.
For the mean effect of the Home Statutory Tax Rate and of the lagged expansion choice,
the results from the random parameter probit are quite similar to those from the random
effect probit, for all dependent variables. However, Column [2], [4] and [6] of Table 2.15
predict a large significant variance in the distribution of the random parameters, suggest-
ing that there is a large unobservable variation across firms in the impact of corporate
taxes on the probability of an expansion, and that the same is true for the size and direc-
tion of the state dependence.
Figure (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5) show the Kernel Density Estimate for the Distribution of
the Tax Effect, as estimated in Column [2], [4] and [6], respectively. Figure (2.3) shows
that for standalone firms (which are the largest mass) the decision of making any kind
of acquisition is negatively affected by an increase in the Home Statutory Tax Rate. The
same result holds when the expansion decision is restricted to cross-border acquisitions
only, Figure (2.4). In Figure (2.3) there is a second mass of firms whose expansion deci-
sion is affected negatively by an increase in home corporate taxes, the mass of domestic
firms. The effect for these firms is smaller, as the predicted tax coefficient is closer to zero,
but still negative. Finally, both Figure (2.3) and Figure (2.4) show how there is a small
mass of firms whose expansion decision is positively affected by an increase of corporate
taxes, as predicted by the proposition derived from the theoretical model. This smaller
mass represents the multinational firms, and supports the argument that productivity
advantages such as those owned by these firms allows to afford the high costs associated
to an acquisition and locate production abroad when facing an increase of home corporate
taxes.
§ 2.7 Conclusions
This papers analyses the effect of home corporate taxes on the decision of a firm to expand
its ownership structure through the completion of an M&A deal. The results from the
existing literature suggest that home corporate taxes could affect this decision in different
ways. The argument proposed here is that the dominating effect depends on the compo-
sition of the observed sample, given that different types of firms are affected in different
ways. In particular, the main result of the paper is that standalone firms are likely to be
negatively affected by a rise of the home statutory corporate tax rate. This is in contrast
with what the literature on corporate tax competition suggests, namely that firms tend
to relocate their capital investment when facing a rise in home corporate taxes. On the
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other hand, a rise in the home corporate statutory tax rate could incentivise more sophis-
ticated firms to enlarge their structure even further, possibly in search of profit shifting
opportunities.
The paper also accounts for the expansion pattern followed by the observed companies
over a period of six years. The results show evidence that the firms that are more likely
to expand are those that have completed other acquisitions in the recent past and that
had a simple structure at the beginning of the sample. This confirms the hypothesis that
a domestic firm that is in the process of evolving into a multinational is likely to continue
and complete the transformation with a series of consecutive acquisitions, but that this
firm will find it inconvenient to keep expanding once a large enough number of subsidiaries
have come under its control.
This paper suggests that firms’ heterogeneity should not be ignored by policy makers.
Corporate tax systems should be flexible enough to differentiate between firms types. A
reduction of the Statutory Corporate Tax Rate would attract more inward FDI, as shown
by the literature on investment location, but it would also incentivise domestic companies
to undertake their first acquisitions and grow into multinational corporations.
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§ 2.8 Tables and Figures
Figure 2.1: Trend in worldwide FDI and cross-border M&A
Note: information on volume and number of cross-border merger and acquisition deals are collected from UNCTAD Stastis-
tics. Cross-border M&A purchases are calculated on a net basis as follows: Purchases of companies abroad by home-based
companies (-) Sales of foreign affiliates of home-based companies. The data cover only the deals that involved an acquisition
of an equity stake of more than 10%. Data refer to the net purchases by the region/economy of the ultimate acquiring
company
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Table 2.1: M&A deals worth over 1 Billion USD completed in 2010
Parent Country
Number of
“MegaDeal”
Total Value
(Bil USD)
European Countries
France 9 24.8
United Kingdom 8 14.1
Spain 7 21
Switzerland 6 11.7
Germany 5 18.9
Netherlands 5 18.3
Sweden 4 5.5
Luxembourg 2 5.6
Russia 2 6.6
Austria 1 1.4
Belgium 1 1.1
Denmark 1 1.3
Greece 1 1.1
Ireland 1 1.6
Rest of the World
United States 36 96.9
China 10 26.2
Canada 9 23.4
Japan 8 18.5
Brazil 6 11.5
Bermuda 5 6.5
India 5 21
Singapore 3 5.5
Australia 2 11
Colombia 2 4.1
Guernsey 2 7.5
Korea 2 4.8
Hong Kong 1 9.1
Israel 1 4.9
Malaysia 1 2.4
Mexico 1 1.2
New Zeal. 1 4.5
Qatar 1 2.2
Thailand 1 1.6
Note: information on “mega-deals” is extracted from the
UNCTAD World Investment Report 2011 and they cover the
largest M&A deals completed in 2010. The Total value of the
observed deals is reported in terms of Billions of USD
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Table 2.2: Sample composition and Firms Size
Initial Type
Number
of Firms
Average Firm Size
Size as Number of Controlled Subidiaries
Average
Size
St. Dev. Median 75th Perc 99th Perc
Multinational 3,268 11.42 29.64 4 10 121
Domestic 10,855 2.64 4.20 1 3 20
Standalone 14,817 0.00 0.00 0 0 0
Size as Number of Countries of Controlled Subsidiaries
Average
Size
St. Dev. Median 75th Perc 99th Perc
Multinational 3,268 3.11 3.18 2 3 17
Domestic 10,855 1.00 0.00 1 1 1
Standalone 14,817 0.00 0.00 0 0 0
Note: two firms’ size measured are used. Total number of controlled subsidiaries or total number of foreign
countries where the controlled subsidiaries are located. Both measures are based on all subsidiaries directly
or indirectly controlled by the Global Ultimate Owner up to the tenth level of dependency as at the end of
2004. Any link in the reconstruction of the corporate ownership tree is conditional on the parent being the
largest shareholder for a given subsidiary. This condition guarantees the pattern of control from the Global
Ultimate Owner to all listed subsidiaries
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Parents size, conditional on Expansion Choice
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Table 2.3: Geographic Distribution of Parent Companies
Country All Firms Distribution of Firms Types:
Multinational Domestic Standalone
United Kingdom 8518 5.93% 54.80% 39.27%
Spain 3445 4.76% 24.06% 71.18%
France 3107 10.72% 30.54% 58.74%
Italy 3096 7.24% 20.22% 72.55%
Sweden 2142 15.83% 68.95% 15.22%
Germany 1894 28.09% 29.14% 42.77%
Denmark 1009 17.84% 57.19% 24.98%
Belgium 943 20.47% 22.16% 57.37%
Netherlands 853 50.29% 21.69% 28.02%
Greece 761 3.81% 23.92% 72.27%
Poland 746 1.21% 10.46% 88.34%
Ireland 677 12.70% 28.80% 58.49%
Portugal 470 6.38% 23.83% 69.79%
Romania 297 0.00% 13.47% 86.53%
Finaland 259 30.50% 27.80% 41.70%
Austria 152 48.68% 19.74% 31.58%
Bulgaria 115 0.00% 31.30% 68.70%
Lithuania 98 0.00% 12.24% 87.76%
Czech Republic 93 1.08% 2.15% 96.77%
Estonia 71 5.63% 19.72% 74.65%
Latvia 71 1.41% 5.63% 92.96%
Luxembourg 64 68.75% 3.13% 28.13%
Hungary 31 19.35% 6.45% 74.19%
Slovenia 18 27.78% 0.00% 72.22%
Slovakia 10 10.00% 20.00% 70.00%
All Countries 28,940 11.29% 37.51% 51.20%
Note: each row reports the total number of parent firms located in the country indicated by
the first column, together with the percentage of these firms represented by multinational,
domestic and standalone firms. A parent is defined as a firm whose shares are not (directly
or indirectly) owned by other firms. A parent firm’s location country is defined on the bases
of the country where the firm was legally incorporated. A parent firm’s “type” is identified
according to the ownership structure as at the end of 2004. A firm is multinational if it owns
at least one subsidiary located in a foreign country. It is a domestic if it owns one or more
subsidiaries, all located within the home country. It is a standalone if it owns no subsidiaries
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Table 2.4: Distribution of Parent Companies across Industrial Sectors
Sector All Firms Distribution of Firms Types:
Multinational Domestic Standalone
Finance, Ins. & Real Est. 9,075 16.44% 50.07% 33.49%
Wholesale & Retail Trade 6,345 6.05% 26.34% 67.61%
Manufacturing 6,037 14.83% 27.81% 57.36%
Construction 2,814 2.31% 36.25% 61.44%
Trasp., Storage and Comm. 2,072 13.18% 36.82% 50.00%
Other Services 871 2.64% 41.91% 55.45%
Electricity Gas & Water 596 4.53% 32.05% 63.42%
Agriculture, For., Fish. 244 3.69% 39.34% 56.97%
Mining & Quarrying 196 13.78% 43.37% 42.86%
Unknown 690 10.58% 63.91% 25.51%
All Sectors 28,940 11.29% 37.51% 51.20%
Note: each row reports the total number of parent firms operating in the industrial sector indicated by
the first column, together with the percentage of these firms represented by multinational, domestic and
standalone firms. A parent firm’s industrial sector is defined according to the main activity reported by the
BvD. There is a total of 690 firms whose Industrial Sector is unknown. Industrial Sectors reported in this
table follow the main categories given by the ISIC rev.4 classification
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Table 2.5: Mean Difference between expanding and non-expanding firms
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
non-
Acquirers
Acquirers Difference
[1]−[2]
Max
Difference
Test
Difference
Means
KS Test
Firm Characteristics Differentials between Multinational parents who expand at least once and
Multinationals who never expand
ln(Total Sales) 16.257 16.618 -.361 0.143 0.0014 0.0010
(.049) (.110) (.120)
ln(Intangible Fixed Assets) 12.515 13.861 -1.346 0.296 0.0000 0.0000
(.084) (.117) (.144)
ln(Financial Revenue) 11.017 11.286 -.269 0.111 0.0208 0.0060
(.065) (.115) (.132)
ln(Operating Revenue) 16.192 16.490 -.299 0.128 0.0024 0.0010
(.045) (.095) (.105)
ln(Profit or Loss Before Tax) 13.117 13.739 -.621 0.193 0.0000 0.0000
(.063) (.0108) (.125)
Av. Cost of Employees 8.271 8.398 -.127 0.195 0.0000 0.0001
(.018) (.027) (.032)
Firm Characteristics Differentials between Domestic parents who expand at least once and Domestic
who never expand
ln(Total Sales) 15.802 15.177 -.625 0.234 0.0000 0.0000
(.024) (.080) (.084)
ln(Intangible Fixed Assets) 11.360 12.894 -1.534 0.273 0.0000 0.0000
(.040) (.082) (.092)
ln(Financial Revenue) 10.199 10.975 -.776 0.160 0.0000 0.0000
(.031) (.078) (.084)
ln(Operating Revenue) 15.130 15.607 -.478 0.192 0.0000 0.0000
(.018) (.058) (.061)
ln(Profit (Loss) Before Tax) 12.007 12.990 -.983 0.254 0.0000 0.0000
(.024) (.069) (.074)
Average Cost of Employees 8.250 8.305 -0.055 0.109 0.0033 0.0000
(.008) (.019) (.020)
Firm Characteristics Differentials between Standalones who expand at least once and Standalones
who never expand
ln(Total Sales) 14.026 14.823 -.797 0.266 0.0000 0.0000
(.013) (.211) (.212)
ln(Intangible Fixed Assets) 8.716 10.775 -2.058 0.308 0.0000 0.0000
(.027) (.286) (.287)
ln(Financial Revenue) 8.414 9.786 -1.372 0.275 0.0000 0.0000
(.021) (.221) (.222)
ln(Operating Revenue) 14.067 14.715 -.648 0.229 0.0000 0.0000
(.012) (.150) (.151)
ln(Profit (Loss) Before Tax) 10.797 12.107 -1.310 0.308 0.0000 0.0000
(.016) (.190) (.191)
Average Cost of Employees 7.989 8.213 -0.223 0.239 0.0030 0.0000
(.008) (.079) (.079)
Note: characteristics distribution comparison tests were conducted on the three groups of firms observed in our sample. All
characteristics are measured on the basis of the firms consolidated financial accounts, averaged over the period 2002-2004.
Column [1] and [2] report mean values of each characteristic. Column [3] reports the mean difference of the two distributions.
Column [5] reports the p-value for a test of the null hypothesis of equal means in column [1] and [2] against the alternative
of of a smaller mean in column [2]. Column [6] reports the result of a test of the null hypothesis of identical distribution
in column [1] and [2], against the alternative that the distribution in column [1] stochastically dominates that in column
[2]. Multinationals with more than 8 different subsidiaries (representing the top 5% of the size distribution of all firms) are
excluded from the sample. The final sample includes a total of 28,023 firms: 14,817 standalone, 10,855 domestic firms and
2,351 multinationals
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Table 2.6: Firms transition into Multinational Companies
Total Sample Domestic Standalone Multinationals
Year [a] [b] [c] [a] [b] [c] [a] [c] [a] [c]
2006 1,045 13.68% 19.43% 483 39.54% 14.08% 40 12.50% 522 24.90%
2007 937 18.89% 19.10% 431 27.61% 15.55% 56 12.50% 450 23.33%
2008 743 21.40% 22.61% 310 33.55% 18.71% 53 22.64% 380 25.79%
2009 521 24.18% 29.58% 233 32.62% 20.60% 49 26.53% 239 39.33%
2010 423 15.13% 23.88% 194 21.65% 21.65% 21 33.33% 208 25.00%
Note: the table reports, in percentage, the share of expansions that lead the acquiring firm to switch to a new
“type”. Column [a] reports the total number of expansions completed every year, simply defined as the acquisition
of the control share of a pre-existing subsidiary. Column [b] reports the share of expansions from column [a]
that corresponds, for the acquirer, to a corporate “re-structuring”. This happens when - given the acquisition - the
company switches from a Domestic to a Multinational or from a Standalone to either a Domestic or a Multinational.
Finally, column [c] reports the number of expansions consisting in a parent firm acquiring the controlling share of
a subsidiary that was already owned before the M&A, but only for a minority share. Column [b] is not reported
for Standalone and Multinational companies because trivial: by definition, all Standalone firms change their type
when completing an acquisition, and none of the Multinationals do.
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Table 2.8: Corporate Taxes in the Parent Home Countries
Statutory Tax Rate
Effective Average
Tax Rate
Allowances
Double Tax
Relief
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Austria 0.2500 (0.00) 0.2310 (0.00) 0.1180 (0.00) Exemp.
Belgium 0.3399 (0.00) 0.2844 (.003) 0.1961 (.003) Exemp.
Bulgaria 0.1167 (.024) 0.1010 (.02) 0.0738 (.015) Credit
Czech Republic 0.2233 (.025) 0.2341 (.02) 0.0983 (.009) Exemp.
Denmark 0.2650 (.015) 0.2342 (.009) 0.1471 (.012) Exemp.
Estonia 0.2200 (.012) 0.3142 (.018) 0.0000 (0.00) Exemp.
Finland 0.2600 (0.00) 0.2233 (0.00) 0.1449 (0.00) Exemp.
France 0.3333 (0.00) 0.2892 (.002) 0.1998 (.001) Exemp.
Germany 0.2000 (.05) 0.3437 (.028) 0.1693 (.028) Exemp.
Greece 0.2667 (.029) 0.2053 (.023) 0.1956 (.022) Credit
Hungary 0.1917 (.015) 0.1598 (.016) 0.1065 (.011) Exemp.
Ireland 0.1250 (0.00) 0.1150 (0.00) 0.0612 (0.00) Exemp.
Italy 0.3025 (.028) 0.3073 (.025) 0.1921 (.014) Exemp.
Latvia 0.1500 (0.00) 0.1146 (0.00) 0.0992 (0.00) Exemp.
Lithuania 0.1583 (.019) 0.1094 (.011) 0.1276 (.013) Exemp.
Luxembourg 0.2167 (.005) 0.2694 (.014) 0.1512 (.016) Exemp.
Netherlands 0.2718 (.024) 0.2473 (.024) 0.1448 (.014) Exemp.
Poland 0.1900 (0.00) 0.1438 (0.00) 0.1313 (0.00) Exemp.
Portugal 0.2500 (0.00) 0.2228 (.004) 0.1608 (.003) Exemp.
Romania 0.1600 (0.00) 0.1097 (.002) 0.1218 (.003) Credit*
Slovakia 0.1900 (0.00) 0.1800 (0.00) 0.0878 (0.00) Exemp.
Slovenia 0.2267 (.019) 0.1985 (.004) 0.1332 (.019) Exemp.
Spain 0.3208 (.022) 0.3131 (.021) 0.1473 (.01) Exemp.
Sweden 0.2743 (.008) 0.2317 (0.00) 0.1604 (0.00) Exemp.
United Kingdom 0.2900 (.01) 0.2640 (.001) 0.1476 (.014) Credit*
Note: country-specific averages and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of the various measures of corporate tax rates are
reported in the table. Statutory Corporate Tax Rate is equivalent to the top rate imposed by each country’s jurisdiction.
Effective Average Tax Rate is calculated using Devereux and Klemm method. The Double Tax Relief can be either
exemption or tax credit. (*) indicates a country has switched to the exemption system
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Table 2.9: Explanatory Variables - definition
Variable Definition
Characteristic of the Parent Firm’s Country
Domestic Credit to Private Sec-
tor (%GDP)
Financial resources provided to the private sector, such as through
loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and
other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment.
(WDI, The World Bank)
ln(real GDP) GDP measured in constant 2005 U.S. dollars. (WDI, The World
Bank)
Industry Value Added (annual %
growth)
Value added in manufacturing sectors (ISIC divisions 15-37). It
measures the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and
subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and
degradation of natural resources. (WDI, The World Bank)
Mkt Capitalization of Listed
Companies (%GDP)
Market Value (measured as the share price times the number of
shares outstanding) of listed domestic companies. These are the
domestically incorporated companies listed on the country’s stock
exchanges at the end of the year. Listed companies does not
include investment companies, mutual funds, or other collective
investment vehicles. (WDI, The World Bank)
Trade (%GDP). Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a
share of gross domestic product. (WDI, The World Bank)
Concentration Index Herfindahl-Hirschmann index, is a measure of the degree of market
concentration. An index value that is close to 1 indicates a very
concentrated market (maximum concentration). On the contrary,
values closer to 0 reflect a more equal distribution of market shares
among exporters or importers. (UNCTAD)
Diversification Index Differences between the structure of trade of the country and the
World average. The index value closer to 1 indicates a bigger dif-
ference from the World average. Diversification index is computed
by measuring absolute deviation of the country share from world
structure. (UNCTAD)
Characteristic of the Parent Firm
ln(Operating Revenue) Four years average of Revenue realized in the course of yearly nor-
mal operations. Only ordinary revenue rather than unexpected,
one-time income, is included. (Amadeus, Bureau Van Dijk)
ln(Sales) Volume of Total Yearly Sales, averaged over four years. (Amadeus,
Bureau Van Dijk)
Profit Margin (%) (Profit before tax / Operating revenue) × 100. (Amadeus, Bureau
Van Dijk)
Solvency Ratio (%) (Shareholders funds / Total assets) × 100. (Amadeus, Bureau
Van Dijk)
Number Owned Subsidiaries Total Number of Subsidiaries owned with majority share at the
end of the accounting year 2004. (Own Calculation)
Number Foreign Countries Number of Different Foreign countries where the Subsidiaries
Owned by the end of 2004 were located. (Own Calculation)
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Table 2.10: Descriptive Statics of Explanatory Variables
Variable Mean St. Dev. Obs.
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate overall 0.2778 0.0521 N = 144700
between 0.0487 n = 28940
within 0.0185 T = 5
Effective Average Tax Rate overall 0.2649 0.0527 N = 144700
between 0.0505 n = 28940
within 0.0148 T = 5
Allowances overall 0.1577 0.0317 N = 144700
between 0.0288 n = 28940
within 0.0132 T = 5
Domestic Credit to Private Sector
(%GDP)
overall 1.4515 0.5120 N = 144700
between 0.4797 n = 28940
within 0.1791 T = 5
ln(real GDP) overall 27.3542 1.0446 N = 144700
between 1.0439 n = 28940
within 0.0378 T = 5
Industry Value Added (annual %
growth)
overall 0.0067 0.0329 N = 144700
between 0.0193 n = 28940
within 0.0267 T = 5
Mkt Capitalization of Listed
Companies (%GDP)
overall 0.8384 0.3966 N = 144700
between 0.3093 n = 28940
within 0.2481 T = 5
Trade (%GDP) overall 0.7608 0.3196 N = 144700
between 0.3171 n = 28940
within 0.0402 T = 5
Index of hourly compensation
costs (US=100)
overall 113.0210 28.2502 N = 141030
between 27.3170 n = 28206
within 7.2026 T = 5
ln(Operating Revenue) average
2002-2005
overall 14.7075 1.6897 N = 99150
between 1.6898 n = 19830
within 0.0000 T = 5
Continued on next page
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Table 2.10 – continued from previous page
Variable Mean St. Dev. Obs.
ln(Financial Turnover) average
2002-2005
overall 14.6016 1.6525 N = 68735
between 1.6525 n = 13747
within 0.0000 T = 5
Profit Margin (%) average
2002-2005
overall 4.5044 13.8669 N = 97540
between 13.8672 n = 19508
within 0.0000 T = 5
Solvency Ratio (%) average
2002-2005
overall 32.8041 25.3809 N = 107725
between 25.3814 n = 21545
within 0.0000 T = 5
Total No. Subsidiaries owned in
2005
overall 2.2788 10.8602 N = 144700
between 10.8603 n = 28940
within 0.0000 T = 5
No. Foreign Countries in 2005 overall 0.7262 1.4434 N = 144700
between 1.4434 n = 28940
within 0.0000 T = 5
Note: all the macro variables are taken from the WDI (World Bank). The TAX variables are from the CBT (Oxford
Said Business School). Finally, the accounting variables are from Bureau Van Dijk, and refer to the consolidated
financial accounts averaged over the years 2002-2005
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Table 2.11: Dynamic Probit Model Estimates - All Acquisitions
Dynamic
Pooled
Probit
Dynamic
RE Probit
[2] + Sq.
Size
[3] +
Macro
Controls
[4] +
Financial
Accounts
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Expansion s− 1 1.948*** 0.982*** 1.012*** 0.996*** 0.900***
(.100) (.115) (.114) (.116) (.189)
Expansion s− 1 * Multinational -.738*** -0.840*** -0.893*** -0.879*** -0.796***
(.105) (.12) (.12) (.122) (.197)
Expansion s− 1 * Domestic -.686*** -0.688*** -0.711*** -0.701*** -0.635***
(.106) (.12) (.119) (.121) (.205)
Statutory Tax Rate -1.131*** -1.604*** -1.618*** -1.644** -2.204**
(.390) (.598) (.591) (.721) (.969)
Statutory Tax Rate*Multinational 2.534*** 2.901*** 2.511*** 2.274*** 2.553**
(.471) (.722) (.717) (.767) (1.087)
Statutory Tax Rate*Domestic 1.706*** 2.315*** 2.187*** 1.752** 1.069
( .481) (.716) (.71) (.731)
(1.072)
Characteristics of Parent Country measured in the year before the expansion
Domestic credit by banking sector
-0.615* -1.237**
(.314) (.523)
Domestic credit to private sector
0.478* 1.439***
(.28) (.506)
Ln (real GDP) -0.011 0.056
(.039) (.041)
Industry Value Added 2.024*** 2.902***
(.678) (1.039)
MKT Capitalization of Listed
Companies
-0.022 -0.071
(.065) (.094)
Trade (% GDP) -0.120* 0.290**
(.07) (.131)
Concentration Index 3.046*** 4.466**
(1.045) (2.191)
Diversification Index -2.089*** -3.638***
(.594) (1.364)
Characteristics of Parent Firm measured in 2004
Type = Multinational 0.683*** 0.618*** 0.459** 0.540** 0.639**
(.129) (.199) (.199) (.214) (.292)
Type = Domestic 0.326** 0.279 0.202 0.299 0.627**
(.134) (.197) (.196) (.203) (.282)
Subidiaries Locations 0.069*** 0.151*** 0.156***
(.007) (.017) (.017)
(Subidiaries Locations)2 -0.006*** -0.007***
(.001) (.001)
Number of Subsidiaries 0.007*** 0.018*** 0.017***
(.000) (.001) (.001)
(Number of Subsidiaries)2
-0.2D-
04***
-0.2D-
04***
(.000) (.000)
Ln (Total Sales) (av. 2002-2004) 0.228***
(.016)
Solvency Ratio (av. 2002-2004) 0.006***
(.001)
Profit Margin (av. 2002-2004) -0.001
Continued on next page
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Table 2.11 – continued from previous page
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
(.002)
Expansion Choice in 2005 1.236*** 1.220*** 1.143*** 1.121*** 1.114***
(.052) (.051) (.05) (.05) (.084)
Constant -2.723*** -3.490*** -3.464*** -2.360*** -1.708***
(.107) (.168) (.166) (1.207) (2.525)
Rho 0.376*** 0.367*** 0.365*** 0.314***
(.016) (.016) (.016) (.028)
Log-L -12431.83 -11608.9 -11530.5 -11488.1 -3671.02
Sample 28,940 28,940 28,940 28,940 11,221
Average Partial Effects (APE)
APE for Expansion s− 1:
Multinational Firms 0.3009 0.0158 0.0136 0.0135 0.0138
(.011) (.006) (.006) (.006) (0.011)
Domestic Firms 0.1980 0.0167 0.0172 0.0167 0.0140
(.009) (.033) (.003) (.003) (0.006)
Standalone Firms 0.1733 0.0171 0.0184 0.0177 0.0110
(.024) (.004) (.005) (.004) (0.004)
APE for Statutory Tax Rate:
Multinational Firms 0.2155 0.1458 0.0987 0.0696 0.0479
(.011) (.049) (.048) (.061) (.109)
Domestic Firms 0.0351 0.0335 0.0268 0.0051 -0.0532
(.018) (.020) (.019) (.025) (.004)
Standalone Firms -0.0091 -0.0096 -0.0098 -0.0099 -0.0090
(.003) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Notes: (1) the dependent variable is the parents choice of acquiring at least one new subsidiary at period s, acquisi-
tions can be only cross-border or cross-border and domestic at the same time (int he case of multiple acquisitions);
(2) all models include dummy variables specific to the country of the parent firm, dummies specific to the indus-
trial sector of the parent firm and dummies specific to the year when the acquisition took place (unreported); (3)
standard errors are given in parenthesis; (4) asterisks indicate significance at *** ( 1%), ** (5%), * (10%); (5) rho
indicates the proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel-variance component; (6) dummies of firms
“type” identify whether the firm is Multinational or Domestic, and use the type Standalone as reference group; (7)
for Standalone companies, number of subsidiaries and number of countries where the subsidiaries are located is 0;
(8) sample size is 28,940 parent firms observed for the five years between 2006 and 2010 (2005 is the base year),
sample size for column [6] is reduced due to incompleteness of data on firms financial accounts; (9) the Average
Partial Effects (APE), reported at the bottom, have standard errors computed using the delta method, bootstrap
standard errors were also computed by they are not reported here; (10) Average Partial Effects conditional on firms
types were computed by restricting the sample to all parent firms who were of a specific type in 2004; (11) the raw
unconditional probability of making an acquisition at any point in time between 2006 and 2010 is 0.1559.
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Table 2.12: Dynamic Probit Model Estimates - Extension of Tab 11 Column 4
Tab 11, Col.
[4]
(TAX=STR)
Double Tax
System
(TAX=STR)
Capital
Allowances
(TAX=STR)
TAX=EATR
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Expansion s− 1 0.996*** 1.015*** 1.014*** 1.031***
(.116) (.120) (.12) (.119)
Expansion s− 1 * Multinational -0.879*** -0.921*** -0.920*** -0.941***
(.122) (.126) (.126) (.125)
Expansion s− 1 * Domestic -0.701*** -0.694*** -0.696*** -0.711***
(.121) (.125) (.125) (.124)
TAX -1.644** -1.685** -2.201** -2.415**
(.721) (.790) (.894) (1.017)
TAX*Multinational 2.274*** 2.738*** 2.813*** -0.343
(.767) (.843) (.848) (.861)
TAX*Domestic 1.752** 1.464* 1.502* -0.048
(.731) (.803) (.801) (.759)
Dummy for Credit System -0.032
(.049)
Capital Allowances 1.557
(1.16)
Characteristics of Parent Country measured in the year before the expansion
Domestic credit by banking sector
-0.615* -1.089*** -1.137*** -0.556
(.314) (.394) (.381) (.407)
Domestic credit to private sector
0.478* 0.886** 0.974*** 0.456
(.28) (.348) (.351) (.36)
Ln (real GDP) -0.011 0.032 0.013 0.118**
(.039) (.050) (.051) (.059)
Industry Value Added 2.024*** 1.935** 2.202*** 2.090***
(.678) (.740) (.759) (.724)
MKT Capitalization of Listed
Companies
-0.022 -0.020 -0.013 -0.175**
(.065) (.081) (.076) (.079)
Trade (% GDP) -0.120* -0.035 -0.037 0.139
(.07) (.079) (.079) (.104)
Concentration Index 3.046*** 2.670*** 2.684** 3.220**
(1.045) (1.301) (1.304) (1.305)
Diversification Index -2.089*** -2.094*** -2.280*** -2.176***
(.594) (.795) (.822)
(.716)
Characteristics of Parent Firms measured in 2004
Type = Multinational 0.540** 0.348 0.327 1.197***
(.214) (.233) (.234) (.239)
Type = Domestic 0.299 0.325 0.315 0.742***
(.203) (.221) (.22) (.201)
Subsidiaries Locations 0.156*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.165***
(.017) (.017) (.017) (.017)
(Subsidiaries Locations)2 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Number of Subsidiaries 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
(Number of Subsidiaries)2 -.2D-04*** -.2D-04*** -.2D-04*** -.2D-04***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Expansion Choice in 2005 1.121*** 1.128*** 1.131*** 1.118***
Continued on next page
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Table 2.12 – continued from previous page
[1] [2] [3] [4]
(.05) (.052) (.052) (.052)
Constant -2.360* -3.391** -2.959* -5.875***
(1.207) (1.614) (1.649) (1.719)
Rho 0.365*** 0.364*** 0.364*** 0.364***
(.016) (.017) (.017) (.017)
Log-L -11488.1 -10348.8 -10348.2 -10350.5
No. Firms 28,940 24,729 24,729 24,729
Average Partial Effects (APE)
APE for Expansion s− 1:
Multinational Firms 0.0135 0.0105 0.0105 0.0101
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)
Domestic Firms 0.0167 0.0184 0.0182 0.0184
(.003) (.004) (.004) (.003)
Standalone Firms 0.0177 0.0197 0.0197 0.0204
(.004) (.005) (.005) (.005)
APE for Tax Variable:
Multinational Firms 0.0696 0.1147 0.0666 -0.3010
(.061) (.066) (.076) (.115)
Domestic Firms 0.0051 -0.0104 -0.0328 -0.1156
(.025) (.03) (.035) (.048)
Standalone Firms -0.0099 -0.0112 -0.0146 -0.0160
(.004) (.005) (.006) (.007)
Notes: (1) the dependent variable is the parents choice of acquiring at least one new subsidiary at period s,
acquisitions can be only cross-border or cross-border and domestic at the same time (int he case of multiple
acquisitions); (2) all models include dummy variables specific to the country of the parent firm, dummies
specific to the industrial sector of the parent firm and dummies specific to the year when the acquisition
took place (unreported); (3) standard errors are given in parenthesis; (4) asterisks indicate significance at
*** ( 1%), ** (5%), * (10%); (5) rho indicates the proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel-
variance component; (6) dummies of firms “type” identify whether the firm is Multinational or Domestic,
and use the type Standalone as reference group; (7) for Standalone companies, number of subsidiaries and
number of countries where the subsidiaries are located is 0; (8) sample size is 28,940 parent firms observed for
the five years between 2006 and 2010 (2005 is the base year), sample size for column [2] to [4] is reduced due to
incompleteness of data on tax variables; (9) the Average Partial Effects (APE), reported at the bottom, have
standard errors computed using the delta method, bootstrap standard errors were also computed by they
are not reported here; (10) Average Partial Effects conditional on firms types were computed by restricting
the sample to all parent firms who were of a specific type in 2004; (11) the raw unconditional probability of
making an acquisition at any point in time between 2006 and 2010 is 0.1559.
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Table 2.13: Dynamic Probit Model Estimates - Cross-Border Acquisitions Only
Baseline
Model
(TAX=STR)
Col. [1] +
Only MNE
and
non-MNE
Col. [2] no
WDI
Col. [2] +
Double
Tax
System
(TAX=STR)
Col. [2] +
Capital
Allowances
(TAX=STR)
Col. [2] +
TAX=EATR
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Expansion s− 1 1.052*** 0.515*** 0.513*** 0.513*** 0.513*** 0.535***
(.214) (.108) (.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.106)
Expansion s− 1 * MNE -1.005*** -0.492*** -0.490*** -0.490*** -0.492*** -0.511***
(.22) (.115) (.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.113)
Expansion s− 1 * DOM -0.665***
(.242)
TAX -2.195* -2.16*** -2.08*** -2.075*** -1.860*** -1.060*
(1.202) (.714) (.579) (0.579) (0.608) (0.620)
TAX*MNE 2.840** 2.578*** 2.748*** 2.757*** 2.752*** -0.083
(1.224) (.731) (.724) (0.723) (0.726) (0.737)
TAX*DOM 0.032
(1.266)
Dummy for Credit System -0.035
(0.055)
Capital Allowances -1.924*
(0.993)
Characteristics of Parent Country measured in the year before the expansion
Domestic credit by banking sector
-0.410 -0.364
(.475) (.474)
Domestic credit to private sector
0.409 0.396
(.419) (.418)
Ln (real GDP) -0.033 -0.033
(.058) (.058)
Industry Value Added 1.124 1.030
(1.118) (1.114)
MKT Capitalization of Listed
Companies
-0.071 -0.023
(.087) (.087)
Trade (% GDP) -0.044 -0.024
(.093) (.094)
Concentration Index 3.539** 3.760*** 3.610*** 3.835*** 2.856*** 3.303***
(1.438) (1.416) (.984) (1.040) (1.073) (0.983)
Diversification Index -2.109** -2.389*** -1.825*** -1.949*** -1.915*** -1.848***
(.87) (.859) (.342) (0.392) (0.342) (0.366)
Characteristics of Parent Firms measured in 2004
Type = MNE 0.647** 0.235 0.174 0.167 0.185 0.963***
(.329) (.202) (.199) (0.199) (0.200) (0.205)
Type = DOM 0.571*
(.342)
No. Subs Locations 0.199*** 0.250*** 0.250*** 0.250*** 0.251*** 0.249***
(.02) (.019) (.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Sq. No. Subs Locations -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
No. Subsidiaries 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(.002) (.002) (.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Sq. No. Subsidiaries
-0.1D-
04***
-0.1D-
04***
-0.1D-
04***
-0.1D-
04***
-0.1D-
04***
-0.1D-
04***
Continued on next page
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Table 2.13 – continued from previous page
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Expansion Choice in 2005 1.092*** 1.083*** 1.092*** 1.092*** 1.086*** 1.071***
(.08) (.08) (.08) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079)
Constant -2.633 -2.340*** -3.452*** -3.429*** -3.144*** -3.707***
(1.793) (1.793) (.228) (0.232) (0.264) (0.250)
Rho 0.406*** 0.412*** 0.413*** 0.413*** 0.413*** 0.410***
(.024) (.024) (.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Log-L -5410.6 -5452.69 -5455.26 -5445.36 -5453.3 -5461.11
Number of Firms 28,940 28,940 28,940 24,729 24,729 24,729
Average Partial Effects
APE for Expansion s− 1:
Multinational Firms 0.0040 0.0020 0.0019 0.0019 0.0017 0.002
(.006) (.005) (.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Domestic Firms 0.0066
(.003)
Standalone Firms 0.0070
(.003)
Non-Multinational Firms 0.0053 0.0052 0.0052 0.0052 0.0056
(0.002) (.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
APE for Statutory Tax Rate:
Multinational Firms 0.0545 0.0351 0.0559 0.0569 0.0744 -0.0956
(.06) (.059) (.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.052)
Domestic Firms -0.0256
(.009)
Standalone Firms -0.0039
(.002)
Non-Multinational Firms -0.0129 -0.0128 -0.0125 -0.0112 -0.00639
(0.004) (.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Notes: (1) the dependent variable is the parents choice of acquiring at least one new subsidiary at period s, acquisitions can
be only cross-border; (2) all models include dummy variables specific to the country of the parent firm, dummies specific to
the industrial sector of the parent firm and dummies specific to the year when the acquisition took place (unreported); (3)
standard errors are given in parenthesis; (4) asterisks indicate significance at *** ( 1%), ** (5%), * (10%); (5) rho indicates
the proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel-variance component; (6) dummies of firms “type” identify
whether the firm is Multinational or Domestic, and use the type Standalone as reference group, in columns [6] and [7] the
reference group is constituted by all non-multinational parent firms; (7) for Standalone companies, number of subsidiaries
and number of countries where the subsidiaries are located is 0; (8) sample size is 28,940 parent firms observed for the five
years between 2006 and 2010 (2005 is the base year); (9) the Average Partial Effects (APE), reported at the bottom, have
standard errors computed using the delta method, bootstrap standard errors were also computed by they are not reported
here; (10) Average Partial Effects conditional on firms types were computed by restricting the sample to all parent firms
who were of a specific type in 2004; (11) the raw unconditional probability of making a cross-border only acquisition at any
point in time between 2006 and 2010 is 0.0685.
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Table 2.14: Dynamic Probit Model Estimates - Domestic Expansions Only
Baseline Model
(TAX=STR)
Col. [1] +
Double Tax
System
(TAX=STR)
Col. [1] +
Allowances
(TAX=STR)
TAX=EATR
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Expansion s− 1 1.007*** 1.020*** 1.017*** 1.027***
(.148) (.155) (.155) (.155)
Expansion s− 1 * Multinational -0.899*** -0.904*** -0.901*** -0.911***
(.161) (.168) (.168) (.168)
Expansion s− 1 * Domestic -0.717*** -0.719*** -0.718*** -0.726***
(.152) (.158) (.159) (.158)
TAX -0.354 -0.052 -0.888 -1.945
(.827) (.955) (1.066) (1.185)
TAX*Multinational 1.134 0.591 0.798 -0.192
(.885) (.975) (.982) (1.019)
TAX*Domestic 1.963** 1.382 1.478* -0.533
(.807) (.882) (.877) (.807)
Dummy for Credit System 0.020
(.054)
Capital Allowances 2.841*
(1.456)
Characteristics of Parent Country measured in the year before the expansion
Domesticestic credit by banking sector
-1.079*** -1.544*** -1.974*** -0.961*
(.336) (.443) (.452) (.493)
Domesticestic credit to private sector
0.777** 1.224*** 1.673*** 0.769*
(.303) (.393) (.425) (.435)
Ln (real GDP) .107*** .151*** 0.148*** 0.235***
(.024) (.030) (.029) (.052)
Industry Value Added 1.737** 2.032** 2.273*** 1.963**
(.712) (.819) (.837) (.806)
MKT Capitalization of Listed
Companies
0.018 -0.045 -0.006 -0.074
(.082) (.092) (.093) (.093)
Characteristics of Parent Firms measured in 2004
Type = Multinational 0.687*** 0.818*** 0.758*** 1.031***
(.252) (.276) (.279) (.291)
Type = Domestic 0.331 0.464* 0.435* 0.986***
(.225) (.244) (.243) (.217)
No. Subs Locations -0.035 -0.036 -0.036 -0.037
(.024) (.025) (.025) (.025)
Sq. No. Subs Locations -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
No. Subsidiaries 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.039***
(.002) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Sq. No. Subsidiaries -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Expansion Choice in 2005 1.018*** 1.036*** 1.041*** 1.028***
(.062) (.065) (.065) (.065)
Constant -5.876*** -7.185*** -7.335*** -9.422***
(.703) (.840) (.835) (1.346)
Rho 0.314*** 0.321*** 0.322*** 0.319***
(.02) (.022) (.022) (.022)
Continued on next page
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Table 2.14 – continued from previous page
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Log-L -8222.83 -7383.76 -7381.65 -7383.87
Number of Firms 28940 24729 24729 24729
Average Partial Effects, SD computed with Delta Method
APE for Expansion s− 1:
Multinational Firms 0.0062 0.0065 0.0065 0.0066
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Domestic Firms 0.0145 0.0149 0.0148 0.0150
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Standalone Firms 0.0161 0.0173 0.0172 0.0177
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Notes: (1) the dependent variable is the parents choice of acquiring at least one new domestic subsidiary at
period s; (2) all models include dummy variables specific to the country of the parent firm, dummies specific
to the industrial sector of the parent firm and dummies specific to the year when the acquisition took place
(unreported); (3) standard errors are given in parenthesis; (4) asterisks indicate significance at *** ( 1%),
** (5%), * (10%); (5) rho indicates the proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel-variance
component; (6) dummies of firms “type” identify whether the firm is Multinational or Domestic, and use
the type Standalone as reference group; (7) for Standalone companies, number of subsidiaries and number
of countries where the subsidiaries are located is 0; (8) sample size is 28,940 parent firms observed for the
five years between 2006 and 2010 (2005 is the base year), sample size for column [2] to [4] is reduced due to
incompleteness of data on tax variables; (9) the Average Partial Effects (APE), reported at the bottom, have
standard errors computed using the delta method, bootstrap standard errors were also computed by they
are not reported here; (10) Average Partial Effects conditional on firms types were computed by restricting
the sample to all parent firms who were of a specific type in 2004; (11) the raw unconditional probability of
making a cross-border only acquisition at any point in time between 2006 and 2010 is 0.07062
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Table 2.15: Dynamic Random Parameter Probit Model - Extension of Preferred Models
from Tab 11 and Tab 13
Dependent Variable: All Expansions
Only Cross-Border
Expansions
Only Domestic
Expansions
Tab 11,
Col [4]
RPM
Tab 13,
Col [3]
RPM
Tab 14,
Col [1]
RPM
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Random Parameter
Expansion s− 1
Intercept 0.996*** 1.033*** 0.513*** 0.620*** 1.007*** 1.149***
(.116) (.104) (.107) (.084) (.148) (.149)
Multinational Type Effect -0.879*** -0.912*** -0.490*** -0.577*** -.899*** -1.069***
(.122) (.111) (.114) (.097) (.161) (.155)
Domestic Type Effect -0.701*** -0.722*** -.717*** -0.874***
(.121) (.110) (.152) (.145)
Standard Deviation 0.320*** 0.206*** 0.461***
(.025) (.037) (.035)
Statutory Tax Rate
Intercept -1.644** -2.724** -2.08*** -2.355*** -0.354 0.016
(.721) (.642) (.579) (.461) (.827) (.821)
Multinational Type Effect 2.274*** 2.901*** 2.748*** 2.858*** 1.134 0.987
(.767) (.644) (.724) (.568) (.885) (.792)
Domestic Type Effect 1.752** 2.109*** 1.963** 1.762**
(.731) (.621) (.807) (.712)
Standard Deviation 1.338*** 0.570*** 1.522***
(.038) (.053) (.047)
Constant
Intercept -2.360*** -2.135** -3.452*** -3.280*** -5.876*** -5.681***
(1.207) (1.023) (.228) (.174) (.703) (.619)
Multinational Type Effect 0.540** 0.338* 0.174 0.114 0.687*** 0.684***
(.214) (.177) (.199) (.157) (.252) (.224)
Domestic Type Effect 0.299 0.188 0.331 0.356*
(.203) (.170) (.225) (.199)
Standard Deviation 0.620*** 0.786*** 0.833***
(0.012) (0.019) (.079)
Characteristics of Parent Country
Domestic credit by banking sector -0.615* -0.608** -1.079*** -1.098***
(.314) (.281) (.336) (.304)
Domestic credit to private sector 0.478* 0.478* .777** .793***
(.280) (.247) (.303) (.272)
Ln (real GDP) -0.011 -0.007 .107*** .100***
(.039) (.033) (.024) (.021)
Industry Value Added 2.024*** 1.935*** 1.737** 1.700**
(.678) (.634) (.712) (.676)
MKT Capitalization of Listed Companies -0.022 -0.019 0.018 0.012
(.065) (.058) (.082) (.075)
Trade (% GDP) -0.120* -0.108* -0.139 -0.153**
(.07) (.499) (.088) (.074)
Concentration Index 3.046*** 2.787*** 3.610*** 3.450***
(1.045) (.870) (.984) (.797)
Diversification Index -2.089*** -2.011*** -1.825*** -1.817***
(.594) (.499) (.342) (.270)
Characteristics of Parent in 2004 (t=0)
No. Subs Locations 0.156*** 0.157*** 0.250*** 0.246*** -0.035 -0.029
Continued on next page
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Table 2.15 – continued from previous page
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
(.017) (.012) (.019) (.013) (.024) (.019)
Sq. No. Subs Locations -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.001 -0.001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
No. Subsidiaries 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.011*** 0.010*** .039*** 0.038***
(.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.002) (.002)
Sq. No. Subsidiaries
-0.2D-
04***
-0.1D-
04***
-0.1D-
04***
-0.1D-
04***
-.0001*** -.0002***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Expansion Choice in 2005 1.121*** 1.079*** 1.092*** 1.045*** 1.018*** 0.947***
(.05) (.031) (.08) (.049) (.062) (.042)
Log-Likelihood -11488.1 -11497.93 -5455.26 -5466.51 -8222.83 -8226.55
Number of Firms 28,940 28,940 28,940 28,940 28,940 28,940
Notes: (1) dependent variable is the parents choice of acquiring at least one new subsidiary at period s, acquisitions
can be only cross-border in columns [3] and [4]; (2) models in column [2] and [4] are estimated by simulated maximum
likelihood; (3) for each random parameter, the table gives the “intercept”, which is the constant term in the means
of the random parameters, the effect of the firm-specific characteristics that are supposed to shift the intercept and
the conditional standard deviation of the estimated parameter; (4) all models include dummy variables specific to
the country of the parent firm, dummies specific to the industrial sector of the parent firm and dummies specific
to the year when the acquisition took place (unreported); (5) standard errors are given in parenthesis; (6) asterisks
indicate significance at *** ( 1%), ** (5%), * (10%); (7) dummies of firms “type” identify whether the firm is
Multinational or Domestic, and use the type Standalone as reference group, in columns [6] and [7] the reference
group is constituted by all non-multinational parent firms; (8) for Standalone companies, number of subsidiaries
and number of countries where the subsidiaries are located is 0; (9) sample size is 28,940 parent firms observed for
the five years between 2006 and 2010 (2005 is the base year)
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of the effect of Home Corporate Statutory Tax Rate on Acqui-
sition Choice across Parent Firms
Kernel Density for Tax Parameter estimated in Column [2] of Table 15. Mean effect shifted by Multi-
national and Domestic Type Dummies, Standalones being the reference group. Effect estimated on the
full sample of 28,940 firms. Mean Value = -0.449, Std Deviation = 0.871, Skewness = -0.374, Excess
Kurtosis -3 = -1.093, Minimum = -1.998, Maximum= 2.640
Figure 2.4: Distribution of the effect of Home Corporate Statutory Tax Rate on cross-
border Acquisition Choice across Parent Firms
Kernel Density for Tax Parameter estimated in Column [4] of Table 15. Mean effect shifted by Multi-
national Dummy, non-Multinationals being the reference group. Effect estimated on the full sample of
28,940 firms. Mean Value = -1.743, Std Deviation = 1.097, Skewness = 1.284, Excess Kurtosis -3 =
-0.267, Minimum = -2.959, Maximum= 2.611
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of the effect of Home Corporate Statutory Tax Rate on domestic
Acquisition Choice across Parent Firms
Kernel Density for Tax Parameter estimated in Column [6] of Table 15. Mean effect shifted by Multina-
tional Dummy, and Domestic Type Dummies, Standalones being the reference group. Effect estimated on
the full sample of 28,940 firms. Mean Value = -0.042, Std Deviation = 0.764, Skewness = 0.155, Excess
Kurtosis -3 = -0.877, Minimum = -1.949, Maximum= 4.121
- Chapter 3 -
Taxes and the Location of Targets
(with Wiji Arulampalam 1 and Micheal P. Devereux 2)
§ 3.1 Introduction
The growth of international cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) over the last
two decades is well documented. UNCTAD (2011) reports that the total value of cross-
border M&A deals rose from around $21 million in 1991 to $338 million in 2010. But this
was no steady increase: during that period there were two major waves, peaking at $905
million in 2000 and just over $1 trillion in 2007. This growth can be seen in the context of
total mergers and acquisitions, and in the context of total cross-border investment. Erel
et al. (2012) report that the percentage of all mergers and acquisitions accounted for by
cross-border deals rose from 23% in 1998 to 45% in 2007. And, according to UNCTAD
data, the percentage of all foreign direct investment that took the form of cross-border
mergers and acquisitions rose from 14% in 1991 to over 50% by 1999. Following the fi-
nancial crash, it has since declined to 27%, but in several recent years the proportion has
been well in excess of 50%.3
This paper examines one aspect of the determination of mergers and acquisitions: the
choice of international location of the target company by an acquirer. We analyse the de-
terminants of choices made by 2,623 individual acquiring corporations from 47 countries
across 19 possible locations of domestic and cross-border target corporations. We pay
2Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Said Business School, Oxford
3A useful description of the pattern of cross-border M&A activity is provided by Brakman et al. (2006)
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particular attention to the role of taxation in affecting this location choice. A number of
features of this paper differentiate it from previous research.
First, in the case of a multinational company, we combine two different datasets
(ZEPHYR and ORBIS, described further below) to identify how an acquisition affects
the geographic spread of the whole company. Most previous studies identify the acquiring
company as the immediate new owner of the target company.4 By contrast, by com-
bining these two datasets we are able to identify the acquirer as the parent company of
the multinational (as well as to control for characteristics of the parent). Suppose, for
example, that a British subsidiary of a US parent company acquired a German company.
In one sense that represents a flow of foreign direct investment from the UK to Germany.
However, control of the German company effectively passes to the US parent. It seems
reasonable to suppose that an acquisition of any size would be approved, or more likely
be organised, by the parent, which could be considered to have expanded into a third
country, and which would, directly or indirectly, control the activities of the whole group.
Second, in identifying the location of target companies, we pay particular attention to
heterogeneity in the characteristics of the acquirer. For example, many of the acquiring
corporations in our dataset do not have foreign subsidiaries prior to the acquisition being
examined. It seems plausible to suppose that there are fixed costs associated especially
with a corporation’s first foreign acquisition; in choosing between a domestic and foreign
target, this would imply that the gross benefits of acquiring a foreign target would need
to be greater for a wholly domestic corporation than for the parent of a corporation that
was already multinational. This suggests that, for a first foreign expansion at least, the
decision to acquire a foreign corporation is more likely to be determined by strategic con-
siderations, and is less likely to be influenced by marginal differences in taxation. The
possible existence of fixed costs also suggests that the size of the corporation may also
matter. We explore both of these dimensions.
Third, we pay particular attention to the role of corporate taxation. Of course many
factors will contribute both to the choice of whether to acquire another corporation, and
which target to choose. Many factors have been extensively analysed, both in the context
of domestic deals, and in the context of aggregate cross-border flows, and are briefly re-
viewed in Section I below. The role of taxes on profit is far from straightforward, and may
differ substantially depending on whether the target is domestic or foreign. For example,
even in the absence of all other factors, in a domestic context it is possible that a merger
could release unused taxable losses in the target company to be set against taxable profit
4A common popular data source for mergers and acquisitions is the SDC database, although as noted
below, several others have been used
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in the parent. Such a merger would create private value, at the expense of tax revenue
for the government. However, it is very rare for a government to allow losses to be offset
in this way across international borders.
We show below that, in principle, a higher tax rate in a country could raise, reduce,
or leave unchanged the probability that its corporations are the subject of a cross-border
acquisition. Suppose that an acquisition may take place because the acquirer is able to
increase its revenue stream, through improved efficiency, greater knowledge or perhaps
simply use of a brand name. Taxes on future profit of the existing corporation should al-
ready be capitalised into its value to existing shareholders. Similarly taxes on any surplus
generated by the acquisition would be capitalised into the value to the acquirer. In a case
in which existing shareholders had greater bargaining power in the deal, and captured the
entire surplus, then tax should have no impact on the probability of the deal going ahead.
This is because the acquirer is simply making a zero net present value transaction. A
higher tax rate would reduce the value of the surplus, but would not change the value to
the acquirer. In a less extreme case, a higher tax rate would reduce the post-tax surplus to
the acquirer, making it more likely that the acquirer would seek an alternative. However,
it may also be the case that the acquisition takes place for strategic reasons, with the
acquirer intending to close down the activities of the target to reduce competition (see,
for example, Neary (2007)). In this case, a higher tax rate would reduce the value and
hence the price of the target, making it more attractive for the acquirer. We discuss these
and other possible cases below.
We also consider other aspects of the tax regime in both the target’s country and
acquirer’s country. For example, in considering the case in which the acquirer may seek
to shift production to a lower cost environment, the rate of capital allowance may be a
factor. This consideration moves the analysis much closer to a conventional treatment
of taxation in the case of cross-border greenfield investment. The discrete decision as to
where to locate a new greenfield investment should in principle depend on an effective
average tax rate, taking into account all relevant aspects of the tax regime (see Devereux
and Griffith (1998a)). In the context of a cross-border acquisition, however, this effect
is likely to be secondary, unless the acquirer intends to undertake significant new capital
expenditure in the target, post-acquisition.
We also allow for the possibility that tax would be levied by the acquirer’s country
on returns ultimately paid back to the parent corporation, especially in the form of divi-
dends. This element of the international tax regime was the primary focus of the analysis
by Huizinga and Voget (2009a) which investigated, in the context of cross-border mergers,
which of the two companies involved in a merger became the new parent company. For
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example, they cite the case of the merger which led to a multinational firm with a parent
(Daimler) located in Germany and a subsidiary (Chrysler) in the US as resulting to a
large extent from Germany exempting foreign source dividend income while the US taxed
such income (net of a foreign tax credit). In the context of our analysis, this consideration
would imply that the tax rate in the target company’s country would be less important
in the case where that rate was lower than the rate in the acquirer’s country, and where
the acquirer’s country taxed worldwide income.
Fourth, we pay careful attention to the econometric structure of the problem. Unlike
almost all previous empirical work on the location of M&As, we investigate directly at
firm level the choices of corporations as to where they acquire a target company, condi-
tional on choosing to make an acquisition. We use a form of the mixed logit model, which
allows us to avoid making the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives
inherent in a standard multinomial logit model.5 We allow for randomness in the effects
of some of the variables. In our central approach, we consider only companies that make
a single acquisition in the three year period 2005-8. However, as a robustness check we
also allow for companies to acquire companies in more than one location in the period
considered.
Our results suggest that the host country tax rate in general has a negative effect on
the probability of a company in that country being acquired. However, the size of the
effect differs according to the characteristics of the acquirer and whether the acquisition
is domestic or cross-border. More specifically, we find no effect of taxation on the choice
for domestic companies as to whether to make their first cross-border acquisition. How-
ever, tax does affect the choice between cross-border locations. By contrast, multinational
companies are sensitive to taxes for both domestic and cross-border acquisitions, although
they are less sensitive to differences in taxation between cross-border acquisitions than
are domestic companies. There is some evidence that these effects are particularly strong
for large companies.
We find evidence that the effect of the tax rate of the target company plays a much
less significant role, or no role at all, when that tax rate is below that of the acquirer’s
country, and where the latter operates a worldwide, rather than territorial, tax system.
This is consistent with the acquirer taking into account home country taxation on profits
earned in the target. This element of the tax system has also been found to be important
in the location of parent companies (see Huizinga and Voget (2009a), and Voget (2011)),
5 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is a consequence of assuming independent errors across
different choices for each company. This implies that the ratio of two choice probabilities is independent
of the other choices/alternatives in the choice set
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and in the location of new subsidiaries (Barrios et al. (2008)).
Section 2 presents a brief review of the relevant literature on which we draw. This
literature informs the approach in Section 3 which explores the role of taxes in two simple
frameworks, drawing on efficiency and strategic considerations. We develop a number
of hypotheses concerning the role of tax in different situations. In the remainder of
the paper, we confront these hypotheses with firm-level data on cross-border acquisitions
taking place between 2005 and 2008 from the ZEPHYR database. We combine these data
with information on corporate structures and financial positions in 2005, from the ORBIS
database. Both datasets are commercially provided by Bureau van Dijk. In Section 4, we
set out our empirical methodology and describe the data in more detail. In Section 5 we
present our results. We conclude in Section 6.
§ 3.2 Literature Review
There have been numerous theoretical and empirical contributions to understanding the
pattern of cross-border M&A activity, on which we draw in this paper. The finance and
industrial organisation literatures have explored the motives for M&As, and to a lesser
extent have applied similar analysis to cross-border M&As. The finance and international
economics literatures have explored the role of cross-border investment flows, though again
only to a lesser extent has the analysis been applied specifically to cross-border M&As.
In the space available here we focus primarily on empirical studies that are close to ours.
A number of papers focus on various aspects of the valuation of the target and acquirer
for cross border M&As. For example, Erel et al. (2012) investigate differences in valuation
which could arise from imperfect integration of capital markets so that a high-valued
acquirer may purchase a low-valued target following movements in exchange rates or stock
market valuations in local currency. Baker et al. (2009) similarly argue that mispricing
of securities could generate arbitrage through cross-border M&As, particularly when the
mispricing is expected to revert the following year6 and particularly in the presence of
capital account restrictions that limit other mechanisms of cross-country arbitrage. This
could arise due to overpricing of the acquirer (the “cheap financial capital” hypothesis,
similar to the model of Shleifer and Vishny (2003)) or underpricing of the target (the
“cheap assets” hypothesis, similar to the model of Shleifer and Vishny (1992)). Both
papers find support for these hypotheses using aggregate flows between bilateral pairs of
countries, Erel et al using the total number of M&A deals and Baker et al using aggregate
flows of FDI.
6 Though permanent differences could also generate more cross-border M&A (see Froot and Stein
(1991))
3.2. Literature Review 72
Permanent differences in valuation may arise from differences in investor protection
across countries. Erel et al. (2012) and Rossi and Volpin (2003) both find support for the
view that relatively weak investor protection in a country increases the probability of a
cross-border acquisition.7 Rossi and Volpin examine this in the context of an empirical
model which analyses the proportion of targets acquired in a country where the acquirer
is from a different country. A similar empirical approach is taken by Ferreira et al. (2010),
in identifying whether foreign portfolio ownership of target companies makes them more
or less likely to be acquired in a cross border acquisition. A substitution hypothesis im-
plies it will be less likely, since shareholders can use international portfolio investment
to diversify around the world, and therefore have less need of FDI by domestic multina-
tionals. However, they instead find support for a facilitation hypothesis that implies that
large institutional shareholders are more likely to look favourably on bids from foreign
multinationals, compared to purely domestic shareholders.8 Ferriera et al also explore this
at the firm level, examining whether a given target is acquired by a domestic or foreign
acquirer.
Beyond specific issues of valuation, there have been many theoretical contributions
of the role of M&As in the development of multinational companies9. Very broadly,
these tend to distinguish two motives: an efficiency motive where gains arise through
economies of scale, internal technology transfer or coordination of decision making, and a
strategic motive, as firms seek to reduce competition in the market. The extent of these
motives may differ between firms, and across countries. For example, the strategic motive
depends on the degree to which the markets in the two countries are integrated. And
clearly greenfield investment has very different strategic implications from acquisition.
Host country governments also sometimes view inbound investment in the form of an
acquisition rather differently from inbound greenfield investment, on the grounds that
it primarily constitutes a change of ownership rather than an addition to the country’s
capital stock10.
A small number of studies have examined macroeconomic factors in the determination
of cross-border M&As11. di Giovanni (2005) and Coeurdacier et al. (2009) examine the
7 Bris and Cabolis (2008) find that merger premia for cross-border mergers relative to domestic mergers
increase with investor protection and accounting standards in the acquirer’s country. Ellis et al. (2011)
also find that acquirers from countries with better governance gain more from acquisitions and that their
gains are higher when their targets are from countries with worse governance
8Desai and Dharmapala (2009) investigate the tradeoff in international diversification between foreign
direct investment and foreign portfolio investment; from the perspective of the US, FDI faces a tax
disadvantage but has an advantage where the target country has weak investor protection.
9 See, for example, Ferrett (2005), Nocke and Yeaple (2007), Neary (2007) and Neary (2009), Norback
and Persson (2007)
10That raises the general question of the optimal tax treatment of inbound and outbound M&A activity,
which is addressed by ? and Norback and Persson (2007). These papers aim to identify whether the
classical optimal tax results in the literature also apply to cross-border investment in the form of M&As
11Seth et al. (2002) investigate the sources of gains and losses on cross border M&As, but do not
examine the locations
3.2. Literature Review 73
determinants of aggregate M&A flows between bilateral pairs of countries, using data
from 1990-1999 and 1985-2004, respectively. Di Giovanni finds that the size of domestic
financial markets has a strong positive association with domestic firms investing abroad,
while Coeurdacier et al find significant effects of membership of the EMU and the EU.
Both papers find a significantly negative impact of corporate taxation in the country of
the acquired company. Bertrand and Mucchielli (2007) follow a more similar approach to
that used in this paper, estimating a conditional logit model to determine the location
of the target for a given acquirer. Using data on 400 European acquisitions, they find
that market size, labour costs, market access and financial openness all play a role in
determining the location of the target.
There is an extensive theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of taxation in
FDI flows, surveyed by, for example, Devereux (2007) and de Mooij and Ederveen (2008).
A small part of the empirical work distinguishes the extensive and intensive margins,
reflecting the literature on multinational companies (see, for example, Markusen (2004)).
The extensive margin refers to various discrete choices, for example, whether to locate
production abroad, and if so, where to locate it. The intensive margin is the decision as to
how much to invest, conditional on deciding to invest in a given form in a given country.
As emphasised by Devereux and Griffith (1998a), the role played by tax differs between
these two margins: discrete choices are generally influenced by an effective average tax
rate, while the continuous investment decision depends on the effective marginal tax rate.
A sparse literature has investigated the role of tax on the extensive margin of location.
Using a nested logit framework, Devereux and Griffith (1998a) consider the determinants
of a decision by a US company to choose to locate in one of France, Germany and the
UK. It identifies whether the parent owns a subsidiary in each of the other countries at a
specific moment in time; however, it does not observe the location decision itself, which
may have been some time in the past. Three other papers, Buettner and Ruf (2007),
Barrios et al. (2008) and Hebous et al. (2010) also use firm level data to investigate
discrete location choices of multinational companies. All, however, use a logit model that
implies that the choice of a parent firm to invest in another country j is independent
of whether it invests in a third country k. In this sense, these papers do not therefore
consider the choice between countries. The first three of these papers do not specifically
consider M&A location decisions. Devereux and Griffith consider whether the parent
company has a firm in location i at a given moment in time. Buettner and Ruf identify
cases where a German parent company has subsidiary in country i in period t, but not
period t− 1, which could be the result of an acquisition or greenfield investment. Barrios
et al effectively identify the birth of new companies owned by a foreign parent, which is
most easily interpreted as greenfield investment. Nevertheless, all three papers find that
taxes in the host country play a significant role in location decisions. Barrios et al also
investigate the role of taxes in the parent country, and also find these to be significant.
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The fourth paper, Hebous et al, uses data on German parents which identify whether
location decisions result from greenfield investment or an acquisition, and estimates the
impact of taxation in each case, finding that greenfield investment responds more strongly
to higher taxation than do acquisitions.
§ 3.3 Alternative hypotheses of the role of tax in
the location of targets
Mergers and acquisitions occur when combining two corporations increases private value,
as perceived by the decision makers. As noted above, there are at least three sets of reasons
why value may increase, relating to differences in valuation, improvements in efficiency
and restriction of competition. We do not specifically investigate these factors here.
Instead we attempt to identify the role of taxation in the choice of location of the target
company, conditional on the plans for the new firm after the acquisition has taken place,
and in the light of alternative factors which may generate the acquisition in the absence of
tax considerations. We do not set out to provide a general framework or develop general
equilibrium conditions. Rather we have the more modest aim of identifying the interaction
of taxes and the key features of acquisitions and mergers. We consider separately the two
motives of efficiency improvement and strategic behaviour, although recognizing that
these may not be independent of each other. In this context, differences in valuation
usually have similar effects to changes in efficiency.
3.3.1 Efficiency motive
We begin with a basic model emphasizing efficiency considerations. We will analyse this
primarily in the context of companies which are seeking either to expand their activities,
or to reduce their costs. Prior to the acquisition, the acquiring companies may be purely
domestic, or they may already be active in more than one country12. In the conceptual
framework, we assume that the company seeks to acquire another company, either in the
same country (country i) or abroad (the “host” or “foreign” country, j). In the empirical
section we generalise this to consider a number of possible foreign locations: this does
not add any issues of principle, other than that the size of the response to differences in
tax rates may vary between the choices available to the acquirer. In the simple analysis
set out here, we assume that the acquiring company makes either one acquisition or no
12We do not explore the precise pattern of ownership. For example, the parent company may own a
subsidiary in country, B, which in turn owns a further subsidiary in C. We do not distinguish this case
from that in which the parent company directly owns both companies
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acquisition at all13. In robustness checks in the empirical work, we allow a company to
undertake more than one acquisition. The central question posed is whether, and how, the
tax system can affect the choice of where to acquire a target. We nevertheless identify a
rich range of channels by which taxes can affect the acquisition decision, and in particular
in which country the acquirer is likely to purchase the target company.
First consider the value of a potential target company to its existing owners. Suppose
that the company expects to earn a stream of income with a present value of Y , and to
incur costs with a present value of C. In the absence of taxes, the value of the company to
existing owners is therefore simply Vˆ = Y − C, where the hat indicates the value before
taxes.
Now suppose that corporation tax is levied on taxable profit at rate τ . Relief is given
for costs. However, this relief may have a present value which is less than the present value
of the stream of costs itself. For example, capital expenditure may not be immediately
deductible against tax; as a result the present value of the tax deduction will be less than
C. Define the proportion of the present value of costs that represent a deduction as α,
so that the present value of the tax liability is T = τ (Y − αC), and the value of the
company after tax is
V = (1− τ) (Y − βC) (3.1)
whereβ = (1− ατ)/(1− τ) is a measure of the generosity of the definition of the tax
base.14 We do not consider other taxes in this analysis. Equation (3.1) could apply to a
potential target in either country, which we denote below with a subscript i or j. Note
that all of the elements in (3.1) may vary between the two countries.
Now consider the value to the acquiring company. We assume that the acquisition will
not take place unless the acquiring company values the target company more highly than
the existing shareholders. That is, some surplus must be generated from the acquisition
– which must be divided between the acquiring company and the existing owners of the
target company. Further, we assume that in choosing between alternative targets, the
acquiring company chooses the target that generates the highest surplus to the acquiring
company.
Before identifying the source of this surplus, an important issue to consider is how the
surplus is distributed between the two parties. At the two extremes, the whole surplus
13Implicitly, then, either the costs of making more than one acquisition are too high, or the benefits in
terms of higher income are too low
14For example, for a cash flow tax, levied only on economic rent, then α = β = 1
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will be captured by one of the parties. The maximum price that the acquirer is willing
to pay is his own valuation of the target. In this case, the acquirer does not share in the
surplus at all. This may happen, for example, if there are many bidding companies, but
only one possible target. In this case, the target shareholders would be able to hold out
for the entire surplus15. In this case, the tax system should have no impact on whether
the acquisition goes ahead since the acquirer’s valuation is post-tax – a higher tax rate
would lower his valuation, and hence also lower the price paid. The acquirer would be
indifferent between paying higher tax, but a lower acquisition price, and lower tax but a
higher acquisition price; in either case the surplus to the acquirer would remain at zero.
This leads to:
Proposition 1. If the target firm captures the entire surplus generated by the acquisition,
then tax has no effect on the acquisition decision
In what follows, we assume instead that the acquirer captures at least some fraction
of the surplus. More specifically, we assume that the fraction captured by the acquirer
does not depend on the location of the target. In comparing targets located in different
countries, the proportion of the surplus captured by the acquirer then becomes irrelevant.
Given this, we make the simplifying assumption that the acquirer captures the whole of
the surplus.
In this simple framework, there are four ways in which the acquirer could raise the
value of the target company, and thereby create a surplus: (a) increase income, Y ; (b)
reduce costs, C; or (c) reduce tax liabilities, by reducing the relevant tax rate by shifting
profit between locations; or (d) undertake additional investment in the target company
which creates a surplus. Consider each of these in turn.
Scenario (a)
First, suppose for example that the acquiring and target companies are in a horizontal
relationship: that is, they each produce a similar good which is sold on the world market.
But the acquiring company may be larger and have a recognised brand name, which
allows it to charge a higher price for its output. By acquiring the target company, the
acquirer can increase the value of the target by re-labelling the product with the acquirer’s
brand, thereby increasing the income stream, Y. Denote the change in the value of the
target’s income stream as a result of the acquisition to be ∆Y . Then the post-tax surplus
generated from the acquisition is
15This is assumed by Norback and Persson (2007), for example
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Home: Si = (1− τi)∆Yi (3.2)
Foreign: Sj = (1− τ ∗j )∆Yj (3.3)
where τ ∗j is defined below. It is clear from these expressions that the surplus depends
only on ∆Y and the statutory tax rate. Assuming that the acquirer chooses the target
which would generate the highest post-tax surplus, then:
Proposition 2. If the acquirer could increase the value of the income stream in the target,
then ceteris paribus it would be more likely to acquire a target company in the country with
the lower statutory tax rate.
To test this proposition empirically it is clearly necessary to control for any differences
in the pre-tax surplus that might be systematically expected across countries. There are
many possible factors that could create differences in the pre-tax surplus across countries,
some of which have been discussed above; they include, for example, the financial depth
in the country of the target relative to the country of the acquirer, the extent of foreign
portfolio ownership of the target, differences in valuations between the two countries, the
size of the available market in the country of the target, the general economic prospects in
that country, and the availability of cheap inputs. We discuss below the control variables
used in the empirical work. These would have a direct effect on the size of the pre-tax sur-
plus for each target, which may well outweigh the effects of taxation. Note also, though,
that the effect of an increase in the tax rate on the post-tax surplus depends on the size
of the pre-tax surplus.
Comment is also required about the tax rate applied to the surplus in the foreign
country, denoted here τ ∗j rather than simply τj . The asterisk denotes that the term in-
cludes not only tax due in the foreign country on profits made there, but also potentially a
withholding tax levied on the payment of a dividend or other return to the home country
parent, and further tax levied in the home country on receipt of the return. In particular,
ignoring deferral, then if the home country uses a credit system, foreign dividends will
be taxed at rate τi with a credit for foreign taxes paid. Broadly in this case, if τj < τi,
then additional tax will be charged by the home country, so that, effectively τ ∗j = τi. In
practice the home country tax can be deferred by not repatriating the profit made abroad.
In general though, where the home country operates a credit system, there may be an
asymmetric effect of the foreign tax rate. Where τj < τi and the home country operates
a system of worldwide taxation with credit, then there may be little effect of the foreign
tax rate, τj, on the post-tax surplus (depending on whether all profits are repatriated).
For τj ≥ τi, the predictions of proposition 2 hold.
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Scenario (b)
Second, suppose that the acquiring company is low cost, that the target is initially high
cost, and that post-acquisition the acquiring company is able to reduce the costs in the
target from high cost, say CH , to low cost, say CL. This may occur through the use of
better technology, organisation, or management skills. Again, suppose this holds whether
the target is a domestic or foreign company.
In this case, the surplus generated from the acquisition is
Home: Si = (1− αiτi)(CH − CL) (3.4)
Foreign: Sj = (1− αjτ ∗j )(CH − CL) (3.5)
In this case, the impact of tax depends on the value of the tax allowances, measured
by αiτi and αjτ
∗
j . Note that the higher the value of allowances, the smaller the gain from
reducing costs. This implies that:
Proposition 3. If the acquirer can reduce costs in the target, then it will be more likely to
acquire a target company in the country with a low value of tax allowances. A lower value
of allowances could be generated by less generous allowances, or by a lower statutory tax
rate.
Proposition 3 abstracts from any difference in the reduction in cost across countries.
A related possibility is that the acquiring company has high costs (say CH) because it is
located in a high-cost economy. Such a company may seek to reduce costs (say to CL) by
relocating its production, or part of its production, to a low-cost economy. In this case,
the surplus from moving production abroad would be
Foreign: Sj = (1− αiτi)CH − (1− αjτ ∗j )CL (3.6)
Here the value of the tax allowances in the foreign country has a positive effect on the
value of the surplus since additional expenditure takes place there. This implies:
Proposition 4. If the acquirer intends to shift production from a high-cost home country
to a lower-cost foreign country, then the acquirer will be more likely to choose a foreign
country with a higher value of tax allowances. A higher value of allowances could be
generated by more generous allowances, or by a higher statutory tax rate.
The stark difference between Propositions 3 and 4 reflects a difference in where the
cost saving is assumed to take place. In Proposition 3, it takes place in the country of the
target, and the value of the saving is reduced by the tax allowance. In proposition 4, it
takes place in the home country. The saving is then reduced by the value of the foregone
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tax allowance in the home country, at the cost of higher expenditure in the foreign country.
Scenario (c)
Another possibility is that the acquirer can affect the tax liability itself and can generate
private surplus at the expense of tax authorities. There are at least two ways in which
this could happen. To explore these, suppose that the acquirer makes no other changes
to the target company.
The first possibility is that either the target company or the acquiring company is in
a country with a high tax rate, while the other is in a country with a low tax rate. Now
suppose that the relationship between the two companies is a vertical relationship: that
is, the company in one country produces a good or service which it sells to the other.
To make this more concrete, suppose that the target company supplies a good to its new
parent. This good is unique, and hence difficult to value for tax purposes. This gives
the new combined company the opportunity to mis-price the transaction to shift income
from the high-tax country to the low-tax country. Another possibility for shifting profit
is simply to lend from the low tax country to the high tax country, gaining a tax relief
in the high-tax country on the interest payment at the expense of a (lower) tax charge in
the low-tax country. In any case, suppose that the amount of income shifted is X. Then
the surplus generated by the newly-acquired opportunity to shift profit is
Foreign: Sj =
∣∣(τi − τ ∗j )∣∣X ≥ 0 (3.7)
Clearly this opportunity does not exist in the case of a purely domestic acquisition,
since this does not create the opportunity to shift profits between countries16. More
generally, though, the size of the surplus depends both on the extent to which profit-
shifting becomes possible (measured by X), and by the difference in statutory tax rates.
Summarising:
Proposition 5. If a cross-border acquisition introduces an opportunity to shift profits
between countries, then the surplus is higher the greater the difference in statutory tax
rates between the two countries.
Note that the opportunities to shift profits between jurisdictions are likely to depend
on the number of jurisdictions in which the company already operates, and the skills which
it has already acquired in doing so. An acquirer that was purely domestic prior to the
acquisition has only two countries between which it can shift profit. A large multinational
has rather more options to shift profits around foreign countries. Thus, while expression
16Other opportunities may arise instead, such as combining profits in one company with losses in
another
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(3.7) points to the comparison of the home country tax rate with a single foreign country
tax rate, the more general case considered in the empirical work below also implies com-
parison between the tax rates in other jurisdictions in which the company has a presence.
The possibility of shifting profit out of a high-tax country may reduce the negative
impact of the high tax rate on the probability of acquiring a target there. By contrast,
the possibility of shifting profit into a low-tax country would reinforce the positive impact
of the low tax rate on the probability of acquiring a target there. This suggests a possible
asymmetric response to the foreign country tax rate, depending on whether or not it is an
attractive location in which to shift profit, which depends in turn on the other tax rates
faced by the acquirer in its worldwide operations.
Scenario (d)
A final possibility which we consider under the general heading of efficiency is that ac-
quirer seeks a bigger operation than the target currently undertakes. That is, the acquirer
intends to purchase the target and then to invest further to expand operations. The sur-
plus from the acquisition is generated by the additional investment, which we assume
could not be undertaken by the current owners. Given that we focus only on acquisitions,
we also assume that this is a cheaper option for the acquiring company than undertaking
a completely new greenfield investment.
The role of tax in affecting the surplus in this case is very similar to the role of tax in
a greenfield investment: new investment receives an allowance that can be set against the
existing taxable profit of the target company, and the higher future income is subject to
tax. In comparing the discrete choice of in which country to undertake such an operation,
the relevant measure of taxation is the effective average tax rate (EATR), denoted T below
(see Devereux and Griffith (1998a) and Devereux and Griffith (2003)). This measure is
in effect simply a non-linear combination of the statutory rate and the value of allowances.
Denoting W as the pre-tax net present value of the surplus generated by additional
investment, the post-tax surplus is
Home: Si = (1− Ti)Wi) (3.8)
Foreign: Sj = (1− T ∗j )Wj) (3.9)
Clearly a lower EATR increases the post-tax surplus, which implies:
Proposition 6. If a cross-border acquisition is based on the intention to expand the
activities of the target, then the acquirer will be more likely to acquire a target company
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in the country with the lower effective average tax rate (EATR)
3.3.2 Strategic Motive
So far we have explored only efficiency aspects of acquisitions, through generating higher
income, lower costs, or simply lower tax liabilities. However, in an industry with a rel-
atively small number of companies, there is clearly the possibility of a strategic motive.
One simple approach to analysing strategic behaviour – see for example, Neary (2007) –
is to assume constant unit costs for each firm. This implies that a low cost firm does not
need to acquire a target as part of its expansion, since there is no cost constraint on the
amount of output it can produce, but only a constraint imposed by the demand side of
the market. As a result, in this type of model, a low cost firm will acquire a higher cost
firm only with the intention of closing it down. In a market where there are barriers to
entry, this would reduce industry output, thereby allowing a rise in the output price and
an increase in the per unit profitability of the remaining firms including the acquirer.
Although we do not explicitly present the model here, the implications for taxation
are intuitive, and are:
Proposition 7. In the case of a strategic acquisition of a high cost target firm, which is
closed down after acquisition, then (a) the statutory tax rate applied to the target company
has a positive impact on the probability that the target is acquired, and (b) the statutory
tax rate applied to the acquirer has a negative impact on the probability of the acquisition
proceeding.
That is, since the target is acquired with the intention of closing it, then the lower
price that the acquirer must pay, the higher the surplus. Because taxation is capitalised
into the value of the target, a higher tax rate reduces its value, and hence raises the
surplus. A second effect applies to the acquirer. Since the output price and revenue rise,
then the surplus also depends negatively on the tax rate that the acquirer must pay on
the additional revenue.
3.3.3 A Summary of Propositions
We have set out 7 propositions reflecting the effects of taxation in the country of the
potential target company and in the country of the potential acquirer, on the probability
that the target is acquired by the acquirer. These are summarised in the following table.
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Reason for surplus to
acquirer
Effect on probability of acquiring a target
in given country of that country’s:
Statutory Tax Rate Value of Allowances
1 Surplus captured by
shareholders of target
company
No effect No effect
2 Raise value of income in
target
< 0 BUT effect weaker
when (i) home country
has credit system and (ii)
τj < τi
No effect
3 Reduce costs in target Negative indirect effect < 0
4 Shift production to low
cost target
Positive indirect effect > 0
5 Increased opportunity
for shifting income to
low-tax countries
< 0 BUT profit shifting
weakens effect of Propo-
sition 2 for high τj and
reinforces it for low τj
No direct effect
6 Additional investment
post acquisition
EATR has negative effect on probability
7 Strategic motive > 0 No direct effect
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§ 3.4 Empirical Approach
3.4.1 Methodology
An acquiring company indexed by i in our model, is assumed to acquire a target in a
country j which provides the largest expected surplus over all countries, where the latent
surplus associated with the target in country j is given by
Sij = β
′
jzi + γxj + εij (3.10)
and zi is a vector of choice invariant (company) characteristics. For ease of exposition,
we assume that there is only one alternative specific variable x, say the target country
specific tax rate. A standard multinomial model assumes that the errors in (3.10) are iid
Gumbel, which implies the assumption of IIA (independence of Irrelevant Alternatives).
We relax the IIA assumption by allowing the parameter γ to be randomly distributed
across the companies. That is, we assume that every company in our sample has its own
γ which is known to the company but unknown to the econometrician, and write this as
γi = γ
′wi + σui where ui ∼ iidN(0, 1) (3.11)
i.e. γi ∼ iidN(γ′wi, σ2). wi are company specific variables that are assumed to shift
the mean effect of γi. This model collapses to the standard multinomial choice model
when σ = 017.
Substituting (3.11) into (3.10) gives
Sij = β
′
jzi + (γ
′wi + σui)xj + εij = β
′
jzi + (γ
′wi)xj + (σxjui + εij) (3.12)
The company specific error term σxjui also induces correlation between alternatives
which is not present in the standard multinomial choice model, and which relaxes the IIA
assumption. Also note, the new additional error term is now heteroskedastic due to the
presence of xj. Under the assumption that εij is iid Gumbel, the conditional probability
(conditioned on γi) that alternative j will be chosen will be of the form of the multinomial
logit probability,
Prob(yij = 1) =
exp
(
β
′
jzi + γixj
)∑
I exp
(
β
′
lzi + γixl
) (3.13)
where yij is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if company i chooses alter-
17It is customary to call the fixed coefficient logit model, a multinomial logit model when all the
variables are choice invariant and a conditional logit model when all the variables are choice specific.
However, there is no reason why one cannot have both types of variables in the model as we have. For
ease of exposition, we describe the model as a multinomial model when the coefficients are not random
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native j18. The new composite error term vij = σxjui + εij will be a mixture of normal
and Gumbel distributions. Since γi is not known, we have to integrate out the u from the
conditional choice probabilities to obtain the unconditional choice probabilities,
pij = Prob(j is chosen) =
∫
exp
(
β
′
jzi + (γ
′wi)xj + σxjui
)∑
I exp
(
β
′
lzi + (γ
′wi)xk + σxlui
)φ(u)du (3.14)
where φ denotes the standard Normal density. The log likelihood will consist of terms
like in (3.14). The model is estimated using simulated maximum likelihood using the fact
that (3.14) is a calculation of an expected value. We replace the integral by a sample av-
erage of the function constructed by drawing enough observations from φ(u) to calculate
this average. It can be shown that this sample average consistently estimates the choice
probabilities given by (3.14). In our simulations we use 50 Halton draws.19.
Relative to a standard multinomial logit model, because of the correlation between
alternatives, this allows us to model (i) random variations in the response probability to
changes in variables, (ii) unrestricted substitution patterns, and (iii) correlated unobserved
factors Train (2009) 20.
3.4.2 Data
The data for the analysis come from the 2005 21 file of ORBIS compiled by the Bureau
van Dijk (BvD). This commercial world-wide dataset provides firm-level accounting in-
formation on companies including ownership structure consisting of a full list of recorded
shareholders in these companies. We use this to construct a chain of majority-owned
subsidiaries for each company, down to the 10th level of dependency. The M&A activities
recorded in another commercially available dataset ZEPHYR (BvD), were then merged
with the original data from ORBIS to trace the changes in the firms’ ownership structure
from 2005 to the end of 2008. The final dataset contains, for each parent company, a list
of location of all majority owned subsidiaries in each year between 2005 and 2008. This
identification of all ownership changes due to M&A deals allows us to look at the location
aspects of all the observed majority-owned acquisitions.
18(3.12) collapses to the error components multinomial logit model when we allow for a company specific
random intercept
19Although there are different ways of drawing random numbers from a particular distribution, the
Halton draws have been proven to be very effective Train (2009). The results were very similar with 50
and 100 draws
20The model parameters are estimated in NLOGIT 4 (NLOGIT, 2007) using simulated maximum
likelihood
21The year 2005 refers to the period 1st April 2005 to 31st March 2006
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Our analysis is based on a cross-section sample of parent companies not defined as
‘micro’ in European Commission (2003) in 2005.22. From this sample, we selected those
parent companies that made at least one acquisition during the three year period 2006 to
2008 regardless of whether they already had a presence in the new country or not. The
ultimate parent of the group is treated as being responsible for the expansions directly
made and for those undertaken by its subsidiaries.
The final sample consists of 2,623 parent companies residing in 47 countries. We used
ownership information from the original full set of data to identify companies in the same
group in our sample. Based on the information in our base year of 2005, companies were
classified as: (i) belonging to a multinational group if they were connected to at least
one other company in a different country by an ownership link of at least 50 per cent of
the capital; (ii) belonging to a domestic group if the company was connected to other
companies by an ownership link of at least 50 per cent but with none of those companies
located in a different country; or (iii) as a stand-alone company if it did not have any
such ownership links with other companies.
The main dependent variable of interest in our model is the choice of a location coun-
try and hence if a parent acquires five subsidiaries in a single country in the same year,
this parent is recorded as having made one location choice. In that sense, we use the word
‘acquisition’ to mean a location choice. Some characteristics of the nature of expansions
in the dataset are provided in Table 3.1. Multinationals and domestic groups equally
dominate the sample of companies that are engaged in acquisitions during our sample
period with only about 15% of stand-alone companies in the sample. 87% of the parents
were observed to make only one expansion during our sample period, while 41% of the
total observed expansions were to a new location where the parent did not already have
a subsidiary.
We define the choice set to preserve reasonable cell sizes for the statistical analysis,
we consider only those alternatives that have been chosen by at least 15 different parent
companies. This yields us a choice set with eighteen possible countries. Since 59% of the
observed expansions were in the same country as the parent, we also add an alternative
‘domestic’ to the choice set. If the parent company is located in one of the 18 countries,
it will have a reduced choice set of 17 alternatives plus the “domestic” option.
The distribution of the location of our parent companies is provided in Table 3.2. The
UK has the largest number of companies undertaking an acquisition, with 674 companies,
22Selecting non-micro companies involved selecting only companies with at least two subsequent years
of recorded total assets greater than 2,000EURO and at least one employee
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followed by the USA with 261 and France with 205. Table 3.3 provides the distribution
of target locations chosen by this sample of parents. In this sample, the United States
has the largest number of targets of cross-border acquisitions, and the United Kingdom
the largest number of domestic acquisitions.
3.4.3 Variables
We use a number of variables informed by previous literature and the theoretical section
to examine the determinants of M&A activity. We use three different measures of the
corporation tax system in each country. The statutory tax rate is the headline corpora-
tion tax rate in the country, including typical local tax rates. The measure of allowances
reflects the present value of allowances for a unit of new investment, based on a range of
different assets. The EATR is the effective average tax rate, which broadly measures the
proportion of the net present value of an investment taken in tax. The EATR is based on
the methodology set out in Devereux and Griffith (2003).
Clearly we need to control for non-tax factors that affect acquisition location decisions.
Informed by the literature described above, we include a number of control variables from
various sources: the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database, the
GeoDist database (Mayer and Zignago (2011) and from Porta et al. (2008). Details are
given in 3.4 presents means for each of the following variables for each of 18 potential
target countries:
• Statutory tax rate
• Present value of allowances
• EATR
• GDP: log of real GDP per capita in constant 2000 US
• GDP growth
• Cost of business start-up, measured as a percentage of GNP
• Disclosure index, which measures the extent to which investors are protected through
disclosure of ownership and financial information. This ranges from 0 to 10, with
10 being the maximum disclosure
• Unemployment as a percentage of labour force
• Dummy variables for whether the countries of the acquirer and target are contiguous,
share a common language, and share a common legal system
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• The distance between the capital cities of the countries of acquirer and target
• The WDI measure of corruption in the target country
• The ration of market capitalization to GDP
• The average credit to private companies as a proportion of GDP
• The number of domestic companies
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Variable Description Source
Tax Variables:
Statutory Tax Rate Main statutory tax rate, includ-
ing typical local taxes
Centre for Busi-
ness Taxation
database
Effective Average Tax Rate Effective average tax rate, us-
ing the Devereux-Griffith (2003)
method
CBT database
Allowance The present value of tax al-
lowances permitted per unit of in-
vestment
CBT database
Economic Indicators:
ln(GDP) ln of GDP (originally measured in
constant 2000 USD)
WDI, 2011
GDP growth GDP growth (annual %) WDI, 2011
Cost Bus. Start-up Cost of business start-up proce-
dures (% of GNI per capita)
WDI, 2011
Bus. Discl. Index Business extent of disclosure
index (0=less disclosure to
10=more disclosure)
WDI, 2011
Unempl. Total Unemployment (% of total
labor force)
WDI, 2011
Distance Variables:
Contiguity Dummy for Contiguity (=1 par-
ent country and alternative loca-
tion share borders)
GeoDist
Database, 2011
Common Language Dummy for Common Language
(=1 parent country and location
have same official or primary lan-
guage)
GeoDist
Database, 2011
Distance btw Capitals Simple distance between capitals
(measured in km)
GeoDist
Database, 2011
Common Legal Syst. Dummy for Legal System (=1 if
parent country and location have
same Legal System)
La Porta et al.,
2008
Institutional Variables:
Corruption Score Average corruption score over the
period 1996-2000
WDI, 2011
Mkt Capit. To GDP Ratio of market capitalisation to
GDP, av. 1999-2003
WDI, 2011
Private Credit to GDP Private credit to GDP, av. 1999-
2003
WDI, 2011
ln(No. Dom. Firms) ln(No. Domestic Firms pc), av.
1999-2003
WDI, 2011
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§ 3.5 Results
We first present the results from our base model estimation in Table 3.5. In column [1]
we begin with a standard multinomial logit (MNL) model. As discussed above, we dis-
tinguish between the alternatives of domestic expansion (dom expansion) from that of a
cross-border expansion (cb expansion) and allow the effect of tax to be different across
these two sets of alternatives. In addition, we also interact the tax variable with the
binary indicator variable for whether the acquirer was a multinational enterprise in 2005
(mne2005). This means that we estimate 4 different coefficients on the tax variable. We
include the 13 choice-specific control variables described above in all specifications. The
‘distance’ measures were only allowed to affect the cross-border choices. In addition, in
all specifications we include choice specific intercepts, and the parent country tax rate,
the coefficient of which is permitted to vary across the choices as shown in (3.12). We
report the coefficients of the choice-specific control variables, but in order to keep the
presentation manageable, we do not report the choice-specific intercepts or coefficients on
the parent country tax rate.
Several of the control variables are strongly significant in all of the specifications in
Table 3.5. The size of the economy, measured by GDP, has a strong positive effect on
the probability of acquiring a target in a given country. Also, as expected, targets are
also more likely in countries that are contiguous with the country of the acquirer, share
a common language and legal system and are closer to each other. The cost of business
start-ups has a negative effect on the probability of choosing a particular location, and
in some specifications, greater disclosure also has a negative effect. These variables may
proxy for a number of aspects of the regulatory framework in the choice country. The
size of private credit also has a negative effect. This may reflect a substitution effect:
companies may be more prone to being acquired by a foreign company in countries where
the supply of credit, and so the possibility of internal expansion, is restricted. Condi-
tional on these effects, unemployment has a positive effect, which may reflect the relative
availability of workers.
The tax variable used in the model results presented in Table 3.5 is the statutory tax
rate in the target country. The coefficient on this variable is significant only for a multi-
national considering the domestic expansion choice. This is surprising, but this result is
not robust to varying the econometric specification.
In column [2] we instead estimate the random parameters (RP) model, in which every
parent company in our sample has its own tax coefficient for the cross-border choice, and
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we assume them to be drawn from a normal distribution. Allowing also for a random tax
effect for the domestic expansion choice did not produce results different to the one where
only the cross-border expansion choice tax effect is random. We therefore concentrate on
only allowing the tax effects to be random for the cross-border expansions from now on.
Including this random component has an important effect on the estimated coefficients –
those presented in the table should be interpreted as a mean effect. The effect of tax on
the domestic choice remains similar to the previous specifications. But now the tax rate
on cross-border acquisitions also becomes significant. Specifically, the first line, which
can be interpreted as the effect for acquirers that were purely domestic in 2005, has a
negative and significant effect. The positive and significant coefficient reported in the
second line indicates that multinational companies respond less in cross-border expansion
than domestic companies to differences between the tax rates in foreign countries. Also
important is that the estimated standard deviation of the random parameters (RP) term
is highly significant, indicating that this random components model should be preferred
over the previous specifications. (This is also indicated by the higher maximised log like-
lihood.) Column [2] is therefore our preferred specification in Table 3.5, and we use it as
a base for the extensions to model specification.
Before doing so, we comment on the different effects of the tax rate for the different
types of company, and for the different options. One obvious interpretation is as follows.
For purely domestic companies, their first acquisition abroad is likely to have an important
strategic motive and to involve substantial fixed costs. In this context, marginal differ-
ences in statutory tax rates are unlikely to have a large effect as to whether to undertake
a cross-border acquisition or a domestic acquisition. However, in choosing between alter-
native locations for a cross-border acquisition, tax appears to play a highly significant role
for domestic companies, in accordance with Proposition 2. By contrast, for companies
that are already multinational, undertaking a cross-border acquisition is likely to be less of
a major strategic development for the company. For such companies, marginal differences
in tax rates have a significant effect on the choice between undertaking a domestic or a
cross-border acquisition, also in accordance with Proposition 2. Multinationals are also
sensitive to differences in tax rates between alternative cross-border locations, though less
so that domestic companies. One reason for this may reflect greater skill and experience
in international taxation, and in particular, a greater opportunity to shift profit between
countries in order to reduce aggregate tax liabilities. In line with Proposition 5, the effect
of the statutory rate on the probability of making an acquisition in a particular country
may therefore be weaker for multinational companies.
We further explore the heterogeneity of responses to taxation in rest of the columns
in Table 3.5. In columns [3] and [4] we investigate whether the effects of taxation differ
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according to the size of the acquirer in addition to whether it is multinational or domes-
tic. Size may matter for several reasons. First, it seems plausible that a larger acquirer is
more likely to be able to capture a larger share of the surplus generated in it that it is has
a stronger bargaining power. This may make it more sensitive to differences in taxation.
Second, larger companies can more easily bear fixed costs of expansion to new countries,
and any fixed costs associated with shifting profit between countries. The first of these
may make them more sensitive to marginal differences in taxation between countries, but
the latter may make them less sensitive. In column [3] we identify a “large” company as
one that owned at least 4 subsidiaries in 2005. In column [4] we instead identify a “large”
company as one that was present in at least 4 separate countries in 2005 – clearly this
second measure applies only to multinational companies. In both cases we experimented
by choosing different numbers of subsidiaries or locations and chose the results with the
highest maximised value of the log likelihood.
The results of columns [3] and [4] are mixed, perhaps reflecting these conflicting is-
sues. In column [3] large multinationals appear to be more sensitive to tax differences
than small multinationals for the location of both domestic and cross-border expansion.
This suggests that large multinationals may consider a wider choice of locations, where the
choice is particularly sensitive to the host country characteristics. In column [4].measur-
ing instead size by the number of countries in which the multinational is already located
in 2005, the tax effects for domestic expansion are larger, but there is no difference to
smaller multinationals in the tax effects of the location of cross-border expansion. In
column [3] there is no significant difference in the response of large and small domestic
acquirers.
In column [5] we examine whether the effects of taxation depend on whether the ac-
quirer is already located in the host country in 2005. Clearly, this also applies only to
cross-border acquisitions by multinational companies, which are located outside of the
home country in 2005. It is possible that acquiring a company in a new, as opposed to
existing, host country is more significant step for multinationals than the choice between
cross-border and domestic. In fact, the results indicate that this distinction is not very
large. Coefficients on both variables are positive and of a roughly similar magnitude,
although the expansion into existing countries is marginally more significant.
In column [6] we explore the second part of Proposition 2, which indicates that the
effect of a foreign tax rate may be smaller when the acquirer is resident in a country that
taxes worldwide income with a credit system, and where the host country has a lower
statutory tax rate. We investigate this by allowing the coefficient on the host country
tax variable to differ in such circumstances. We find a striking effect for multinational
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acquirers, though not for domestic acquirers. For the former, we find a large, positive and
significant effect, which approximately cancels out the other effects applying to multina-
tional companies (in the first two rows), indicating that in such circumstances the tax rate
in the host country effectively has no effect on the choice of cross-border target. Given
the possibilities of international tax arbitrage, this is a striking result, which is, however,
consistent with results in other contexts. For example, Huizinga and Voget (2009a) find
that the identity of the parent following a cross-border merger depends on this effect (in-
dicating that parents are less likely to be located in the US, for example). Voget (2011)
also finds that such taxation in the country of the parent has a significant impact on
relocation of parents.
In column [7] we expand this line of investigation to investigate Proposition 5 in more
detail. In particular, we examine whether there is an asymmetric effect of the host country
tax rate, which could be due to profit shifting combined with location choice. If the host
country tax rate is high, this may not dissuade acquirers from choosing that location if
they can subsequently shift taxable profit to another low-taxed location. But if the host
country tax rate is low, then it may prove advantageous to shift profit into that country,
creating a double reason for that choice of target. This would imply that we should find
a larger effect for host countries with lower tax rates. We investigate this, relative to
column [6], by allowing the coefficient to differ where the host country tax rate exceeds
the home country tax rate. However, while the coefficient is positive for both domestic
and multinational acquirers, as would be expected, neither term is significant, indicating
no asymmetric effect of the host country tax rate when the home country has a territorial
system of taxation. However, it is possible simply that such an effect is dominated in the
data by the case of worldwide tax treatment by the home country.
In Table 3.6 we explore Proposition 3, 4 and 6 which relate to capital expenditure.
The first two consider cases where it is intended to increase, or reduce, capital expenditure
in the target post-acquisition. The value of capital allowances should potentially play a
role here: more generous treatment of capital expenditure is beneficial when it is intended
to undertake more expenditure, but less beneficial when it is intended to reduce expen-
diture. More generally, previous literature (for example, Devereux and Griffith (1998a))
has argued that the effective average tax rate (EATR) is the relevant measure of taxation
for new greenfield investment. To the extent to which it is intended to expand the target
company post-acquisition, then the EATR may be relevant to the choice of target.
Column [1] reproduces column [2] from Table 3.5, which is the baseline used in Ta-
ble 3.7. Column [2] replaces the host country statutory tax rate with the host country
EATR, to see whether the EATR is the more relevant measure. A problem here is that
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the two measures are highly correlated with each other, and so it is difficult to determine
separate and individual effects. Including both tends to raise standard errors, with few of
the coefficients remaining significant. Including just the EATR indicates that the EATR
has a similar effect to the statutory rate. The most notable difference is that domestic
expansion by non-multinational companies does depends significantly on the EATR. This
is consistent with cross-border acquisition being seen as an alternative to domestic green-
field expansion through additional capital expenditure, especially for domestic companies.
Column [3] instead adds a variable measuring the generosity of capital allowances in
the host country, allowing the coefficient to vary according to whether the acquisition is
domestic or cross-border and whether the acquirer is a multinational or domestic company.
Again, the results for the tax rates are very similar. According to column [3], allowances
do play a significant and positive role for domestic acquisitions. This is consistent with
the result for the EATR in column [2], since the EATR is in effect a non-linear combina-
tion of the measure of allowances used in column [3] and the statutory rate. Consistent
with column [2], the more generously domestic capital expenditure is treated by the tax
system, the less likely is the company to choose a cross-border acquisition.
Table 3.7 returns to the issue of the nature of the sample. The results presented so
far relate only to acquirers that undertake exactly one acquisition in the period 2005-8.
This induces a potential selection bias, since companies undertaking multiple acquisi-
tions may be more or less responsive to taxation. In Table 3.7, as a robustness check,
we therefore take the alternative approach of including all acquisitions in our database.
However, in order to make this feasible, we treat each acquisition as being independent –
in effect treating each of them as if they were being undertaken by a separate company.
An acquirer that has made, say, 3 acquisitions will therefore appear in the data 3 times.
Clearly, this approach also has econometric problems in that we treat the error terms as
being independent. However, the nature of the error is different from our previous ap-
proach, and we can gauge how important these problems are by following both approaches.
Table 3.7 reproduces the specifications in Table 3.5, but including these multiple ac-
quisitions. Across the 7 columns, the results are broadly similar to those in Table 3.5.
The coefficient estimates differ to some extent, but they are never significantly different
from the estimates in Table 3.5. Standard errors tend to be slightly smaller, reflecting
the larger sample size. The effects of size are slightly different from those in Table 3.5,
though the coefficient estimates are of the same sign and broadly of the same magnitude.
The effects of allowing for a worldwide tax system in the home country are also similar,
though in Table 3.7 the additional variable is insignificant. Given that we are not allowing
for correlation in the error terms between multiple acquisitions by the same company, the
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precise significance of these results is questionable. We include them rather to provide a
check on the results in Table 3.6, and from that perspective, they provide a reasonable
confirmation of those results.
Finally, we consider the magnitude of the effects of taxes that we find on the location
of acquisitions. Tables 3.8 and 3.9 summarise elasticities based on Table 3.5 column [1]
and column [2]. In each case, the diagonal shows the own-elasticity: the effects of a 1
percent change in the host country tax rate on probability that an acquirer will choose
a target in that country. The off-diagonals show the cross-elasticities: the ijth element
shows the effect on the probability that an acquirer would choose j of a change in the
tax rate in i. By construction, for the standard multinational logit model (Table 3.8),
the off-diagonal elasticities are the same for each row by assumption; that is, a change in
the tax rate in, say, Austria, has the same effect on the probability of choosing any other
country. This assumption is relaxed in Table 3.9.
In both tables, the own-elasticities are generally quite large, and approximately half
of them exceed 1. For a typical country in our dataset, with a tax rate of around 30%, a
reduction to 27%, for example, would increase the probability that an acquirer chose that
country by more than 10%. Not surprisingly, the cross-elasticities are much smaller, with
the exception of elasticities for the domestic tax rate, a change in which has relatively
large effects on the probability of choosing each other country.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of estimated effects of taxation across acquirers, again
based on Table 3.5, column [2]. This takes into account the heterogeneity of effects across
domestic and cross-border acquisitions, and between domestic and multinational compa-
nies, and also the random component of the model. There is clearly a wide dispersion of
effects of taxation on location choice. The single largest peak is at a coefficient of around
-0.13, with a smaller peak at around -0.03. The mean (S.D.) estimated tax coefficient is
-10.48(4.98). The estimated coefficient varies from -17.30 to +5.28 with about 45 parents
having an estimated positive tax effect.
§ 3.6 Conclusions
This paper investigates the impact of corporation taxes on the location of mergers and
acquisitions. It contains four novel contributions. First, we are able to identify the ac-
quirer as the parent company of a multinational company by combining two datasets,
ZEPHYR and ORBIS, containing information on acquisitions and existing ownership
patterns, respectively. Second, in identifying the effects of taxation on the location of
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target companies, we allow for heterogeneity in the characteristics of the acquirer. In
particular, we distinguish between companies that, prior to the acquisition, were already
multinational compared to those that were purely domestic. We also consider the size of
the acquirer and whether it already has an operation in a given potential host country.
Third, we pay particular attention to a variety of mechanisms by which corporate taxation
could affect the location of the acquisition. We show that, in principle, a higher tax rate
in a country could raise, reduce, or leave unchanged the probability that its corporations
are the subject of a cross-border acquisition. We consider aspects of the tax regime in
both the target’s country and acquirer’s country. Fourth, we pay careful attention to the
econometric structure of the problem. We estimate directly at firm level the choices of
corporations as to where they acquire a target company, conditional on choosing to make
an acquisition. We use a form of the mixed logit model which allows us to avoid mak-
ing the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives inherent in a standard
multinomial logit model.
The conceptual framework leads to several hypotheses about the impact of taxes,
summarised in Section II. The host country tax rate would have a negative effect on a
target being chosen if the acquirer believed that it could generate higher income than the
existing owners. But if, for example, the acquirer intended to close down the operations
of the target to improve its market share, then the main effect of the host country tax
would be to reduce the price which the acquirer needs to pay for the target; in this case
as well, a higher tax rate would make an acquisition more likely. Section II also considers
several other cases, including the role of tax in the country of the acquirer.
The impact of taxes on the location of a target in an acquisition is therefore an em-
pirical issue. To study this, we analyse individual domestic and cross-border acquisitions
between 2006 and 2008 taken from the ZEPHYR database. We combine these data with
information on acquiring companies in 2005, before the acquisitions took place, from the
ORBIS database, which provides financial and ownership data. We estimate a location
choice model in which the choice of target country depends on the characteristics of the
acquirer and characteristics of the country of the target company.
Our results suggest that the host country tax rate in general has a negative effect on
the probability of a company in that country being acquired. On average, elasticities are
around 1: around half the countries have elasticities in excess of 1. However, the effects
differ according to the characteristics of the acquirer and whether the acquisition is do-
mestic or cross-border. More specifically, we find no effect of taxation on the choice for
domestic companies as to whether to make their first cross-border acquisition. However,
tax does affect the choice between cross-border locations for such companies. By contrast,
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multinational companies are sensitive to taxes for both domestic and cross-border acqui-
sitions, although they are less sensitive to differences in taxation between cross-border
acquisitions than are domestic companies. There is some evidence that these effects are
particularly strong for large companies.
We also present evidence that the host country tax rate does not play a role in the loca-
tion decision when the acquirer’s country operates a worldwide tax system with a credit
for foreign taxes, and where the host country tax rate is lower than the home country
tax rate. This is consistent with acquirer’s taking account of home country taxation on
future dividends from the newly-acquired target company. Finally, we find a significant
of allowances and the EATR on the choice of target location for domestic companies,
which is consistent with cross-border acquisition being seen as an alternative to domestic
greenfield expansion through additional capital expenditure.
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§ 3.7 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Characteristics of Observed Expansions
The sample of 2,623 companies chosen for the analyses, made at least one acquisition between the end of
2005 and the end of 2008. Companies were categorised as Multinational, Domestic or Standalone based
on the information in the base year 2005. A Parent is defined “standalone” when it does not own any
subsidiaries; a “domestic” when it only owns subsidiaries in the same country; and a “multinational”
when it owns at least one subsidiary recorded in a country different from its own
Firms
Number %
Total 2,623
Multinational 1,106 42.2
Domestic 1,127 43
Standalone 390 14.9
Expanding only in one year 2,132 81.3
Expanding in two years 400 15.2
Expanding in three years 91 3.5
Expanding to a New Location 1,085 41.4
Expanding to a Old Location 1,538 58.6
Making only one expansion 2,282 87
Making two expansions 255 9.7
Making more than two expansions 86 3.3
Domestic Expansion (new location same as the Parent Country) 1,806 58.3
Cross-border Expansion 817 41.7
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Table 3.2: Geographic Distribution of Parent Firms
The geographic distribution is provided for various samples in the following columns: (1) Total sample;
(2) Multinational Parent Companies only; (3) Parents expanding in new locations only; (4) Parents
making one expansion only. The location of the parent is the country where the company was initially
incorporated and this information is obtained from the BvD database
Parent Country (1) (2) (3) (4)
Australia 50 21 40 44
Austria 19 13 8 18
Belgium 64 44 25 54
Brazil 15 5 6 15
Canada 93 40 69 83
Colombia 6 2 3 6
Cyprus 1 1 1 1
Denmark 61 28 31 52
Estonia 1 1 1 1
Finland 69 37 28 57
France 205 117 71 170
Germany 124 81 51 102
Greece 20 6 6 19
Hong Kong 1 1 1 0
Hungary 2 2 2 2
Iceland 7 5 3 6
India 52 21 47 45
Ireland 19 10 5 19
Italy 77 44 31 70
Jamaica 1 0 1 1
Japan 19 18 6 19
Kazakhstan 2 1 2 2
Kuwait 2 1 2 1
Lithuania 1 1 1 1
Luxembourg 1 1 1 0
Mexico 7 2 6 7
Morocco 1 1 1 1
Netherlands 109 85 48 88
New Zealand 2 0 2 2
Norway 53 14 25 47
Peru 2 0 1 2
Poland 21 1 10 21
Continued on next page
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Table 3.2 – continued from previous page
Parent Country (1) (2) (3) (4)
Portugal 15 6 5 15
Romania 2 0 2 2
Russia 120 3 56 116
Singapore 10 4 8 10
Slovakia 1 0 1 1
South Africa 16 5 8 16
South Korea 45 9 29 45
Spain 115 41 44 102
Sweden 195 110 68 156
Switzerland 52 45 23 39
Turkey 4 3 3 4
Ukraine 5 0 4 5
United Kingdom 674 192 224 573
United States 261 83 75 241
Venezuela 1 1 0 1
Total 2,623 1,106 1,085 2,282
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Table 3.3: Expansion Location Choice Made in Observed Acquisitions
This table lists the countries where the parents chose to acquire during the sample period end of 2005 to
end of 200: in the full sample (columns 1 and 2); among those making only one choice (columns 3 and
4); among the multinational companies (column 5 and 6). The information is split according to whether
the acquisition was domestic (Dom) or cross-border (CB). The percentages are calculated for the chosen
category.
Location of Targets Full Sample
Parents Making
One Choice
Multinationals
CB acquisitions 1,290 41.66% 725 31.36% 960 64.17%
Austria 16 0.52% 7 0.44% 11 0.74%
Belgium 40 1.29% 27 1.70% 30 2.01%
Brazil 28 0.90% 16 1.01% 22 1.47%
Canada 41 1.32% 14 0.88% 26 1.74%
Switzerland 16 0.52% 6 0.38% 11 0.74%
Denmark 18 0.58% 10 0.63% 12 0.80%
Finland 36 1.16% 18 1.13% 28 1.87%
France 75 2.42% 40 2.52% 57 3.81%
Germany 115 3.71% 55 3.47% 83 5.55%
Ireland 33 1.07% 15 0.95% 20 1.34%
Italy 39 1.26% 17 1.07% 29 1.94%
Netherlands 53 1.71% 31 1.95% 36 2.41%
Norway 36 1.16% 21 1.32% 23 1.54%
Russia 42 1.36% 26 1.64% 35 2.34%
Spain 56 1.81% 38 2.39% 49 3.28%
Sweden 75 2.42% 50 3.15% 52 3.48%
United Kingdom 242 7.82% 147 9.26% 196 13.10%
United States 329 10.63% 187 11.78% 240 16.04%
Dom acquisitions 1,806 58.33% 1,587 68.64% 536 35.83%
Australia 18 0.58% 18 1.13% 4 0.27%
Austria 8 0.26% 8 0.50% 4 0.27%
Belgium 34 1.10% 31 1.95% 16 1.07%
Brazil 11 0.36% 11 0.48% 2 0.13%
Canada 62 2.00% 53 3.34% 20 1.34%
Colombia 6 0.19% 6 0.38% 1 0.07%
Denmark 30 0.97% 24 1.51% 7 0.47%
Finland 43 1.39% 37 1.60% 15 1.00%
Continued on next page
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Table 3.3 – continued from previous page
Location of Targets Full Sample
Parents Making
One Choice
Multinationals
France 137 4.43% 123 7.75% 54 3.61%
Germany 81 2.62% 67 4.22% 46 3.07%
Greece 17 0.55% 17 1.07% 11 0.74%
India 13 0.42% 13 0.56% 2 0.13%
Ireland 7 0.23% 7 0.44% 2 0.13%
Italy 53 1.71% 48 3.02% 27 1.80%
Japan 7 0.23% 7 0.44% 0.00%
Mexico 1 0.03% 1 0.04% 1 0.07%
Netherlands 45 1.45% 34 2.14% 25 1.67%
Norway 32 1.03% 27 1.70% 6 0.40%
Peru 2 0.06% 2 0.13% 1 0.07%
Poland 20 0.65% 20 0.87% 10 0.67%
Portugal 9 0.29% 9 0.57% 5 0.33%
Romania 2 0.06% 2 0.13% 0.00%
Russia 117 3.78% 113 7.12% 2 0.13%
Singapore 6 0.19% 6 0.26% 0.00%
South Africa 7 0.23% 7 0.44% 5 0.33%
South Korea 37 1.20% 37 2.33% 11 0.74%
Spain 93 3.00% 84 5.29% 22 1.47%
Sweden 121 3.91% 98 4.24% 55 3.68%
Switzerland 14 0.45% 12 0.76% 10 0.67%
Ukraine 3 0.10% 3 0.19% 1 0.07%
United Kingdom 554 17.89% 460 28.99% 126 8.42%
United States 216 6.98% 202 8.74% 45 3.01%
Total 3,096 100.00% 2,312 100.00% 1,496 100.00%
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Table 3.6: Extension to Model Column (2) of Table 5
This table presents results from some sensitivity checks where the statutory tax variable is replaced by
the EATR (column [2]), or where a measure of allowances is also included (columns [3]). The dependent
variable takes the value of 1 if the parent company chooses a particular location among a set of alternatives.
The choice set varies across companies. Some have 18 and some have 19 alternatives to choose from,
depending on whether the domestic acquisition is part of the choice set or not. See data section for
further details. All specifications are random parameter logit (RPL) where the effect of host country
tax variable is allowed to be random across companies. The RPL model was maximised using simulated
maximum likelihood with 50 Halton random draws. In addition to the coefficients reported, all models
allow intercepts and parent country statutory tax rate (columns [1] and [3]), EATR (column [2]), and
allowances (column[3]) to have effects that vary over the alternatives. Sample size is 2,282 parents that
made one location choice during the observation period: end of 2005 to end of 2008. mne2005 is a
binary indicator for multi-national enterprises as defined in the base year 2005. cb expansion refers to
cross-border expansions and dom refers to domestic expansions, both defined with respect to the country
of location of the parent. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. The asterisks indicate significance:
*** ( 1%), ** (5%), * (10% ).
Tax Variable used in the model
Statutory
Tax τ
EATR
τ+
allowances
[1] (Table 5:
[2])
[2] [3]
Interaction of Tax & cb expansion -12.349** -10.672** -9.454*
(4.857) (5.344) (5.156)
Interaction of Tax & cb
expansion*mne2005
5.078** 5.217** 5.106**
(2.412) (2.34) (2.424)
Interaction of Allowance & cb
expansion
-4.216
(3.257)
Interaction of Allowance & cb
expansion & mne2005
-2.214
(1.947)
Interaction of Tax & dom expansion -5.78 -7.706** -8.688**
(3.693) (3.613) (4.223)
Interaction of Tax & dom
expansion & mne2005
-5.687*** -6.132*** -6.296**
(1.441) (1.539) (3.119)
Interaction of Allowance & dom
expansion
10.225***
(2.919)
Interaction of Allowance & dom
expansion & mne2005
-2.013
(2.208)
log GDP (constant 2000 USD) 1.045*** 1.155*** 1.432***
(.257) (.27) (.318)
GDP growth -0.066 -0.061 -0.06
Continued on next page
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Table 3.6 – continued from previous page
[1] (Table 5:
[2])
[2] [3]
(.051) (.049) (.053)
Cost of business start-ups as % of GNI -0.060*** -0.058*** -0.064***
(.014) (.013) (.015)
Business extent of disclosure index -0.010* -0.117** -0.151**
(.055) (.055) (.061)
Unemployment as a % of labour force 0.065* 0.067* 0.071*
(.037) (.035) (.039)
Contiguity of Host and Target
Country & cb expansion
0.455*** 0.476*** 0.406**
(.172) (.172) (.182)
Common Language & cb expansion 0.315* 0.294 0.338*
(.184) (.186) (.19)
Distance btw capitals of Host and
Target Country & cb expansion
-0.424*** -0.400*** -0.445***
(.085) (.081) (.089)
Common Legal System & cb expansion 0.800*** 0.814*** 0.803***
(.127) (.131) (.134)
Average Corruption Score, av.
1996/2000
-0.368 -0.357 -0.242
(.251) (.244) (.274)
Ratio of market capitalization to
GDP, av. 1999/2003
0.18 -0.026 -0.251
(.279) (.269) (.314)
ln(No. Domestic Firms pc), av.
1999− 2003
0.074 0.168 0.222
(.176) (.169) (.193)
Private credit to GDP, av. 1999−2003 -1.780*** -1.794*** -2.056***
(.496) (.482) (.537)
Standard Deviation of the RP (σ)
for the tax effect
7.620*** 7.720*** 8.045***
(2.238) (2.262) (2.169)
Maximised Log Likelihood -2602.28 -2590.81 -2571.47
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Figure 3.1: The Distribution of Effects of the Host Country Tax Rate across all
Acquirers, from Table 5 Column 2
Mean Value = - 10.48; Std Deviation = 4.98; Skewness = 0.959; Excess Kurtosis -3 = -0.662;
Minimum = -17.30; Maximum = 5.28
- Chapter 4 -
Ownership Structure Changes Database
§ 4.1 Introduction
The work presented in this Thesis studies two aspects of firms discrete investment deci-
sions. Parent firms have to choose whether to maintain their status quo or rather expand
their ownership structure by acquiring the controlling share of other pre-existing firms.
If they decide to expand, they have to choose what is the most desirable location for the
acquisition targets.
In both papers, the empirical analysis relies upon an attentively built dataset, that
follows the pattern of Ownership Structure changes due to all Merger and Acquisition
transactions (M&As) undertaken during a fix period of time. The datasets carefully
explore two features observed in the initial raw data. First, the high level of heterogene-
ity among firms, in terms of size, geographic dispersion and structure complexity. The
database includes only firms defined as large in terms of number of employees or volume
of operating profit and total assets. Despite this common feature, the observe firms are
very diverse, especially in terms of number of subsidiaries owned and number of countries
where these subsidiaries are located. Secondly, the pyramid structure of complex cor-
porations constituted by several firms connected through direct and indirect ownership
links. Ignoring the ownership links that connect the observed firms would mean to treat
all firms as independent and autonomous entities and all M&A as single transactions be-
tween two economic agents. Instead, tracking the ownership chain between the observed
firms allows to identify the final headquarter responsible for all decision aspects regarding
a M&A project.
Two examples help illustrate the advantages of modelling the data as described here.
As a first example, assume a firm located in Italy and called “IT1” qualifies as the direct
acquirer of a firm also located in Italy and called “IT2”. Assume then that a British
114
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firm called “GB” owns the controlling share of firm “IT1”. If the link between “IT1” and
“GB” is not acknowledged, the acquisition of “IT2” is recorded as a domestic acquisition.
This misrepresents the transaction in two ways: first, the deal should be recorded as a
cross-border acquisition, because “IT2”, an italian firm, becomes annexed to the structure
controlled by “GB”, a British firm. Secondly, only aknowledging the pre-existence (with
respect to the acquisition) of the link between “GB” and “IT1” allows to record the fact
that the observed cross-border acquisition expands the ownership structure controlled by
“GB” without stretching its geographical distribution. In other words, firm “GB” is not
entering a new (geographic) market. For the second example, assume that “GB” not only
controls “IT1”, but it also control “FR1”, a firm located in France. Then also assume
that “FR1” acquires another French firm called “FR2”, during the same financial year
when “IT1” acquires “IT2”. Under these circumstances, to ignore the link between “GB”
and its directly controlled subsidiaries (“IT1” and “FR1”) has an additional consequence
with respect to those described in the previous example. “IT1” and “FR1” would be
treated as independent entities, each undergoing an ownership expansion. Instead, it is
only one firm, “GB”, that has extended both branches of its organization by acquiring
new subsidiaries in two of its foreign locations.
The datasets implemented in this Thesis were built starting from raw data extracted
from three commercial database, all provided by the Bureau Van Dijk: ORBIS, AMADEUS
and ZEPHYR. This Chapter describes key features of the raw data, along with the proce-
dure followed to build the final datasets that allowed the empirical investigation presented
in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Section 4.2 describes the methodology employed to recon-
struct the Ownership Structure of the initial sample of firms, extracted by ORBIS. Section
4.3 describes the main characteristics of the observed M&A deals and it explains how the
M&As information extracted by ZEPHYR were used to track all the Ownership changes
occurred to the initial sample of firms observed in ORBIS. Finally, Section 4.4 describes
the methodology used to merge these two sources and produce the final datasets used to
investigate on the determinants of the M&A investment decision.
§ 4.2 Reconstruction of Firms Ownership Struc-
ture
The initial sample covered all large1 firms listed in the May 2004 electronic version of
ORBIS database. The database does not have any geographic restriction, which means
firms are distributed worldwide. For each firm ORBIS provides the identity of all known
1Bureau Van Dijk classifies a firm as “large” if its operating revenue is above 14 mil USD, if its total
assets are above 20 mil USD or if its employees are more than 150
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shareholders and the size of both direct and indirect ownership links. To guarantee accu-
racy of the final dataset, only direct links were used to build the ownership structure of
the observed firms 2.
The analysis of ownership expansions realised through merger and acquisitions (M&As)
requires identification of the firms involved in the deal and of their specific role. One ap-
proach is to assume that only the firms legally involved in the deal benefit from its effects,
in which case only the direct acquirer is considered to be affected by the ownership trans-
action realised through the acquisition contract. An alternative approach is to identify all
firms that, through a chain of direct and indirect ownership links, are connected to the
firms listed in the legal contract defining the terms of the acquisition, and indicate the
global ultimate owner of the reconstructed chain as responsible for the deal. As it is often
the case, firms have multiple shareholders, so it is not trivial to attribute the responsibility
for an ownership change occurred at the subsidiary level. To solve this issue, a simple
“controlling share rule” is defined. Accordingly, non-independent firms are placed under
the structure of the shareholder owning their controlling share, while parent firms are
global ultimate owners with no direct shareholders.3 This procedure allowed to identify
a total of 130,285 parent firms and 129,883 subsidiaries.
A second feature of the ORBIS database regards the definition of a firm’s location. A
variable “country” is provided, which indicates the place where production of a given firm
takes place. The variable often includes a string with several countries, listed in alphabet-
ical order. However, there is no instruction on how the countries listed in the string relate
to the location of the firm’s listed subsidiaries. Having to identify the country under whose
jurisdiction a parent firm is taxed, decision was taken to define a firm’s location on the
basis of the incorporation country, which is the country where the firm is legally registered.
The parent firms were subsequently classified into three groups. The group of “stan-
dalone” firms, constituted by all parents controlling no subsidiaries; the group of “do-
mestic” firms, constituted by all parents controlling only domestic subsidiaries; and the
group of “multinational” firms, constituted by all parents controlling at least one sub-
sidiary located in a foreign country. The sample composition corresponds to the 7% of
firms (9,148) being multinationals, the 24% of firms (31,556) being domestic and the
69% of firms (89,581) being standalone. This classification constitutes the first source of
heterogeneity across firms, a feature largely exploited in the econometric analysis of the
work presented in this Thesis. As well known, a large part of the literature on Foreign
2Firms have no obligation to provide complete information about their ownership structure and indi-
rect links are partially reconstructed by Bureau Van Dijk on the basis of the available data
3Shareholders represented by individuals, associations and public institutions are not considered when
reconstructing the chain of ownership links between active firms
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Direct Investments (FDI) focuses exclusively on multinational firms. These are certainly
relevant, given the scale of their activity and their geographic spread, but they represent
only a small portion of the World population of large firms.
The dataset resulting at this first stage is a picture of all ownership structure trees
defined by controlling share links that were active by the end of the financial year 2004.
Note that the dataset has no record on when or how each link was established. However,
according to the compiling rules followed by Bureau Van Dijk, it includes all the owner-
ship changes due to transactions of shares that were completed by the end of 2004.
The “size” of a parent firm can be defined in terms of number of subsidiaries owned at
a given point in time. In addition, it is possible to think about any ownership structure
as having at least other two dimensions: “depth”, given by the lowest dependency level
through which subsidiaries are linked to their parent, and “geographic spread”, given by
the number of countries where these subsidiaries are located. Figure 4.1 shows that the
distribution of firm size is positively skewed, and much more so for domestic than for
multinational firms. In fact, the largest domestic owns 79 different subsidiaries, while the
99% of domestic parents own 13 of less subsidiaries. Instead, the largest multinational
owns 740 subsidiaries, while the 99% of multinational parents own 91 or less subsidiaries.
Figure 4.2 shows a structural difference between domestic and multinational firms: the
top Graph relates the total number of subsidiaries owned by domestic parents by the
end of 2004 with the “depth” of their structure; the bottom Graph does the same for
multinational parents. What emerges is that domestic firms that own a large number of
subsidiaries do not necessarily have them connected through many levels of dependence,
while the contrary is true for multinational firms. Table 4.1 and 4.2 show a complementary
aspect of the pyramidal structure of domestic and multinational firms. The tables report
the number of subsidiaries owned at each level of dependency. The 99% of domestic firms
has no more than 13 subsidiaries within the same dependency level, whereas the 99%
of multinational firms have no more than 42. Moreover, according to Table 4.1 only 76
domestic firms (less than the 1% of the total) control more than four subsidiaries within
the fourth (or lower) dependency level, whereas, according to Table 4.2, 291 multinational
firms (just above the 3% of the total) do. Table 4.3 gives some statistics on the geographic
spread of multinational firms. About 65% of multinationals own subsidiaries in only one
foreign country, 35% spreads their structure over between two and fifteen different foreign
countries, and the largest 1% of multinational firms control subsidiaries in up to thirty
foreign countries. Figure 4.3 sheds some light on the relationship between depth an width
of multinational firms. The top Graph shows that multinationals that are spread over
a large number of foreign countries tend to have subsidiaries linked through maximum
four, five or six level of dependency. The bottom Graph shows that the geographical
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spread of a multinational firm mostly depends on the location of the subsidiaries owned
at the first two levels of dependency, as subsidiaries owned at lower levels of dependency
are concentrated in less than three countries. Finally, Table 4.4 shows the distribution
of parent firms across countries. The United Kingdom, Russia and Spain are the three
countries with the highest number of parent firms, whereas the United States of America,
followed by Germany and the United Kingdom are the three countries with the highest
number of multinational parent firms.
§ 4.3 M&A activity
Zephyr database includes records of all transactions that involve the exchange or purchase
of shares between existing firms. Each transaction involves three firms: the acquirer, who
directly purchases the share of another firm, the target, whose shares are directly pur-
chased by the acquirer, and a vendor, who sells the control it has over the target to the
acquirer. The transactions are grouped in terms of “deals”, and a unique code is asso-
ciated to each deal. A deal can be thought of as a legal contract between two or more
parties, and as such it can be constituted by one or more transactions. For the purpose
of the economic questions posed by the papers of this Thesis, interest lies only on the
transactions that affect the structure of the parent firms observed in ORBIS and the
chain of ownership that links them to their subsidiaries. The data used are limited to the
transactions classified as Mergers and Acquisitions and recorded as completed.4
The papers presented in this Thesis used two different versions of Zephyr. The paper
with title “Corporate Taxes and the Growth of the Firm” uses the 2011 electronic update
of Zephyr, whereas the paper with title “Taxes and the Location of Targets” uses the
2009 electronic update of Zephyr. The more recent update includes all deals completed
up to the end of 2010, while the earlier update only includes deals completed by the end of
2008. This section presents statistics that describe the main features of the larger sample.
Table 4.5 reports the sample coverage for the years between 2005 and 2010. It shows
that 121,057 Mergers and Acquisition (M&A) deals were completed over the six years, for
a total of 130,484 ownership transactions. The post-crisis fall of M&As emerges from the
table, as the number of deals and transactions completed over 2009 and 2010 dropped on
average by 20%. Table 4.6 reports statistics on the composition of the deals, in terms of
number of transactions. 99% of completed deals (a total of 120,196 over the six years)
include three of less transactions, while the more complex deals include up to over twenty
different transactions. This shows how most deals take place between only one acquirer,
4Zephyr defines a transaction as “completed” if all its effects on the involved parties have taken place.
The database also has information on deals “started” or even just “rumoured”.
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one target and one vendor. Table 4.7 looks deeper into this matter, by reporting the
number of acquirers, targets and vendors involved in each deal. Note that in Zephyr 20%
of deals have missing acquirer, 32% have missing target and 71% have missing vendor.
In particular, information on the identity of the vendor were not used when merging
Zephyr with the Ownership Structure dataset, due to the under-representation of the
sample. Table 4.7 shows that on average over the six years the 79% of deals involve
only one Acquirer, and the 65% of deals involve only one target, suggesting that it is
common to have deals where the same acquirer purchase shares of multiple targets. In
fact, according to Table 4.8, 1,613 deals had one acquirer purchasing shares of more than
one target, whereas 886 deals had multiple acquirers purchasing shares of the same target.
Finally, Table 4.10 reports statistics on the nature of the ownership shares object of the
transactions reported in Zephyr. The first three columns show that, on average over the
years, just below 2% of the observed transactions resolved with the acquirer owning a
minority share of the target. This is especially the case for deals where multiple acquirers
purchase shares of the same target. Instead, after completion of the 98% of transactions,
the acquirer becomes the majority shareholder of the purchased target, and in 82% of
these cases the acquirer becomes the sole shareholder of the target firm. The remainder
of the table show descriptive statistics on the size of the share of the target owned by
the acquirer before the beginning of the deal. As reported in the bottom row, on average
over the years the 21% of transactions involved acquirers that already owned some share
of the target, and in half of this cases the share involved covered over 50% of the target’s
full ownership.
§ 4.4 Changes in the Ownership Structures Induced
by completed M&As
To guarantee that a M&A deal has an effect on the ownership chain of the involved firms,
as reconstructed through ORBIS, three criteria are established. First, if a deal includes
more than one transaction and shares of the same target are being purchased by more
than one acquirer, there needs to be exact record of what share is purchased by each ac-
quirer. Unfortunately, in some cases Zephyr reports only the overall share involved in the
deal, so it is not possible to reconstruct the effect of the deal on the ownership structure
of each firm involved. Second, all transactions where the acquirer owns an initial majority
share of the target are treated as redundant, because such transactions cause no effect
on the ownership of the firms involved. Third, transactions where the acquirer purchases
the minority share of the target have no effect on the ownership structure of the parties
involved, because the purchase of a minority share of the target does not shift control
over the target from the vendor to the acquirer.
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When reconstructing the effect of a completed M&A on the ownership of the involved
firms, a specific routine was followed:
1. verify that the firms involved in a completed deal belong to the 2005 base sample
from Orbis, and drop cases where information on the target firm are missing, or
where the acquirer is not listed in the base sample
2. identify the GUO of the acquirer, unless the acquirer is itself a GUO
3. add the target firms to the structure of the GUO
4. remove from the structure of the vendor’s GUO the firm sold in the deal and all the
subsidiaries that this firm directly, or indirectly controlled before the deal
The reduction in the sample size that lead to the datasets finally used for the imple-
mentation of the econometric analysis in the two papers of this Thesis is mainly due to
changes in the ID code associated to each firm, and of which Bureau Van Dijk does not
keep record. Departing from the initial sample of 130,285 parent firms, 106,818 firms were
observed in all consecutive years between 2004 and 2010 (of these 80,326 were European),
and 35,615 maintained the same ID code. For the three years between 2006 and 2008,
2,623 parent firms located worldwide completed at least one acquisition of the majority
share of at least one target located in one of eighteen countries, as discussed in Chapter 3.
For the five years between 2006 and 2010, instead, 28,940 parent firms located in Europe
were observed to make at least one expansion or to keep their structure unchanged, as
discussed in Chapter 2.
§ 4.5 Tables and Figures
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Figure 4.1: Size of Ownership Structure of Domestic and Multinational Firms
Note: the size of a parent firm is measured in terms of total number of subsidiaries owned at the end of
2004, regardless of the level of dependency at which each subsidiary is linked to their parent.
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Figure 4.2: “Depth” of Ownership Structure
Note: the “depth” of an ownership structure is determined by the lowest level of dependency at which the
controlled subsidiaries are linked to the parent firm. This is measured as at the end of 2004. The lowest
level of dependency traceable through the ORBIS database is the 10th level. The sample represented in
the Figure excludes the 89,581 standalone firms that own no subsidiaries, and whose ownership structure
“depth” stops at the parent level.
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Table 4.1: Pyramidal Structure of Domestic Firms
Number of
subsidiaries owned at
each level of
subsidiarity
Number of Domestic Firms owning a specific Number of Subsidiaries at each Level
of Dependency by the end of 2004
1st Lev. 2nd Lev. 3rd Lev 4th Lev 5th Lev 6th Lev 7th Lev 8th Lev 9th Lev
1 24,469 2,471 469 118 39 14 9 2 0
2 4,011 722 174 47 14 9 4 0 0
3 1,380 330 71 26 7 2 2 0 0
4 621 174 53 16 5 2 0 0 0
5 334 103 33 4 4 1 1 0 0
6 173 72 16 6 4 0 1 1 0
7 113 39 14 9 1 0 0 0 0
8 93 28 5 4 3 0 0 1 0
9 42 25 6 3 3 2 1 1 0
10 38 16 3 5 1 0 0 0 0
11 29 14 9 3 0 1 0 0 1
12 26 11 9 1 1 1 0 0 0
13 19 9 7 1 1 0 0 0 0
> 13 105 58 19 7 1 2 0 0 0
Note: the pyramidal structure of a firm is given by the number of subsidiaries owned at each level of dependency.
The sample used in this Table includes all Domestic firms and their ownership structure at the end of 2004.
Subsidiaries are controlled through majority links up to the tenth level.
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Table 4.2: Pyramidal Structure of Multinational Firms
Number of
subsidiaries owned at
each level of
subsidiarity
Number of Domestic Firms owning a specific Number of Subsidiaries at each Level of
Dependency by the end of 2004
1st Lev. 2nd Lev. 3rd Lev 4th Lev 5th Lev 6th Lev 7th Lev 8th Lev 9th Lev 10th Lev
1 4,752 1,538 589 226 102 58 22 2 2 2
2 1,507 655 276 125 50 22 8 5 1 1
3 698 404 156 71 31 11 1 2 0 0
4 423 225 94 35 17 8 1 4 0 0
5 294 171 85 27 14 4 4 0 1 0
6 205 117 48 24 11 2 0 0 0 0
7 161 98 40 24 6 3 1 1 0 0
8 123 78 29 11 9 0 1 0 2 0
9 101 69 25 18 2 2 2 0 0 0
10 90 37 22 7 1 3 0 0 0 0
11 72 54 20 11 2 1 0 0 0 0
12 54 45 14 5 6 1 1 0 0 0
13 63 29 19 6 4 1 0 0 1 0
14 43 26 17 5 1 1 0 0 0 0
15 45 33 17 5 1 0 0 0 0 0
16 37 18 11 2 1 0 0 0 0 0
17 26 26 9 2 1 0 0 0 0 0
18 26 16 10 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 26 20 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0
20 19 11 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
21 27 6 2 4 1 0 0 0 0 0
22 21 12 10 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
23 16 14 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 0
24 13 8 5 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
25 9 11 5 2 1 0 0 0 0 0
26 9 11 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
27 13 7 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 0
28 15 8 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
29 3 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
30 8 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 10 5 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
32 7 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
33 6 8 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
34 9 3 3 4 1 0 0 0 0 0
35 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
36 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
37 5 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
38 6 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
39 3 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
40 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
41 4 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
42 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
> 42 65 64 20 6 0 0 0 0 0 0
Note: the pyramidal structure of a firm is given by the number of subsidiaries owned at each level of dependency. The sample
used in this Table includes all Multinational firms and their ownership structure at the end of 2004. Subsidiaries are controlled
through majority links up to the tenth level.
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Table 4.3: Geographic Spread of Multinational Firms
Number of countries
where Subsidiaries
are located
Number
of MNE
Firms
Perc. Cum.
1 5,930 64.82 64.82
2 1,393 15.23 80.05
3 604 6.60 86.65
4 334 3.65 90.30
5 221 2.42 92.72
6 142 1.55 94.27
7 119 1.30 95.57
8 73 0.80 96.37
9 60 0.66 97.03
10 35 0.38 97.41
11 42 0.46 97.87
12 37 0.40 98.27
13 25 0.27 98.55
14 27 0.30 98.84
15 17 0.19 99.03
16 21 0.23 99.26
17 14 0.15 99.41
18 11 0.12 99.53
19 8 0.09 99.62
20 7 0.08 99.69
21 6 0.07 99.76
22 8 0.09 99.85
23 2 0.02 99.87
24 1 0.01 99.88
25 4 0.04 99.92
26 3 0.03 99.96
29 2 0.02 99.98
30 1 0.01 99.99
31 1 0.01 100.00
Total 9,148 100.00 100.00
Note: the geographic spread of an ownership structure is measured
in terms of foreign countries where the subsidiaries owned at the
end of 2004 are located, regardless the level of dependency at which
they are connected to their parent. The sample includes the 9,148
Multinationals observed at the end of 2004.
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Figure 4.3: Complexity of Ownership Structure of Multinational Firms
The top Graph relates the total number of countries where the subsidiaries owned by each multinational
parent are located to the lowest level of dependency at which these subsidiaries are linked to their par-
ent. The bottom Graph shows the number of countries where the subsidiaries owned within each level of
dependency are located. The sample used includes the 9,148 Multinationals observed at the end of 2004.
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Table 4.4: Location of Parent Firms
Country of Parent Firm Parent Firm Type All types
Domestic Multinational Standalone
United Kingdom 12,117 805 20,486 33,408
Russia 1,514 11 12,108 13,633
Spain 1,433 210 9,954 11,597
France 2,248 439 5,858 8,545
Italy 774 322 4,642 5,738
Denmark 2,760 281 2,555 5,596
Sweden 3,955 493 922 5,370
Korea, Republic of 354 37 4,204 4,595
United States of America 713 2,109 1,364 4,186
Germany 991 920 2,005 3,916
Ireland 663 213 2,701 3,577
Norway 1,066 118 2,200 3,384
Greece 251 38 2,874 3,163
Belgium 533 282 1,967 2,782
Japan 101 471 2,006 2,578
Netherlands 423 810 1,194 2,427
Portugal 211 37 1,767 2,015
Ukraine 169 2 1,753 1,924
Poland 101 9 1,045 1,155
Australia 32 65 588 685
Switzerland 32 412 155 599
Malaysia 27 19 534 580
Canada 54 159 362 575
Romania 86 0 473 559
Finland 113 111 317 541
China 30 5 443 478
Austria 115 135 226 476
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 0 400 400
India 10 44 338 392
Bulgaria 139 1 247 387
Serbia and Montenegro 7 0 373 380
Singapore 13 35 304 352
Taiwan, Republic of 55 47 190 292
Thailand 9 3 250 262
Bermuda 4 72 180 256
Iceland 5 18 213 236
Estonia 33 6 170 209
Lithuania 18 2 179 199
Croatia 40 2 151 193
Czech Republic 4 2 174 180
Brazil 117 16 46 179
Cayman Islands 1 14 151 166
Luxembourg 6 97 62 165
Indonesia 2 1 160 163
Latvia 8 5 129 142
Peru 8 0 103 111
South Africa 19 42 49 110
Hungary 5 8 74 87
Hong Kong 8 29 49 86
Chile 31 3 51 85
Philippines 8 4 73 85
Argentina 37 1 43 81
Jordan 2 3 57 62
Egypt 18 2 41 61
Israel 0 32 28 60
New Zealand 4 14 41 59
Mexico 19 6 26 51
Oman 4 1 46 51
Other Countries 56 125 480 661
All Countries 31,556 9,148 89,581 130,285
Note: the country of the parent firm corresponds to the country where the firm is legally
registered. Th table shows only the countries that have at least 50 parent firms, irre-
spective of the type. Among “Other Countries”, the list of countries where between 50
and 10 parent firms are located is: Bahrain, Bangladesh, British Virgin Island, Colombia,
Cyprus, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Macedonia, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pak-
istan, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates
and Venezuela.
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Table 4.5: Number of M&A Deals and Transactions
M&A Deals M&A Transactions
Year of Completion Number
Percentage
of Total
Number
Percentage
of Total
2005 20,495 16.93% 21,881 16.77%
2006 20,814 17.19% 22,226 17.03%
2007 23,174 19.14% 24,979 19.14%
2008 22,821 18.85% 24,761 18.98%
2009 19,804 16.36% 21,249 16.28%
2010 13,949 11.52% 15,388 11.79%
Total 121,057 100.00% 130,484 100.00%
Notes: an M&A “deal”, as reported in ZEPHYR, is equivalent of a contract, as it
can include one or more ownership transactions between existing firms. The 130,484
transactions completed between 2005 and 2010 are grouped under 121,057 deals.
Table 4.6: Number of Transactions per Deal
Number of
Transactions per
M&A deal
Completed Deals per Year All Years
Percentage
of Total
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 19,636 19,973 22,137 21,800 18,939 13,114 115,599 95.49%
2 607 573 728 642 586 552 3,688 3.05%
3 131 132 163 186 152 145 909 0.75%
4 59 65 58 82 61 62 387 0.32&
5 31 28 30 39 28 36 192 0.16%
6 9 21 21 22 15 21 109 0.09%
7 11 4 13 12 6 6 52 0.04%
8 2 10 8 14 5 2 41 0.03%
9 2 5 3 11 6 3 30 0.02%
10 3 2 2 2 1 3 13 0.01%
11 1 0 4 3 3 3 14 0.01%
12 1 1 1 5 0 0 8 0.01%
13 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0.00%
14 0 0 2 0 1 0 3 0.00%
15 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0.00%
>15 1 0 3 3 0 1 8 0.00%
Notes: each row reports the number of deals completed each year and constituted by the number of transactions
indicated but he first column. The three largest deals observed in the sample were completed in 2007 and were
constituted by twenty-seven, twenty-eight and thirty-three different transactions, respectively.
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Table 4.7: Number of Firms Involved within each Deal
Number of Completed Deals
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 All Years
Number of Acquirers
within same Deal
1 Acquirer 16,620 17,178 19,093 18,045 14,427 10,516 95,879
(81.09%) (82.53%) (82.39%) (79.07%) (72.85%) (75.39%) (79.20% )
2 Acquirers 152 150 199 183 182 114 980
(0.74% (0.72% (0.86%) (0.80%) (0.92%) (0.82%) (0.81%)
≥ 3 Acquirers 33 44 42 56 59 35 269
(0.16%) (0.21%) (0.17%) (0.25%) (0.31%) (0.25%) (0.22 %)
Number of Targets
within same Deal
1 Target 12,363 13,646 16,568 16,045 12,454 8,796 79,872
(60.32%) (65.56%) (71.49%) (70.31%) (62.89%) (63.06%) (65.98%)
2 Target 220 209 275 236 186 257 1,383
(1.07%) (1%) (1.19%) (1.03%) (0.94%) (1.84%) (1.14%)
≥ 3 Targets 48 85 96 107 70 90 496
(0.22%) (0.4%) (0.39%) (0.46%) (0.38%) (0.65%) (0.41%)
Number of Vendors
within same Deal
1 Vendor 5,435 5,163 5,715 5,850 6,028 3,988 32,179
(26.52%) (24.81%) (24.66%) (25.63%) (30.44%) (28.59%) (26.58%)
2 Vendor 256 240 292 259 240 200 1,487
(1.25%) (1.15%) (1.26%) (1.13%) (1.21%) (1.43% ) (1.23%)
≥ 3 Vendor 172 140 170 211 153 155 1001
(0.81%) (0.68%) (0.73%) (0.91%) (0.8%) (1.11%) (0.81%)
Notes: each cell reports the number of deals completed in the year indicated in the column that
saw one or more acquirers, targets or vendors involved. Numbers in parenthesis give the percentage
with respect to the total number of deals completed during the year indicated in the column. The
deal with the largest number of acquirers was completed in 2008 and saw the involvement of twelve
different acquirers. The deal with the largest number of targets was completed in 2007 and saw the
involvement of thirty-three different targets. The two deals with the largest number of vendors were
completed in 2005 and 2008 and saw the involvement of sixteen different vendors. On average across
years the 20% of deals have missing acquirer, the 32% have missing target and the 71% have missing
vendor.
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Table 4.8: Number of Acquirers and Targets involved in the same Deal
Number of Acquirers
Number of Targets 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 ≥ 7
0 9,491 29,496 267 36 5 5 3 3
1 14,218 64,770 677 121 56 19 8 3
2 167 1,188 25 3 0 0 0 0
3 35 248 9 2 0 0 0 0
4 7 87 2 1 0 0 0 0
5 3 30 0 0 0 2 0 0
6 2 19 0 0 0 0 1 0
≥ 7 6 41 0 1 0 0 0 0
Notes: each cell reports the number of deals completed between 2005 and 2010 that
saw involved a given number of Targets and Acquirers. Rows refer to different numbers
of Targets and columns to different numbers of Acquirers. The deals with unknown
Target and Acquirer cannot be used to reconstruct changes in the ownership structures
of the firms observed in ORBIS. The deals with unknown Acquirer cannot be used to
connect the Target to the structure of the new shareholder.
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Table 4.9: Size of Target Shares Involved in M&A Transactions
Acquirer’s Final Share Acquirer’s Initial Share
Year of
Deal Com-
pletion
Minority
Final
Share
Majority
Final
Share
Final
Share =
100%
Initial Share
6= 0%
Initial Share
< 10%
Initial Share
10% to 50%
Initial Share
> 50%
Initial Share
> 90%
2005 377 21,198 17,797 3,579 133 964 1,439 266
(1.75%) (98.25%) (83.75%) (18.14%) (0.7%) (5.05%) (7.52%) (1.39%)
2006 406 21,654 18,314 3,241 187 943 1,255 268
(1.84%) (98.16%) (84.14%) (16.15%) (.96%) (4.82%) (6.41%) (1.37%)
2007 498 24,280 20,190 3,883 267 1,104 1,654 444
(2.01%) (97.99%) (82.47%) (17.3%) (1.22%) (5.03%) (7.53%) (2.02%)
2008 458 24,073 19,394 5,066 290 1,156 2,510 800
(1.87%) (98.13%) (80.24%) (22.86%) (1.35%) (5.37%) (11.64%) (3.72%)
2009 430 20,545 16,043 5,249 385 1,060 2,235 914
(2.05%) (97.95%) (77.63%) (27.42%) (2.11%) (5.82%) (12.26%) (5.02%)
2010 245 14,936 11,985 3,338 243 697 1,404 541
(1.61%) (98.39%) (79.99%) (24.29%) (1.86%) (5.33%) (10.75%) (4.15%)
All Years 2,414 126,686 103,723 24,356 1,505 5,924 10,497 3,233
(1.87%) (98.13%) (81.47%) (20.77%) (1.33%) (5.22%) (9.25%) (2.85%)
Notes: each cell reports the number of transactions (completed during the year indicated in the first column) that involved
a particular share of the Target firm. Numbers in parenthesis give the percentage with respect to the total number of deals
completed during the year indicated in the first column. The first three columns refer to transactions that resulted in the acquirer
owning the minority, majority or full share of the target firm, respectively. Transactions where the acquirer has a minority final
share are assumed to be ineffective in terms of ownership structure changes. The last five columns of the table report the number
of transactions (completed during the year indicated in the first column) where the acquirer already owned some initial share of
the target. Transactions where the acquirer already controlled the majority share of the target are assumed to be ineffective in
terms of ownership structure changes.
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Table 4.10: Location of Acquirers and Targets
Country Name Target Firms Acquirer Firms
tgtcountryname Number
Percentage
of Total
Number
Percentage
of Total
United States of America 19,489 24.70 14,501 26.26
United Kingdom 10,187 12.91 6,604 11.96
Russian Federation 6,241 7.91 2,126 3.85
France 3,695 4.68 2,654 4.81
Canada 3,667 4.65 2,556 4.63
Germany 3,409 4.32 2,467 4.47
Netherlands 2,912 3.69 2,417 4.38
Spain 2,378 3.01 1,572 2.85
Sweden 1,765 2.24 1,251 2.27
Finland 1,752 2.22 1,244 2.25
Japan 1,677 2.13 1,488 2.69
Italy 1,483 1.88 956 1.73
Australia 1,361 1.73 1,248 2.26
Norway 1,306 1.66 919 1.66
Belgium 1,089 1.38 694 1.26
Switzerland 948 1.20 862 1.56
Ukraine 906 1.15 276 0.50
Denmark 896 1.14 680 1.23
China 797 1.01 800 1.45
Poland 759 0.96 422 0.76
Brazil 702 0.89 392 0.71
India 662 0.84 766 1.39
Estonia 526 0.67 383 0.69
Austria 519 0.66 472 0.85
Singapore 457 0.58 557 1.01
Malaysia 454 0.58 787 1.43
Czech Republic 436 0.55 175 0.32
Ireland 425 0.54 285 0.52
South Africa 423 0.54 356 0.64
Korea, Republic of 411 0.52 426 0.77
Romania 409 0.52 159 0.29
Portugal 329 0.42 213 0.39
Bulgaria 292 0.37 117 0.21
Greece 282 0.36 205 0.37
Mexico 240 0.30 127 0.23
Argentina 237 0.30 109 0.20
Hungary 228 0.29 97 0.18
Serbia 226 0.29 59 0.11
Chile 212 0.27 141 0.26
Lithuania 177 0.22 85 0.15
Bermuda 175 0.22 154 0.28
Latvia 161 0.20 68 0.12
Colombia 158 0.20 104 0.19
Thailand 153 0.19 108 0.20
New Zealand 150 0.19 139 0.25
Taiwan 140 0.18 239 0.43
Hong Kong 136 0.17 138 0.25
Cayman Islands 134 0.17 128 0.23
Israel 125 0.16 149 0.27
Croatia 121 0.15 69 0.12
Cyprus 107 0.14 151 0.27
Slovakia 105 0.13 45 0.08
Egypt 104 0.13 53 0.10
Turkey 101 0.13 59 0.11
Peru 95 0.12 35 0.06
Luxembourg 93 0.12 129 0.23
Philippines 85 0.11 84 0.15
Nigeria 80 0.10 45 0.08
Indonesia 77 0.10 43 0.08
Iceland 72 0.09 80 0.14
Slovenia 70 0.09 71 0.13
Bosnia and Herzegovina 60 0.08 18 0.03
British Virgin Islands 58 0.07 132 0.24
United Arab Emirates 58 0.07 66 0.12
Other Countries 892 1.13 557 1.01
Unknown Countries 123 0.16 146 0.26
Total 78,889 55,215
Note: the country of a firm corresponds to the country where the firm is legally
registered. Th table shows only the countries that have at least 50 parent firms,
irrespective of the type.
4.5. Tables and Figures 133
ection
Part I
Annexes
134
- Appendix A -
Chapter 2: Equilibrium Conditions
The Equilibrium of the model presented in the paper is closed by the productivity cutoff
(mkEA)
1−η, the Free Entry Condition, the balance of the Government Budget Constraint
and the Price Index.
Free Entry Condition: before drawing their productivity type, firms will have to
make a decision on paying the sunk cost (fs) to discover how productive they will actu-
ally be in the domestic and foreign market. To close the model a free entry condition
guarantees that firms will enter the market until their expected profit, net of the sunk
cost, is zero. This implies
∫ ∞
0
piD dG(m) +
∑
k
(∫ ∞
mkEA
pik,E dG(m) +
∫ mkEA
0
pik,A dG(m)
)
= fs (A.1)
which, denoting
∫ m0
0
m1−ηdG(m) = V (m0), can be rewritten as
(1− t) A
wη−1
V (m) +
∑
k
(
(1− t) Ak
(wτk)η−1
(
V (m)− V (mjEA)
)
+ (1− tk − T ) Ak
wη−1k
V (mkEA)−
(
(1− tk − T )fkA + (1− tk)p¯ik
)
Fm(m
k
EA)
)
= fs (A.2)
Government Budget Constrain: the government of the Home country collects
taxes t on profit realised by domestic production of all firms located within its border,
and in addition it will collect taxes T from repatriation of the profits realised by the
foreign subsidiaries acquired by those domestic firms with productivity above the cutoff
level mEA. The total tax revenue is then redistributed to individuals as a public good g,
so the Government Budget constrain is
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g = t
A
w
V (m) +
∑
k
(
t
Ak
wτk
(
V (m)− V (mkEA)
)
+ T
(
Ak
wk
V (mkEA)− fkAFm(mkEA)
))
(A.3)
under the assumption that individuals have a linear utility from consumption of the public
good, U(g) = g, the Home country welfare will be given by W = W (P,w, I) + g
Prices: the Price Index in the Home country, P , is a weighted average of the price set
by all firms that sell the differentiated good, each firm in its own variety. This includes
all prices set by firms that serve the domestic demand, and by firms that serve the foreign
demand through exports, along with the prices set by the domestic firms that acquire
foreign subsidiaries to serve the foreign demand, which is
P 1−η =
∫ ∞
0
p(ω)1−η dG(m) +
∑
k
(∫ ∞
mkEA
p(ω)1−η dG(m) +
∫ mkEA
0
p(ω)1−η dG(m)
)
(A.4)
P 1−η =
1
wα1−η
V (m) +
∑
k
(
1
wτkα1−η
(
V (m)− V (mkEA)
)
+
1
wkα1−η
V (mkEA)
)
Helpman et al. (2003) show the analytical solution to the equilibrium for the special
case where all countries are symmetric, and the labour endowment is not too different
across countries. In that case the system of conditions presented here is simplified by
the fact that wages are equalised to 1, the transport cost and the acquisition fixed cost
are constant across countries, so τij = τ and f
j
A = fA and as a consequence the markup
adjusted demand, A, and the productivity cutoff level, mEA, are also constant across
countries.
- Appendix B -
Chapter 2 - Average Partial Effects (APE) of
Dynamic Probit Model
Given
yi,s = 1[γyi,s−1 + β′xi,s + ci + i,s > 0]
ci|yi0, zi ∼ N(φ0 + φ1yi0 + φ′zi;σ2a)
i,s|xi,s, zi ∼ N(0, I)
Wooldridge (2005) propose a simple procedure to estimate the Average Partial Effect
(APE) of a given explanatory variable. He suggests to obtain this estimate by starting
from the Average Structural Function (ASF), which is the expectation of a mean function
w.r.t. the ci . So defining
ASF (yi,s−1,xi,s) = Ec[Φ(γyi,s−1 + β′xi,s + ci)] (B.1)
and using the distributional assumption made on ci, can write
Eyi0,zi [Φ(γyi,s−1 + β
′xi,s + φ0 + φ1yi0 + φ′zi + ai)] =
Eyi0,zi
[
Φ
(
γyi,s−1 + β′xi,s + φ0 + φ1yi0 + φ′zi
(1 + σ2a)
1/2
)]
(B.2)
A consistent estimator for (B.2) is
ÂSF (yi,s−1,xi,s) = N−1
N∑
i=1
Φ
(
γˆayi,s−1 + βˆ′axi,s + φˆ0a+ φˆ1ayi0 + φˆ
′
azi
)
(B.3)
(where the subscript a indicates that an estimated parameter has been scaled by (1 +
σˆ2a)
−1/2). To obtain the APE w.r.t. a continuous variable it is only necessary to take the
derivative of (B.3) with respect to the continuous variable of interest. Whereas for the
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APE w.r.t. a discrete variable, such as yi,s−1 it is necessary to look at the discrete change
in Equation (B.3).
In the analysis presented in this paper particular attention is given to modelling the
effect of firms heterogeneity on the probability of an expansion. In fact, in the main model
specification the continuous corporate tax variable and the lagged dependent variable are
interacted with the dummies identifying the original firms “type” (multinational or do-
mestic, with standalone as reference group). This allows the estimated effect of the main
variables to have heterogeneous mean. The presence of these interactions has to be taken
into account when estimating the APEs. The issue with this particular specification is
that to evaluate the function at the sample mean, like in the illustrated general case,
corresponds to average also the binary indicators for the firm’s type. Which would make
interpretation and inference of the derived APEs ambiguous. Instead, the interest lies on
deriving the APEs for each specific firm’s type. This is not done by forcing the firm’s
type indicators to 1 and estimating the APE on the full sample of firms, but rather by
estimating the APE for the subgroup of firms with common type only.
The APE standard error can be obtained with panel data bootstrap when, like in this
case, N is large and T is not. Alternatively, they can be derived using the delta method.
Using both procedures, it was found that the results were extremely similar whenever the
bootstrap was set on 100 or more draws. The standard error shown in the table are those
obtained through the delta method (as estimated by NLOGIT5).
- Appendix C -
Chapter 3 - Marginal Effects and Elasticities in
Multinomial and Mixed (Random Parameter) Logit
Models
The model specification for the latent surplus derived from a particular choice of a target
company in countryj(= 1, . . . , J) by acquirer i is given by
Sij = β
′
jzi + γxj + εij (C.1)
where zi is a vector of choice invariant (company) characteristics. For ease of expo-
sition, we assume that there is only one alternative specific variable x, say the target
country specific tax rate. The company is assumed to make the choice which gives the
largest surplus.
Multinomial Logit Model
Marginal Effect of a change in location j specific variable xj (the target country j’ s tax
rate), on the probability of a particular choice of a target company in the same country
j is
∂pij
∂xj
=
∂
∂xj
[
exp{β ′jzi + γxj}∑J
k=1 exp{β ′kzi + γxk}
]
= pij(1− pij)γ (C.2)
where,
pij ≡ Prob(j is chosen ) =
exp{β ′jzi + γxj}∑J
k=1 exp{β ′kzi + γxk}
(C.3)
The corresponding elasticity is given by
∂ log pij
∂ log xj
= (1− pij)xjγ (C.4)
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Similarly, it is easy to show that the cross marginal effect with respect to another
location m’ s tax rate is
∂pij
∂xm
=
∂
∂xm
[
exp{β ′jzi + γxm}∑J
k=1 exp{β ′kzi + γxk}
]
= −pijpimγ (C.5)
And the corresponding elasticity is given by
∂ log pij
∂ log xm
= −pimxmγ (C.6)
Note, the elasticity in (C.6) does not depend on j.
We see from the above that a change in the tax rate at a particular target location will
have an effect on not just the probability of choosing that location but the probability of
choosing all other locations too.
Random Parameter Logit (RPL) or Mixed Logit Model
Instead of assuming that γ is fixed in (C.1), we now assume that every company in our
sample has its own γ and write this as
γi = γ
′wi + σui where ui ∼ iid N(0, 1) (C.7)
i.e. γi ∼ iid N(γ′wi, σ2). This model collapses to the earlier one when σ = 0.
Substituting (C.7) into (C.1), we get
Sij = β
′
jzi + (γ
′wi + σui)xj + (σxjui + εij) (C.8)
Estimation of company specific effect γi
ui in (C.8) is an unobserved company specific random variable. Then, by Bayes
theorem, the density of ui given data
f(ui|data) = f(ui|choices) = f(choices|ui)f(ui)
f(choices)
Thus,
E(ui|choices) =
∫
uf(u|choices)du =
∫
uf(choices|u)f(u)du
f(choices)
(C.9)
f(choices|u) is the conditional likelihood which appears in the likelihood function prior
to marginalisation, and f(choices) is the marginal likelihood which are obtained during
the maximisation. f(u) is the standard normal density by assumption in our model. The
estimated E(ui|choices) is known as the Bayesian shrinkage estimator.
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Marginal effects and Elasticities
The conditional marginal effects and elasticities in this model will be given by equations
(C.2)-(C.6). In order to obtain the unconditional marginal effects and elasticities, one
has to marginalise this with respect to the distribution of the coefficients (i.e the random
error u here), which again requires simulations to approximate the integral as discussed
above.
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